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THE STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
WON KIDANE

I. INTRODUCTION
The resort to and conduct of warfare has a long history of regulation. The set
of rules commonly known as the jus ad bellum provide the legal limits to the
commencement of warfare.2 The set of rules known as the jus in bello set forth the
legal limits to its conduct.3 The latter set of rules properly identifies all of the

* Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. An earlier version of this article was
presented at a faculty workshop at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law. I would like to thank
members of the faculty for their thoughtful suggestions. In particular, I would like to thank Professors
Stephen Ross and Tiya Maluwa for their written comments. I would also like to thank my former
colleague, a former co-author and friend, Thomas R. Snider of the law firm of Wilmer Hale, for his
thorough review of the manuscript and valuable suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Darren
Thomason and Ms. Junsen Ohno for their able research, editorial, bluebooking, and formatting help.
1. A very good example of an ancient Western tradition of some sense of justice in war is the
Roman general Scipio Africanus' equation of the talents of a great army general with that of a surgeon
who operates on a human body with due care not to cause an unnecessary injury. See STEPHEN C.
NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 21 (2005) [hereinafter NEFF]. A very good example of an
ancient non-Western tradition is contained in the Confucian Classic, The Book of Changes - I Ching,
Shih- The Army, http://www.cfcl.com/ching/P/07.20.shtml.
Long before the emergence of the traditional international legal theories of the nineteenth century, there
were serious discourses relating to the relevance of law to war. While some had dismissed law's
relevance to war entirely, others maintained its relevance at least in the sense of ethics, justice, and
religious values. Von Moltke and Clausewitz may be cited as examples of those who had dismissed the
law's relevance to war. See DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 46 (1954) [hereinafter KENNEDY].
Catholic thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), Francisco Suirez (1584-1617), and the
Protestant thinkers such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), may be cited
as those who have advocated the law's relevance to war in different forms. See id. at 48. For Professor
Kennedy's discussion of the works of the latter thinkers, see generally David Kennedy, Primitive Legal
Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986). See also, HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI
TRES, VOL. II 470 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (discussing the obligation of authors of war to
provide restitution).
2. In its current form, the jus ad bellum is essentially based on Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, ch. VII. See also George Aldrich, The
Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (2000), and FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 84, 170 (International Committee of the Red Cross 2001)
(1987).
3. Jus in bello rules of most current importance are contained in the Four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva
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parties involved in hostilities and defines their rights and responsibilities.4 In
contemporary usage, the latter set of rules is commonly referred to as International
Humanitarian Law (fIL).5 Although IHL is not premised on the recognition that
war is inevitable, 6 it seeks to mitigate the tragic consequences through regulations
whenever and wherever it occurs.' The difficult equilibrium that it seeks to
maintain is between military necessity and humanity. As early as 1868, one of the
landmark declarations known as the St. Petersburg Declaration neatly put the
difficult equation as "the technical limits at which the necessity of war ought to
yield to the requirements of humanity."9
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV], and the Two Additional Protocols of 1977
(Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II], and Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 67-84 (3rd ed. 2004) [hereinafter ROBERTS & GUELFF])).
4. It must, however, be noted that there are some overlaps between the jus ad bellum and jus in
bello rules at different levels. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 1-2.
5. The origin of this term is relatively recent and is not contained in the Geneva Conventions of
1949; however, it is currently used in relation to these Conventions and the Additional Protocols of
1977. See Christopher J. Greenwood, HistoricalDevelopment and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1-15 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter FLECK].
"International Humanitarian Law comprises all those rules of international law which are designed to
regulate the treatment of the individual - civilian or military, wounded or active - in international
armed conflicts." Id. at 11. See also, ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the origins
and current usage of the term).
6. John Carey, Introduction to the Three-Volume Work, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW: ORIGINS xi-xii (John Carey et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter INTERN4TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.
ORIGINS] (discussing that in its solemn appeal to the international community on the occasion of the
50th Anniversary of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) urged all nations to reject the notion that war is inevitable and asked them to make
profound efforts to eliminate the underlying causes); Int'l Review of the Red Cross, People on War Solemn Appeal, 459-60, ICRC No. 835 (Sept. 30, 1999), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jq2r?opendocument.
7. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

ARMED CONFLICT 20-26 (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEIN]. Some proponents of the complete abolition of
armed forces and peaceful resolution of all conflicts suggest that an attempt to regulate warfare may
prejudice its complete abolition. See, e.g., ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 28 (suggesting that
"the need to mitigate the worst effects of armed conflict, by upholding the idea that there are standards
of civilization by which conduct can be judged, remains. The legal regime embodying these standards
is by no means prejudicial to various proposals to limit the use of force, and may even contribute to the
achievement of broader ideas and objectives referred to above.").
8. DINSTEIN, supranote 7, at 16.
9. Id. at 17, explaining that:
[i]f military necessity were to prevail completely, no limitation of any kind would
have been imposed on the freedom of action of belligerent States: a la guerre
comme a la guerre. Conversely, if benevolent humanitarianism were the only
beacon to guide the path of armed forces, war would have entailed no bloodshed,
no destruction and no human suffering; in short war would not have been war.
Dinstein concludes by saying that Humanitarian Law essentially takes the middle
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The fundamental approach designed to attain a principled equilibrium
between military necessity and humanity is the definition of the status of each and
every party and individual involved and affected by warfare. The laws that
regulated warfare prior to the Second World War focused on the protection of
persons who had already fallen victim to warfare and rendered harmless, including
the wounded, the captive, and the interned.10 As the nature and magnitude of
warfare changed, the scope of its reach obviously widened."
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on
Geneva Convention IV notes that the legal norms that regulated warfare prior to
1945 "had only applied to the armed forces, a well-defined category of persons,
placed under the authority of responsible officers and subject to strict discipline"
but then it became necessary "to include an unorganized mass of civilians scattered
over the whole of the countries concerned."1 2 That essentially led to the adoption
of the Geneva Convention IV, which protects civilians in times of war. 13 The
Convention identifies each individual involved in and affected by warfare and
defines the scope of protection.14
In the summary of rationales section of their introduction to Documents on
the Laws of War, professors Roberts and Guelff point out that one of the two most
important rationales of the laws of war is that "[a]rmed hostilities should as far as
possible be between organized armed forces, not entire societies: hence the efforts
to maintain a 'firebreak' distinguishing legitimate military targets from civilian
objects and people not involved in armed hostilities." 15
It follows that the major distinction that the law makes is between combatants
and non-combatants or civilians. 16 This distinction is extremely important because
it determines the most important issue of who may kill or injure another human
being during combat without fear of prosecution.17 To this effect, article 43 of
Additional Protocol II provides that"[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to a
conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the
Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities." 18 No other person is ordinarily entitled to a combatant
status. If a person who does not have a combatant status gets involved in
hostilities, he not only loses protection as a civilian but may also be prosecuted for
any actions, including for killing an enemy solider. 19 Others claiming civilian

ground. Id. at 16-17.
10. See JEAN S. PICTET (ED.), ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949 RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 5 (1958).

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. See also generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 4 (defining protected persons).
ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 27.
See FLECK, supra note 5, at 79-117 (discussing combatants and non-combatants).
See DINSTEIN, supranote 7, at 29-31.
See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 43(2).
Id. at art. 45. See also FLECK, supranote 5, at 83.
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status who may be prosecuted include mercenaries, 20 Spies, 21 and other kinds of
unlawful combatants.22
In the post-Cold War era, the legal regulation of armed conflict has been
complicated by the advent of a remarkable new player: the privatized military
industry. 23 This multi-billion dollar industry drew its strength from providing
efficient services to sovereign governments.24 Today, private military contractors
operate from "Albania to Zambia" and perform anything from transporting food
and medicine to designing precision weaponry and performing outright combat
duties. 2 5 Their clients range from brutal dictators to democratic governments and
humanitarian agencies. 26 Because IHL took its current shape and form prior to and
during the Cold War, the new players were not a significant part of the equation.
As such, the status of today's private military contractors is ambiguous at best. 27
The debate over the desirability of engaging private military contracts in
activities traditionally performed by uniformed military personnel raises complex
20. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47. ("A mercenary shall not have the right to be a
combatant or a prisoner of war."). This topic is discussed more fully in relation to civilian military
contractors in Part IV infra.
21. Id. at art. 46 (stating that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or this
Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and
may be treated as a spy"). See infra Parts III, IV.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY 8 (2003) [hereinafter CORPORATE WARRIORS].
24. No precise current date is available; however, older data suggests that from 1994 to 2002, the
Department of Defense of the United States entered into 3,000 contracts with private military contracts,
the value of which is estimated at about $300 billion. See id. at 15 (citing INT'L CONSORTIUM OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, MAKING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF WAR (2002)). The contracted out
duties included the maintenance and administration of B-2 bombers, the F-117 fighters, and several
surface warfare ships. Id. Obviously, the number has since increased dramatically because of the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the ratio of private contractors to uniformed military
personnel now is ten times more than the ratio during the Gulf War of 1991. P.W. Singer, War, Profits
and the Vacuum of Law: PrivatizedMilitary Firms and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 521, 522-23 (2004) [hereinafter War, Profits and the Vacuum ofLaw].
25. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 9.
26. Id. For example, the now defunct South African based military private contractor, Executive
Outcomes (EO), had provided combat serves to various factions in different African countries,
including in Sierra Leone and Angola, where its role was considered outcome-determinative. See it. at
4, 9. Although the United Nations has not yet involved private military contracts in peacekeeping
missions, proposals have surfaced from time to time. See e.g., U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation, 2001-02, H.C. 577, at 18 (cited in Laura A.
Dickinson, Public Law Values in a PrivatizedWorld, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 394 (2006) [hereinafter
Public Law Values in a Privatized World]). See also Peter H. Gantz, Refugee International, The
Private Sector's Role in Peacekeepingand Peace Enforcement, Global Pol'y F., Nov. 18, 2003 (cited in
id.).
27. In this article, the term "private military contractors" is used to limit the discussion to only a
segment of the wider private military industry with a recognizable role in armed conflict situations.
This limitation is important because the industry is otherwise extremely broad. In the words of Dr.
Singer, the industry is so broad that "many Americans unknowingly own slices of the industry in their
401(k) stock portfolio." War, Profits and the Vacuum ofLaw, supra note 24, at 522.
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legal, political, and socio-economic issues and is outside the scope of this article.
This article, however, attempts to characterize the status of civilian military
contractors under IHL, which has traditionally governed the conduct of armed
conflict where the status of all parties to the conflict is clearly defined, and identify
appropriate IHL standards that could be used for the regulation of civilian military
contractors. Professor David Kennedy makes an interesting observation when he
notes that "[i]n broader terms, modem war reflects modem political life. In large
measure, our modem politics is legal politics: the terms of engagement are legal,
and the players are legal institutions, their powers expanded and limited by law." 28
Accordingly, this article argues and properly assumes that the most pertinent body
of law is IHL because the very existence of the private military industry is
inextricably linked to the existence of the threat and use of military force; in other
words, the existence of war. It further contends, therefore, that identification of the
exact legal status under IHL of all the players is an essential step in understanding
and regulating their future role.
Because event driven scholarship often tends to focus on the specifics of the
given event, the legal literature that followed the news of the involvement of
private military contractors in the abuses that occurred in the Iraqi prisons,
particularly at Abu Ghraib, almost exclusively focused on ways and means of
holding them immediately accountable for their role in the reported abuses.29 Little
effort seems to have been made to assess their general status under IHL. Such
assessment is useful for several important reasons. Primarily, it identifies the gaps
in the existing law, not only as it pertains to their accountability, but also as it
relates to their own protection and the responsibilities of the states which host them
and use their services. Secondly, it offers an important guidance as to how to
supplement the gap and provide for their regulation. Thirdly, it helps to
reemphasize the notion that the principal theoretical foundation for the discourses
pertaining to the regulation of this particular industry must begin with IHL
standards.
With this view, this article is divided into five parts. Part II provides a
historical background on the legal limitations in warfare, and the monopoly of the
use of coercive force by states to the exclusion of all other types of entities,
including organized private forces. It also highlights the perceived necessity and
philosophical underpinnings of the monopoly of the use of force by the state. Part
III discusses the concept of lawful combatancy, and offers an analysis of the
28. See KENNEDY, supranote 1, at 13.
29. The seminal work that dealt with the issue of private military contractors following these
events was SINGER, supranote 23; see also, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Governmentfor Hire: Privatizing
ForeignAffairs and the Problem of Accountability under InternationalLaw, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
135, 142 (2005) [hereinafter Government for Hire] (advocating a contracts based accountability
approach); Public Law Values in a PrivatizedWorld, supra note 26, at 389 (advocating similarly for a
contracts based accountability approach); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing
Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REv. 989
(2005); Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-MartialJurisdiction
over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367 (2006) (advocating a courtsmartial jurisdiction for civilian contractor misconduct) [hereinafter Peters].
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definition of the status of each and every party involved and affected by armed
conflict and sets the stage for the discussion of the status of today's private military
contractors. Part IV highlights the nature and functions of the private military
contracts and attempts to define their status under IHL based on the discussion in
Part III of the various possible statuses. To put their status into perspective, it
provides a detailed discussion of the various functions they perform in a legal
continuum, and suggests an IHL based theoretical framework for the regulation of
their operations. Part V concludes the article.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITATIONS IN WARFARE AND MONOPOLY OF THE USE

OF FORCE BY NATION-STATES

Part II provides a brief description of the historical and philosophical
underpinnings of limitations in warfare, and the notion, perceived necessarily, and
development of the monopoly of all instruments of coercion by the state.
A. Limitations in Warfare
Military historian J.F.C. Fuller notes that "[p]rimitive tribes are armed hordes,
in which every man is a warrior, and because the entire tribe engages in war,
warfare is total."30 He further notes that the objective of war was not only to defeat
the armed forces of the opposing tribes but to overturn their entire social
structure.3 In situations where every man is a warrior, and the objective is to
overturn the entire structure of the society, it is difficult to imagine the
applicability of recognizable limits to warfare. Writing in the context of the
historical development of state responsibility, Professor Brownlie noted that
"[t]racing the origins of legal concepts and institutions can be an artificial and
practically fruitless endeavor."3 2 Indeed, pinpointing to a particular historic
juncture during which states raised armies and monopolized all types of coercive
force to the exclusion of all other entities and began to abide by certain rules of
war could be very difficult.
In fact, perspectives seem to differ on whether limitations of humanity have
always characterized human conflict. For example, Professor Stephen Neff
suggests that war seems to have always been understood "as an exercise more in
skill and craftsmanship than blind anger or emotion."33 To support his position, he
quotes from Proverbs:
Wisdom prevails over strength,

Knowledge over brute force;
For wars are won by skilful strategy, and
34
victory is the fruit of long planning.

30. J.F.C. FULLER, THE CONDUCT OF WAR, 1789-1961 31 (1961), quoted in PETER MAGUIRE,
LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 38 (2000) [hereinafter MAGUIRE].
3 1. Id.
32. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I1 (1983).
33. NEFF, supranote 1, at 20.
34. Id. at 21 (quoting 24 Proverbs 5-6).
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He further notes that in Greek mythology, the goddess Athena symbolized not
only bravery but also knowledge, wisdom, and skill.35 Professor Neff also seeks
support from the ancient Chinese Confucian tradition of fair play in war.
According to this tradition, exploiting the weaknesses of the enemy was viewed as
dishonorable, and because of that, for example, the days and places of battle were
commonly fixed.36
Howard Levie takes a completely opposite point of view. He begins his thesis
with the following remark:
For many millennia there was no such thing as humanity in land
warfare. From the caveman to Biblical times, and for centuries
thereafter, the winner in battle took from the loser not only his life, but
also all of his available belongings, including women, children,
domestic animals, and personal property. 37
To support this conclusion, he cites to the following Biblical verse:
They made war on Midian as the Lord had commanded Moses, and slew
all men. In addition to those slain in battle, they killed the kings of
Midian - Evi, Rekem, Zur, Hur and Reba, the five kings of Midian and they put to death also Balaam, son of Beor. The Israelites took
captive the Midianite women and their dependents, and carried off their
beasts, their flocks, and their property. They burnt all their cities, in
which they had settled, and all their encampments. They took all the
spoil and plunder, both man and beast.38
Professor Peter Maguire takes a somewhat middle ground and asserts that, at
least in the European and American historical perspective, the rules of engagement
seem to have depended on the nature of the enemy. He begins his inquiry by
noting that "what is often overlooked is that the gentlemanly rules of war outlined
by both Christian scholars and the Heralds applied only to warriors of the same
race and class. When invasive 'others' like Norsemen and Muslims descended on
early European states, the only law of war was survival."3 9
In the American historical context, Professor Maguire cites historian Fredrick
Jackson Turner as saying that the first era of the formation of the United States
35. Id. at 20-21. Most scholarly inquiries regarding the origins of limitations in warfare began
from the ancient Greek and Roman times because historical evidence seems to suggest that the Greeks
and the Romans respected certain humanitarian principles, which later became the foundations of the
modem conception of the laws governing warfare. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 3 (citing
COLMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME, Vol.

11166-384 (1911)).
36. NEFF, supranote 1, at 22.
37. Howard S. Levie, Humanitarian Law and the Law of War on Land, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 181.
38. Id. (quoting Numbers 31:7-11). Professor Levie also quotes verses from the Koran for an
exception: "When you meet in battle those who have disbelieved, smite their necks, and after the
slaughter tighten fast the bonds, until the war lays aside its burdens. Then either release them as a
favor, or in returnfor ransom." Id. (quoting Surah xlvii T 4 (M.Z. Kahn trans., 1971)).
39. MAGUIRE, supranote 30, at 19.
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required "determination and brutality" to clear and pacify the western frontiers.40
He further notes that "[b]efore there were 'war criminals,' there were 'barbarians,'
'heathens,' and 'savages,' who did not qualify as equals in the arena of 'civilized
warfare."' 41 He further notes that the founding fathers of the United States always
considered the American Indians barbarians. He cites President John Adams's
description of the Indian warfare of 1775: "The Indians are known to conduct their
Wars so entirely without Faith and Humanity, that it will bring eternal infamy . . ..
To let loose these blood Hounds to scalp Men and butcher Women and Children is
horrid."4 2 He concludes that this perception justified the lack of any traditional
European restraints to the means and methods of warfare vis-A-vis the indigenous
people. 43 He contrasts this with the treatment of armed forces of the Confederacy
during the American Civil War. He notes that although the Federal Government
"did not consider the Rebel Army lawful combatants .

.

. they were not 'others'

who stood outside the circle and so not considered barbaric. This distinction was
reserved for racial and cultural others who flouted the military customs of the
West. The Confederates were both white and American." 44
Although perspectives differ, it is clear that some concepts of restraint in
warfare and humanitarianism had earlier historical origins rooted in theological
and classical philosophical precepts. 45 The convergence of customs and the
attainment of general consensus on some fundamental principles of humanitarian
rules of warfare are phenomena that took a long time to crystallize.46 Indeed, it
was not until the nineteenth century that codifications of what might be considered
customary rules of warfare began.47 But then, the last century saw marked
advancement in the refinement and codification of customary norms of
humanitarian law.48 Currently, humanitarian law stands as one of the most highly
systematized and crystallized bodies of international law.

40. Id. at 20.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id at 37. It is important to note that this does not mean that existing European norms of
restraint in warfare were respected in significant measure during the Civil War. Professor Maguire
gives many examples which suggest otherwise. For example, he quotes George Nicolas, General
Sherman's aide-de-camp as saying: "the only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict ...
is to make it terrible beyond endurance." Id. at 38 (quoting J.F.C. FULLER, THE CONDUCT OF WAR
1789-1961 109 (1961)). General Sherman himself said: "war is cruelty and you cannot refine it." Id.
Describing General Sherman's march on Atlanta, historian J.F.C. Fuller said: "Nothing like this march
had been seen in the West since the maraudings of Tilly and Wallenstien in the Thirty Years War ....
Terror was the basic factor in Sherman's policy, he openly says so." Id. at 39 (quoting J.F.C. FULLER,
DECIsIvE BATTLE OF THE U.S.A. 305-08 (1993)).
45. See Christopher Greenwood, HistoricalDevelopment and Legal Basis, in FLECK, supranote 5,
at 12.
46. Id.
47. Id.
4 8. Id.
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B. Monopoly of the Use of Force by Organizedand DisciplinedArmed Forces of
the State
Today the world is seemingly organized into territorial unities under
sovereign entities. Although the political landscape is far more complicated than
this simple assertion,49 presumably, these sovereign entities command their own
armies and protect their own territorial integrity. Although different historic eras
saw different forms and shapes of the exercise of sovereign authority, the
underlying notion of the monopoly of the means of coercion by sovereign entities
of some sort is not a recent phenomenon.o Organized and disciplined militaries
existed as far back as the Greek and Roman times." Their organization was such
that some military offenses punishable by law today were also punishable under
the laws of the Greeks and the Romans.5 These offenses, for example, include
desertion, mutiny, violence to superiors, and the sale or misappropriation of arms.53
The punishment also included such familiar determinates as dishonorable
discharge.54

49. Commenting on the complexity of today's international political environment, Professor
David Kennedy said: "[T]he international political system today is a far more complex multilevel game
than the rows of equivalent national flags arrayed at U.N. headquarters would suggest. States and their
governments differ dramatically in powers, resources, and independence." KENNEDY, supra note 1, at
14.
50. P.W. Singer of the Brookings Institution provides a good historical background of the private
military industry in his seminal book, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 19-39. He argues that:
"In fact, the monopoly of the state over violence is the exception in world history, rather than the rule."
Id. at 19 (citing JANICE THOMSON, MERCENARIES (1994)). In conclusion, he quotes Jeffrey Herbst as

saying: "The private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international relations before the
twentieth century." Id. (quoting JEFFREY HERBST, THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FORCES, in
GREG MILLS

&

JOHN STREMLAU,

THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY IN AFRICA,

117 (1997)).

Recognizing the significant role that private military service providers have played in history, Singer's
assessment that states' monopoly of the use of force has been the exception seems to be an
overstatement. In fact, towards the end of the chapter on the history of private warriors (chapter two),
Singer, himself, provides what seems to be a balanced account of their role. He states:
At numerous stages in history, governments did not possess anything
approaching a monopoly on force. Instead, rulers were often highly reliant on the
supply of military services from business enterprises. Private actors, such as free
companies, contracted units, military entrepreneurs, and charter companies
played key roles in state-building and often served governmental interests. These
organizations also had the tendency to become powers unto themselves, however,
and often grew superior in power to local political institutions, particularly in
areas of weak governance. Id. at 39.
His final and reasoned conclusion on the history and its importance reads: "In sum, the line between
economies and warfare were never clear-cut. From a broad view, the state's monopoly of both
domestic and international force was a historic anomaly. Thus, in that future, we should not expect that
organized violence would only be located in the public realm." Id.
51. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 17 (1988) [hereinafter
WINTHROP].

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Although no written military codes of these times remain today, this constitutes a part of the
historic record. See id
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As a natural continuation of this, the Romans did not consider a non-state
entity as an enemy proper. Cicero, for example, pointed out that a true enemy of
Rome must be a recognizable state possessing the following characteristics: "a
Commonwealth, a Senate-house, a treasury, a consensus of likeminded citizens."
According to him, an enemy state must be distinguished from irregular entities
such as pirates and bandits.56 Any operation to eradicate the latter category was
thus viewed as a law enforcement task rather than the conduct of war. 7 A similar
suggestion is contained in the classical work of Ulpain. According to him, any
armed forces other than states against which Rome declared war, or the vice versa,
are just "robbers and bandits" who must be dealt with accordingly. 8 Cicero
further noted that irregular armed forces, such as bandits, did not have legal status
and unlike states, they neither acquired ownership title to any property they might
have captured nor did they possess any authority to enslave prisoners they might
have taken.59
Furthermore, states were not required to make deals or respect any truce made
with such irregular forces as opposed to other states.60 However, apparently some
such forces called the lactrociniaewere so powerful that military operations were
at times necessary to deal with them. 61 Practically, Rome had to take a middle
ground by conducting a limited military campaign against them. 62 That does not
seem to have changed their perceived legal status.
The legitimacy and moral superiority of the monopoly of the use of force by
states is a complex subject. St. Augustine's characterization of the Roman State as
a "magna latrociniae" might be cited as an example of the school of thought that
challenges the moral superiority of the state with respect to the use of force to the

exclusion of others.63
Nonetheless, the perception of sovereign and lawful authority as opposed to
unlawful irregular forces persisted throughout history. For example, written
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

NEFF, supranote 1, at 18 (quoting Cicero, Philippics,at 143).
Id.
See id. (citing Cicero, On Duties, at 141).
Id. (citing Justinian, Digest, at 49.15.24).
Id. (citing Cicero, On Duties, at 17-18, 141-45).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 19 (citing Cicero, On Duties, at 78, n. 1).
62. See id. Although the scale of these operations may not be characterized as the conduct of
war, it is suggested that it is also difficult to characterize them as acts of law enforcement because the
scale of operations did not allow the determination of the criminal guilt of everyone involved. See id.
(citing O.F. ROBINSON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ANCIENT ROME 28-29 (1995)). This phenomenon is
also of current jurisprudential importance because it pertains to a critical point of departure between the
applicability of the emergency provisions of international human rights law which suggests an
emergency situation, and the applicability of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which
suggests the existence of a state of armed conflict. For commentary on this issue, see generally,OREN
GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 326-64 (2006).
63. Patrick Giddy, Characterand Professionalism in the Context of Developing Countries- the
Example of Mercenaries, 4 ETHIQUE ET ECONOMIQUE/ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 9 (2006) [hereinafter

Giddy]. "Magna latrociniae" is translated as "a great band of robbers." Id.
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European codes of military conduct date as far back as the fifth century.64 In his
seminal treatise, William Winthrop states that existing military codes of
continental Europe have their origins in the French ordonnance of military law of
1378; the first German Kriegsartikel of 1487, and the celebrated 1532 penal code
of Emperor Charles V. 65
That is not to suggest that irregular armed forces such as mercenaries did not
play a significant role in shaping the history of the world. Machiavelli's discussion
of mercenaries and other irregular forces that he calls auxiliaries and mixed
soldiery in The Prince, is instructive on how involved they were in the political
and military environment of Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Europe.66
Although it seems that many legitimate authorities sought their assistance in
67
different forms, it is clear that they were a disfavored group of discrete entities.
Although it may not be representative of the general opinion that prevailed during
that time in Europe, Machiavelli suggests that relying on mercenaries for military
duties was utterly useless: 68
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are
either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant
before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of
God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the
attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.
The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field

than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to
die for you.69
The history of the British military's laws of proper conduct offers another

example of the importance historically attached to assignment of the responsibility
of the use of coercive force to an organized, disciplined, and accountable entity.
Published statutory military codes of Great Britain date as far back as 1689.70
Much older British laws of military discipline and conduct existed. These laws
took the form of specific directives or orders issued from the government to the
army.

71

64. These military laws were incorporated in what is called the Salic Code, originally compiled
by the Chiefs of the Salians during this period. See WINTHROP, supranote 51, at 17-18. This Code was
revised and improved by successive Frankish kings. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 18. William Winthrop also lists other notable laws of military discipline including the
Articles of War of the Netherlands of 1590, republished in 1705; the regulations of Louis XIV of 1651
and 1665; and the Penal code of 1768 of the Empress Maria Theresa. Id.
66. NICOL( MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

17-21 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,1952).
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
See id.at 18.
Id.
See WINTHROP, supra note 51, at 19.

71. Id. at 18. "They were commonly ordained directly by the King, by virtue of his royal
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One of the most important requirements of these laws has been the taking of
the oath of fidelity. For example, the Articles of War of James II issued in 1688
required every officer and other member of the army to take the following oath:
I, A.B., Do swear to be true and faithful to my Sovereign Lord King
JAMES, and to His Heirs and Lawful Successors; and to be Obedient in
all things to His General, Lieutenant General, or Commander in Chief of
His Forces, for the time being, And will behave myself obediently
towards my Superior Officers in all they shall command me for His
Majesty's Service .... I do likewise Swear, That I believe, That it is not
lawful upon any Pretence whatsoever, to take Arms against the King
and that I do Abhor that Traitorous Position of taking Arms by His
Authority against His Person, or against those that are Commissioned by
Him. So help me God.72

The oath of allegiance and fidelity to a sovereign entity remained at all times
relevant to military service. It would not be an overstatement to say that an oath is
perhaps one of the most important features that distinguishes a regular and
disciplined military force from all other types of forces.
The history of law of the United States military is directly and immediately
linked to the British military articles and codes briefly mentioned above. In fact,
the raising of the armed forces of the United States predated the Constitution of the
United States itself. It was on June 14, 1775, that the Continental Congress
"resolved" to raise a military force and set up a committee consisting of George
Washington and three other members to draft rules and regulations for the
administration of the armed forces so raised.73 The committee then drafted a
military code consisting of sixty-nine articles. This code fundamentally relied on
the same principles as the British army.74 William Winthrop makes an interesting
observation when he notes that the two opposing armies were in fact governed by a
similar set of military rules.
With the adoption of the United States Constitution, all preexisting military
laws became part of the constitutional system.76 The Constitution leaves no room
prerogative, and with the aid and counsel of his peers, especially of the High Constable and Earl
Marshall, official . . . viewed by some writers as the proper original of the court-martial in England."
Id. (citing FRANCIS GROSE, MILITARY ANTIQUITIES RESPECTING A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH ARMY 58
(1801)).
72. ARTICLE OF WAR OF JAMES II; RULES AND ARTICLES FOR THE BETTER GOVERNMENT OF HIS
MAJESTIES LAND FORCES IN PAY (1688), art. VI., reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 51, at 920-28
(emphasis in original). It is important to note that implicit in the contents of this oath is the notion that
only the sovereign can raise and maintain armed forces to the exclusion of all others.
73. See id. at 21 (quoting 1 Journals of Congress, 82). The other four members of the committee
were Philip Schuyler, Silas Deane, Thomas Cushing, and Joseph Hewes. Id.
74. The immediate precursor of this code was, however, the Massachusetts Articles, which is said
to be the first American Code of military conduct. Id.
75. Seeid.at22n.81.
76. See id. at 15. "The Constitution itself provides for military government as well as for civil
government.... There is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies, or the navy of the United
States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution."
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for doubt that only Congress could raise, maintain, and regulate armed forces.
The President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is responsible for
the "faithful" execution of the laws. 8 Commenting about the role of the military
following the American Civil War, Professor Peter Maguire wrote that"[a]bove all,
what the Civil War demonstrated was the military was no longer the praetorian
guard of the political elite. Instead, it was an instrument of democracy, and
democratic political leaders could not be content to win a limited military victory
and striking an advantageous diplomatic solution." 79 Similarly, contemporary
political scientist Samuel Huntington remarked that "[w]hile all professions are to
some extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the
state." 80
Given this historical background, the legal status of any other types of armed
forces is a matter that needs to be looked into very carefully.
III. LAWFUL COMBATANCY,

IDENTIFICATION OF THE

PARTIES,

AND

STATE

RESPONSIBILITY

Part III offers a detailed discussion of the various possible statuses that every
party involved in and affected by warfare may have in a continuum. It also
provides a description of the consequences attached to each legal status, including
individual and state responsibility. By so doing, it identifies the parameters by
which the status of private military contractors must be measured.
A. TheoreticalBackground ofLawful Combatancy
The philosophical underpinnings of lawful combatancy are perhaps more
complex than the legal prescriptions. In simple terms, a morally justifiable war, or
a just war as to which it is often referred, would require right intentions, legitimate
authority, and proportionate ends." Michael Brough notes that "if the war is
(quoting Chief Justice Chase, in Ex Parte Milligan 4 Wallace, 137).
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be
for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections
and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of
the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the
officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.
78. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2, & 3. The President's powers include the commissioning of
officers of the armed forces.
79. MAGUIRE, supra note 30, at 38.
80. CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 8 (quoting SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER
AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS 37 (1957)).

81. See Michael W. Brough, Dehumanizing the Enemy and the Moral Equality of Soldiers, in
MICHAEL W. BROUGH, JOHN W. LANGO, HARRY VAN DER LINDEN, RETHINKING THE JUST WAR

TRADITION 149, 162 (eds., 2007). Of course, this is a simplification of the deep philosophical inquiry
that dates as far back as the history of warfare itself. The fundamental assumption throughout history
remained to be that a legitimate authority may employ force in self-defense or for some legitimate
reason and use proportionate means to attain the objective. For a succinct summary of the early
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justified . . . then the soldiers must be allowed to kill. States must be allowed to
direct the killing. ... 82 Even if the decision by the state to go to war may not be
justified or is in violation of the jus ad bellum, from a philosophical perspective,
the soldiers who are ordered to kill may not lose their moral authority. In this
respect, Michael Walzer notes:
[T]he moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the
same: they are led to fight by their loyalty to their own states and by
their lawful obedience. They are most likely to believe that their wars
are just . . . . they are not criminals; they face one another as moral
equals. 83
There is no dispute that loyalty to one's own state, citizenship, and obedience
to the laws of the states are the important justifications for the soldiers' moral as
well as legal authority to defend his or her nation and kill on its behalf when the
circumstances so demand. It is this fundamental moral and legal authority that is
usually missing in profit-driven military enterprise. In relation to this notion,
Professor Patrick Giddy notes:
But killing is not proportional to the private ends of contractual
warriors, whatever these might be - say, supporting a middle-class
family: this end is not grave enough to justify killing. Killing is only a
proportionally appropriate act when military action for the just cause
(restoring justice and peace) has been embarked upon by the proper
authority, as a last resort with a reasonable chance of success.84
These historical and philosophical notions underpin the legal classification of
parties involved and contribute to the legitimate use of force. Professor David
Kennedy makes an important observation when he notes that the earlier thinkers
considered the law not only as an ethical limit on military power but also as a
license. This suggestion has an enduring relevance to IHL because it pertains to
the issue of lawful combatancy. In other words, it raises the question of who has
the license to kill another human being without fear of prosecution. Writing from
a moral and philosophical perspective, Pauline Kaurin notes:
medieval, the medieval, the early modem and contemporary paradigms of the just war doctrine, see
generally, William E. Murnion, A Postmodern View of Just War, in STEVEN P. LEE, INTERVENTION,
TERRORISM, AND TORTURE 23, 23-40 (2007) [hereinafter INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE].

82. Brough, supranote 81, at 163.
83. Brough, supra note 81, at 149 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (3d ed.
2000)). Michael Brough further notes that according to Grotius, less than half of the wars ever fought
were justified and according to the jus ad bellum. Accordingly, any randomly chosen war would be
without justification. But in any case, the soldiers who were recruited by their states to fight and kill
would be justified regardless of the justness of the war. See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF DEFENSE,
165-73 (2002), cited in id at 150. For a critique on Michael Walzer's, Just and Unjust Wars, see also,
David Duquette, From Rights to Realism: Incoherence, in Walzer's Conception of Jus in Bello, in
STEVEN P. LEE, INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE, supra note 81, at 41-57. See also Patrick
Hubbard, A Realist Response to Walzer's Just and Unjust War, in LEE, INTERVENTION, TERRORISM,
AND TORTURE, supra note 81, at 57-71 (2000).

84. See Giddy, supranote 63, at 13.
85. See KENNEDY, supranote 1, at 49.
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The clarity of the combatant / noncombatant distinction is crucial since
it preserves the essential moral difference between a soldier and a
murderer; the difference between doing one's duty and committing a
war crime; the difference between coming home in honor or coming
home in shame, with the attendant effects for both the soldier and
society. If this distinction cannot be rendered in a way that is practical
in the field, soldiers become murderers, committers of war crimes and
bearers of individual and collective shame. 86
The legal ramifications are even more serious. The following section
provides a detailed discussion of the legal status of the various parties involved and
affected by warfare and describes their rights and responsibilities. It is intended to
set the stage for the discussion of the particular status of the private military
contractors by showing the continuum of the various types of legal statuses under
IHL. Because private military contractors perform various types of activities, their
status would naturally depend on the types of activities they perform. The
discussion of an activity-based continuum of legal statuses in Part III provides the
standards against which the functions of the private military contractors should be
measured.
B. Overview ofLegal Statuses under InternationalHumanitarianLaw
In July 2002, fifteen-year old Omar Khadr allegedly threw a grenade and
killed Sergeant Christopher J. Speer of the U.S. military during a firefight in
southeastern Afghanistan. 7 He was later captured, held at Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba, and brought to justice.88 The fundamental legal question in his preliminary
hearing before a military commission set up by the U.S. military for this purpose89

86. Pauline Kaurin, When Less Is Not More: Expanding the Combatant/Noncombatant
Distinction,in BROUGH, ET AL., RETHINKING THE JUST WAR TRADITION, supranote 81, at 116.
87. See Josh White, ChargesAgainst GuantanamoDetainee Set for Trial DroppedOver Limit on
Law, WASH. POST, June 5, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2007/06/04/AR2007060400188.html[hereinafter White].
88. Id. at 1.
89. The constitutionality of military tribunals set up to try persons detained in relation to the
armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has remained a subject of great controversy. For a discussion
of constitutional issues relating to this matter, see generally, Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002). This
particular Military Commission was set up following the enactment of the Military Commission Act of
2006, Pub L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). Prior to the enactment of this law, several cases
challenged earlier attempts by the government to try detainees by ad hoc military tribunals. For
example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the government should provide a
meaningful opportunity for detainees to contest the factual allegations against them before a neutral
decision maker. The respondent in this case was a U.S. citizen. The Court suggested that a military
commission duly constituted by an act of Congress would be sufficient. See generally, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Thereafter, Congress enacted the Military Commission Act cited
above. Other cases that dealt with related jurisdictional issues include: Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.
426 (2004). Particularly relevant to the passage of the Military Commission Act was the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (requiring a congressional act for the
establishment of a military commission and suggesting minimum requirements of due process).
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was his combatant status. 90 The Military Commission suspended the charges
against him on the grounds that his combatant status merely states "enemy
combatant" while the Commission's jurisdiction only extends to the trial of
"unlawful enemy combatants." 91 Determination of whether he was a lawful or
unlawful combatant would essentially decide his fate, because if he had lawful
combatant status when he caused the death of Sergeant Speer, he would be
immune from prosecution.92 The following quote from Professor Dinstein's book
on the conduct of hostilities properly explains the essence of this assertion:

90. See White, supranote 87.
91. Id. The usage of the terms "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy combatant" has recently
been a source of some dispute primarily because of their inconsistent usage in the past in domestic and
international jurisprudence. Nowhere is the term "enemy combatant" defined. The term first appeared
in the U.S. domestic case of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). For a discussion of the history of this
case, see Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the
Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REv. 59 (1980). Quirin is a World War II case. In this case, eight
German-born men were apprehended while attempting to sabotage installations in the U.S. and brought
before a military commission. The Court held that their trial by a military commission was lawful. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45. The Court had to distinguish this World War II decision from its Civil War
decision of Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). In Milligan, the Court held that the use of military
tribunals is not appropriate where the courts are open and their processes unobstructed. More
particularly, the Court stated:
It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are occasions when
martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the
courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice
according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war
really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority,
thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power
is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can
have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for,
if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross
usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise oftheir jurisdiction. It is also confined to
the locality of actual war." Id. at 80-8 1.
The Quirin court distinguished this ruling. The major point of distinction that the Court made was that
in Quirin,the defendants were "enemy combatants," while in Milligan, they were U.S. citizens who
were alleged to have committed military-related crimes in peacetime. It is, however, clear from the
reading of the Quirin opinion that the Court used the term "enemy combatants" to mean "unlawful
combatants" because it characterized the defendants as not wearing uniforms, and secretly passing
across enemy lines in a time of war. See Quirin,317 U.S. at 31. Subsequent cases did not elaborate the
usage of terminologies in Quirin. As such, the usage of the terminologies became a subject of dispute
following the commencement of the current terrorism-related war in 2001. To clarify the uncertainty
relating to the usage of terms, the Military Commission Act of 2006 used the term "unlawful enemy
combatant" and defined it as one who is not a "lawful enemy combatant." See Military Commission
Act of 2006, supra note 89. The issue in the pending Omar Khadr case, which the Military
Commission suspended, centered exactly on the designation of the individual as an "enemy combatant"
as opposed to an "unlawful enemy combatant" by the military's status review tribunals. The
Commission deemed this distinction important because the Act limits the Commission's jurisdiction to
the trial of "unlawful combatants" and the defendant was not so designated by the military. See White,
supranote 87, at 2.
92. See White, supranote 87, at 2.
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At bottom, warfare by its very nature consist of a series of acts of
violence (like homicide, assault, battery and arson) ordinarily penalized
by the criminal codes of all countries. When a combatant, John Doe,

holds a rifle aims it at Richard Roe (a soldier belonging to the enemy's
armed forces) with the intent to kill, pulls the trigger, and causes
Richard Roe's death, what we have is a premeditated homicide fitting
the definition of murder in virtually all domestic penal codes. If, upon
being captured by the enemy, John Doe is not prosecuted for murder,
this is due to one reason only. LOIAC [Law of International Armed
Conflict, a body of International Humanitarian Law] provides John Doe
with a legal shield, protecting him from trial and punishment, by
conferring upon him the status of a prisoner of war. If John Doe acts
beyond the pale of a lawful combatancy, LOIAC removes the protective
shield. Thereby, it subjects John Doe to the full rigour of the enemy's
domestic legal system, and the ordinary penal sanctions provided by that
law will become applicable to him. 93
That is precisely why the Military Commission in the aforementioned Omar
Khadr case suspended the trial - so that the Commission could first determine
Khadr's legal status.
As indicated above, the most fundamental distinction that IHL makes is
between combatants and non-combatants. This distinction essentially defines the
legal status of all parties involved. It generally provides for their rights and
responsibilities.94 As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the distinction
between primary and secondary statuses that IHL assigns to persons involved in

situations of warfare. A primary status is a status that the particular individual
possesses as a matter of his or her assignment by his or her state as a combatant or
a non-combatant. 95 A secondary status is a status that arises out of the primary
status but attaches as a result of a change in circumstances. 96 For example, a
person with a primary combatant status would acquire a prisoner of war status in a
The prisoner of war status can then be
case of capture by the enemy state.
considered a secondary status that emanates from the primary status of being a
lawful combatant. With this noted, the following sections discuss the legal status
of persons involved in warfare in different capacities.
C. Combatants and Non-combatants/ Civilians
The general premise is contained in article 3 of the Hague Regulations. It
provides that "[t[he armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of
combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a

93. DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 31.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Non-Combatants,in FLECK, supra note 5, at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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right to be treated as prisoners of war." 98 Article 43 of Protocol I redefines the
same principle and provides more elaborate guidance. It states:
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible
to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an
adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than
medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third
Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to
participate directly in hostilities.
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed
law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other
Parties to the conflict.99
This definition articulates two fundamental principles. The first principle
requires a chain of command and subordination as necessary elements. Mainly
states,100 as subjects of international law, may lawfully raise and deploy armed
forces as their agents in their international relations.10 1 The second important
principle contained in this provision is that "non-combatants" may also be
considered as constituting the armed forces of a state.102 Members of the armed
forces that are classified as non-combatants are not authorized to take part in

98. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403
[hereinafter Hague II], reprintedin ROBERTS, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 3, at 73-

84. Article 1 of the Hague II provides for the qualifications of belligerents. It states:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: 1. To be commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; 2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance; 3. To carry arms openly; and 4. To conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In countries were
militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included
under the denomination 'army'.
Id. at art. 1.
99. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 43.
100. The application of IHL does not depend on the recognition of the government of the state in
question by the enemy. For example, Geneva Convention III makes it clear that armed forces of a
government that is not recognized by the enemy state must be accorded prisoner of war status provided
all the requirements of lawful combatancy are met. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art.
4(A)(3). See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 44. It is also important to note that this
provision may also apply to non-state actors as long as they have a recognizable chain of command and
discipline and meet the remaining requirements discussed more fully below.
101. See Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Non-Combatants,in FLECK, supranote 5, at 66.
102. Id.
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armed hostilities or combat activities.1 0 3 This category usually includes medical
and religious personnel. 104 Summarizing these principles, Professor Ipsen notes:
This means that only a party to a conflict which is a subject of
international law can have armed forces whose members are
combatants. This reflects the basic relation in international law between
the state (as a subject of international law), and its armed forces (as its
organ), and the members of armed forces (as combatants).0 5
Elaborating the principle further, Professor Ipsen notes that article 3 of
Protocol I makes it clear that as a matter of international legal definition, if a state
maintains armed forces, members of the armed forces would ipso facto acquire
combatant status. 106 As such, they would have the legal authority to directly take
part in hostilities. 10 He further notes that while the express exception is medical
and religious personnel, a state may also designate, by an internal act, other
members of the armed forces to be non-combatants.108 By so arguing, he refutes
an opposing argument, which suggests that a state possesses a broad authority to
classify members of its armed forces as combatants and non-combatants. 109 The
plain reading of the principle enshrined under article 3 paragraph 2 of Protocol I
clearly supports Professor Ipsen's contention that all members of the armed forces
of a state, except medical and religious personnel, are as a matter of principle
presumed to be combatants.110 However, a state may, by an internal act, designate
some of such members as non-combatants.n "[R]educed to a concise formula: a
member of the armed forces is a combatant by nature; the status of non-combatant
can only be granted to a member of the armed forces by an internal constitutive
legal act."1 12
It follows that persons possessing combatant status are immune from
prosecution for any lawful combat activity, which may include fighting, killing,
and causing destruction within the legal limits. 113 They will also be entitled to
prisoner of war status if captured by the enemy. 114 However, if persons who do not
possess combatant status take part in hostilities and cause the same type of injury
and damage as combatants, they are considered unlawful combatants and are
punishable as criminals. 15 Non-combatants or civilians11 6 who do not "take a
direct part in hostilities"1 17 are, however, entitled to protection.118
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Ipsen, supra note 5, at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
See id.at 66.
Id.
See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 43, para. 2.
See Ipsen, supra note 5, at 68.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.
Additional Protocol I, defines a civilian as:
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The primary objective of this distinction is to ensure that armed hostilities are
conducted only between disciplined armed forces of states, which presumably
respect the laws and customs of warfare. 119 Equally important is the fundamental
principle that seeks to identify civilians for protection. The lack of identification
of civilians in combat activities vitiates two fundamental assumptions of
humanitarian law. First of all, the identification is important because without
identification they can never be protected. Secondly, combatants who pose as
civilians mislead the enemy and take inappropriate advantage. For these reasons
identification remains extremely crucial. 120 For example, combatants may hide
among bushes to mislead the enemy but not among civilians for the same
purpose. 121 If they do so, they lose their privileges as combatants and may be
prosecuted for whatever conduct they perform and injury they make possible. 122
That is precisely why the law imposes punishment when those who are supposed
to be protected as civilians take part in hostilities or commit "acts harmful to the
enemy." 123 In fact, combatants are required to identify themselves as far as
possible by carrying arms openly, wearing uniforms, and carrying distinctive
emblems. 124 Although the practicability of all of these requirements may be
problematic, they make the importance attached to the identification process clear.
Although the principle seems straightforward, the identification of persons
who have a combatant status and those who take part in hostilities without having
such status may be problematic. The appropriate legal test is contained in article
51, paragraph 3 of Protocol I. It states that "[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."12 5 As soon as civilians take part in hostilities, not only are they not

1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of
persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention
and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian,
that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 2. The civilian population
comprises all persons who are civilians. 3. The presence within the civilian
population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does
not deprive the population of its civilian character.
Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 50.
117. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art 51(3).
118. The protection of civilians during armed conflict is perhaps the most fundamental legal
principle of IHL. As a matter of fact, the whole of Geneva Convention IV is dedicated to the protection
of civilians. See also Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, at arts. 50-51.
119. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 27.
120. Id.
121. See Denise Bindschedler-Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflict, The Law
of Armed Conflict: Report of the Conference on Contemporary Problems of the Law of Armed
Conflicts, 1969 1, 43 (1971), cited in DINSTEN, supranote 7, at 29.
122. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 29.
123. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 13 (providing that medical personnel who
engage in acts that are considered harnful to the enemy could lose their protection as civilians).
124. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art. 4(A); see also Additional Protocol I, supra
note 3, art. 44. For a comprehensive discussion of all the requirements of lawful combatancy, see
DINSTEIN, supranote 7, at 33-47.
125. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(3) (emphasis added). Although this provision
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entitled to protection as civilians, but they may also be subjected to prosecution as
unlawful combatants. 126 As indicated above, the determination of direct
involvement in hostilities could be very difficult. Nowhere is this standard
defined. For example, would a civilian truck driver who delivers a supply of
ammunition to combatants be considered to have taken a direct part in hostilities
and lose his civilian status? What if the delivery was foodstuff? The ICRC Model
Manual answers the former in the affirmative but the latter in the negative. 127 How
about a civilian who collects intelligence in enemy occupied territories? What if
she does the same work while sitting in an office thousands of miles away from the
place of hostilities? The ICRC Model Manual again answers the former in the
affirmative but the latter in the negative. 128 Be this as it may, however, the
difficulty of the application of this standard cannot be over stated. In fact, as of the
writing of this article, the ICRC is struggling to define and elaborate the direct
participation standard. 129
Professor Dinstein notes that because nobody is born a combatant, combatants
may become non-combatants and vice versa.130 He cautions, however, that a
constant shift in status may create serious problems.131 In line with this, he says
"one cannot fight the enemy and remain a civilian."132 To support this conclusion
he cites to the Paris Declaration of 1856, one of the very first modem codifications
of laws and customs of warfare in the sea. The very first article of this Declaration
provides: "Privateering is, and remains, abolished." 3 3 Privateers were organized
groups who attacked enemy merchant vessels upon the official request by the
governments of belligerent states.134 The law of warfare on land subsequently
proscribed the same types of conduct by agents who paralleled the privateers of the

maritime world. 135

contains perhaps the clearest expression of this principle, it is derived from Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and it now appears in various provisions.
126. International Committee of the Red Cross, Official Statement: The Relevance of lHL in the
Context of Terrorism, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705.
127. See DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 27-28 (citing A.P.V. Rogers & P. Malherbe, Model Manual on
the Law ofArmed Conflict, 29 (ICRC, 1999)).
128. Id.
129. The ICRC has recently released a detailed interpretive guide on the notion of direct
participation on hostilities. The report is guide is available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-ihl-article-020609/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009ICRC.pdf. Since the specific meaning of this notion is outside of the scope of this article, no attempt
is made to discuss the contents of the guide. It must, however, be emphasized that this guide is very
useful in drawing the lines between the permissible and impermissible involvements of private military
contractors.
130.

DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 28.

131. Id.
132. See id. at 27-28 (citing A.P.V. Rogers & P. Malherbe, Model Manual on the Law of Armed
Conflict, 29 (ICRC, 1999)).
133. Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, 1856, Laws of Armed Conflicts 787, 788, cited
in DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 28.

134. Id. They are sometimes called corsairs.
135. Id.
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The other two important factors included in the definition of armed forces are
the existence of a chain of command and internal discipline. 136 The chain of
command and discipline requirements are necessary because of the state
responsibility attached to the conduct of organs operating at the behest of the state,
which is a subject of international law.1 37 The law gives a state some flexibility as
to who it may incorporate into its armed forces, including militia and volunteer
corps.13 8 However, it also requires the state to maintain a chain of command and
ensure discipline. 139 In other words, it requires the state to ensure respect for IHL.
The failure by any organ associated with the government to observe rules of IHL
could potentially give rise to international legal responsibility for the state. 140 That
is another important reason why states must be certain of the status of any entities
with which they engage in any type of warfare-related duties. They should
particularly be careful in involving forces outside their military's chain of
command and not subject to their discipline. The last part of this section will be
discussed more fully in Part IV below.
D. Non-combatantsAccompanying the Armed Forces
Non-combatants may lawfully accompany armed forces and are entitled to
civilian status as long as they refrain from combat activities. 14 1 Their primary
status is civilian. 142 A near exhaustive list of non-combatants who are entitled to
civilian status is contained in article 4A(4) of Geneva Convention III. It accords
the following civilians prisoner of war status: "Persons who accompany the armed
forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of the
armed forces."

43

This category also includes "[m]embers of crews, including

masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civilian
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict."1 4 4
The Convention also requires that such persons obtain authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany, and carry an identity card that mimics a
model that the Convention provides. 145 Identification and ascertainment of all
parties involved in conflict situations is so important that the Convention provides
a model identity card for state parties to issue to civilians that accompany their
armed forces. 146 The card, which is reproduced below, specifically asks parties to
complete the following statement: "Accompanying the armed forces as ... ." The
answer must be specific. As is seen below, it also requires the identification of the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 43(1).
See Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Non-Combatants,in FLECK, supranote 5, at 70-71.
Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, at art 43.
Id.
See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supra note 5 supra note 5, at

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 13.
See Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Non-Combatants,in FLECK, supranote 5, at 95.
Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 4(A)(4).
Id. at art. 4(A)(5).
Id.
See Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, Annex IV.

71.
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issuing authority. All persons who accompany the armed forces as noncombatants must carry this identification card. 147 The card serves as evidence of
authorization to perform whatever civilian duties that the person carrying the card
performs. Most importantly, if a civilian falls in the hands of the enemy, it would
serve as evidence of entitlement to prisoner of war status. 148
ANNEX
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Civilian status has significant benefits. Persons having a status of "civilian
accompanying the armed forces," and identified as such could be entitled to dual
protection. Firstly, they cannot be targeted by the enemy. Secondly, they are

147. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, art 4(A)(4); see also the "Notice" section of the
card reproduced above.
148. See Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 4(A)(4).
149. Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, Annex IV, sample available at http://www.icrc.org
/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument (last visited June 6, 2007).
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entitled to prisoner of war status if they fall into the hands of enemy forces. The
two protections are discussed in turn below.
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I articulates what could be considered one
of the most fundamental principles of IHL. The essence of this provision is the
protection of civilians. It states in part: "Those who plan or decide upon an attack
shall: (i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection."150
The same provision goes on stating that persons who plan an attack must "refrain
from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."151 It further provides that "effective advance warning shall
be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless the
circumstances do not permit." 15 2 And of course, what this essentially requires is
the reasonable balancing of the interests of military advantage and the extent of
collateral damages. 153 It is important to note that by accompanying the armed
forces, civilians assume the risk of becoming collateral victims.
Such
victimization may not necessarily be a result of the enemy's unlawful conduct if
the military advantage it obtains by including civilians in the attack outweighs the
civilian injury caused by the attack. 154
The second important protection that civilians accompanying the armed
forces get is a prisoner of war status if they fall into the hands of the enemy. As
indicated above, Geneva Convention III specifically accords civilians who
accompany the armed forces, and are properly identified as such, prisoner of war
status.155 Prisoner of war status is extremely beneficial not only because persons
having such status must be repatriated to their country as soon as hostilities
cease, 156 but also because it entitles the prisoner to several protections while in
captivity.157
In the case of combatants, as discussed in Part II above, it would serve as a
shield from prosecution for death, injury, and damage they might have caused

150.
151.
152.
153.

See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
Id. art. 57(2)(c).
See, e.g., id. art. 57(2)(b)
[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
154. See id.
155. See Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 4(A).
156. See also Geneva Convention III, supra note 3, arts. 109-17 (providing for circumstances
whereby repatriation should occur prior to the conclusion of hostilities). See id. arts. 118-19.
157. Protection begins from the time of captivity, see, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supranote 3,
art. 17-20. For protection during internment, see id. § II.
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during combat.158 What is extremely important to note here is that if civilians
conduct themselves outside their civilian duties and are suspected of combat
behavior, the repercussions could be extremely serious. Not only would they lose
their protection as civilians, but they would also lose prisoner of war status and
may be prosecuted for war crimes and other related forms of criminal offenses,
which they could have avoided if they had a combatant status. That is precisely
the reason why there should be no room for lack of identification of the exact
status of persons involved in any capacity in situations of hostility.
The provisions of Additional Protocol I relating to the protection of medical
personnel demonstrate the link between legal status and the treatment the statusholder must receive.
Article 12 provides that medical personnel must be protected at all times and
must not be made targets of attack;15 9 however, this provision conditions the
protection on numerous specific grounds. These grounds include: (1) the given
civilian medical unit must "belong to one of the Parties to the conflict"1 60 and (2)
they must be "recognized and authorized by the competent authority of one of the
Parties to the conflict" 16 1 or otherwise be authorized by Parties permitted by the
Protocol and Geneva Convention 1.162 Moreover, the parties are required to
identify the locations of their medical units so that they may not be targeted by the
enemy. 163 Of course, shielding military objectives from attack under the pretext of
medical units is strictly prohibited. 164
Most importantly, the Protocol provides for conditions for the discontinuance
of protection to civilian medical units. It provides that protection may cease if they
are "used to commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the
enemy." 165 The Protocol does not define what constitutes "acts harmful to the
enemy;" however, it contains a list of acts that are not considered harmful to the
enemy. 166 The opposite could easily be extrapolated from the list.
The following are not considered to be harmful to the enemy:
a. that the personnel of the unit are equipped with light individual
weapons for their own defense or for that of the wounded and sick in
their charge;
b. that the unit is guarded by a picket or by sentries or by an
escort;

158. See DINSTEIN, supranote 7, at 31.

159. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 12(1).
160. See id.art. 12(2)(a).
161. See id.art. 12(2(b).
162. Other parties such as neutral powers and humanitarian agencies may deploy medical workers.
See id. art. 12(2)(c) and the provisions cross-referenced therein. This is a prime demonstration of the
strict regulation of who may do what lawfully.
163. See id.art. 12(3).
164. Id. art. 12(4).
165. Id. art. 13(1).
166. Id. art. 13(2).
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c. that small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and
sick, and not yet handed to the proper service, are found in the units;
d. that the members of the armed forces or other combatants are in
the unit for medical reasons. 167
Presumably, the same principle applies to all other categories of civilians
accompanying the armed forces. The Protocol provides for a related concept that
would disqualify all civilians from the protection accorded to civilians. It states:
"[c]ivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 168
A cumulative reading of these provisions suggests that there is, indeed, a red
line that must not be crossed by anyone claiming civilian status. Although factual
disputes as to the applicability of the standard are inevitable, IHL seems to have
drawn the line at the performance of any action that could reasonably be
interpreted as taking a direct part in hostilities. Crossing that line would not only
wipe out all the protections that would otherwise be available to civilians, but also
expose them to criminal prosecution. 169 This subject will be discussed in more
detail in relation to civilian military contractors in Part IV below.
E. Unlawful Per Se
Towards the end of the legality spectrum are categories that are unlawful per
se. Persons classified in these categories are presumed unlawful combatants, and
as such are not entitled to any of the benefits of IHL, and may be prosecuted for
their conduct.170 The most notable categories are spies and mercenaries. These
categories are discussed in turn below.
1. Spies
Although the definition of the term spy is contained in earlier legal
instruments, including the Brussels Declaration of 1874,171 the legal definition of
most current importance is contained in articles 29 - 31 of The Hague Regulations
and article 46 of Additional Protocol I.
The Hague Regulations provide that a person is considered a spy "when,
acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavors to obtain
information in the zone of operation of a belligerent, with the intent of
communicating it to the hostile party."1 72 The most important factor that makes a
person a spy is not the gathering of the information and communication of the
same to the enemy, but the manner of the collection. For example, if the same
information is obtained without false pretences while wearing a military uniform
that would identify the person as belonging to the armed forces of the opposing
party, that person is not considered a spy.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 51(3).
169. See DINSTEIN, supranote 7, at 29-30.

170. Id. at31.
171. See The Brussels Declaration, art. 19, cited in Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants,
in FLECK, supranote 5, at 111.

172. Hague II, supranote 98, art. 29.
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This principle is also contained in article 46 of Additional Protocol I. It
states:
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf
of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or
attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in
espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces. 173
If the same soldier wears a disguise, penetrates into the enemy territory, and
collects information, he would be considered a spy.174 The same applies to
civilians accompanying the armed forces.175 This classification is important
because spies are not only denied prisoner of war status but are also considered
criminals and may be prosecuted and punished for their espionage and related

crimes.176
This is yet another clear demonstration of the importance of the identification
of the exact status of any individuals involved and affected by situations of armed
conflict. Of course, with the advancement of sophisticated military surveillance
equipment, the workability of this traditional definition of a spy might be
problematic. This issue is discussed in some detail in relation to the military
intelligence gathering roles of private military contractors in Part IV below.
2. Mercenaries
The most important unlawful per se category is perhaps mercenaries.
Mercenaries are unlawful combatants who are denied combatant and prisoner of
war status.177 The definition of the term mercenary of most current importance is
contained in article 47 of Additional Protocol 1. It provides that:

A mercenary is a person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in hostilities;
173. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46(2). The unlawfulness of wearing the enemy's
uniform or other forms of clothing for purposes of disguise in military operations has always been a
subject of controversy. For a brief discussion of this controversy and the compromise that the existing
rules make, see Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Non-Combatants, in FLECK, supranote 5, at 108 ("It shall
be lawful for combatants recognizable as such (by their uniforms, insignia etc.) to participate in raids,
acts of sabotage, and other attacks carried out by special forces in the enemy's hinterland or in forward
areas. Combatants who commit such acts wearing plain clothes or the uniform of the adversary are
liable to be punished. They shall nevertheless have the right to a regular judicial procedure."
174. See Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29. According to Hague II, those who are not considered
spies include:
Soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission openly, entrusted with the
delivery of dispatches intended either for their own army or for the enemy's
army. To this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose of
carrying dispatches and, generally, of maintaining communications between the
different parts of an army or a territory. Id.
175. See Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Noncombatants, in FLECK, supranote 5, at 99.
176. See Hague II, supranote 98, arts. 29. See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46.
177. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 47(1) ("A mercenary shall not have a right to be a
combatant or a prisoner of war.").
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(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised
or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces
of that party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of its armed forces.178
Anyone meeting these requirements is considered an unlawful combatant.
Mercenaries have always been a disfavored category of fighters. Professor Ipsen
suggests that the codification of this particular rule in the Additional Protocol I
"can be explained by the crucial and fatal role which mercenaries - especially of
European and North American origin - have played in armed conflicts on the
African continent."1 79 The exclusion of mercenaries, apart from the practical
undesirable roles they have historically played, rests on the fundamental
assumption that only disciplined forces of a party to the conflict are authorized to
engage in armed conflict with a primary status of lawful combatants. Professor
Ipsen neatly summarizes this notion as follows:
First and foremost it is the person belonging to the armed forces of a
party to the conflict who has the primary status of combatant. This
assignment to an organ constitutes authorization to carry out armed acts
causing harm. A simple contract between an individual and a party to
the conflict - fighting in exchange for payment - is not sufficient. Thus
the rule regarding mercenaries does not amount to an exception but
represents a logical consequence of the law: a person who is not a
member of the armed forces is not (with the exception of participants in
18 0
a levie en masse) a combatant either.

Engaging in harmful conduct for monetary compensation is not authorized
and recognized as legitimate conduct under IHL. Persons who meet the above
requirements are thus considered to have engaged in criminal enterprise and may
be prosecuted for their crimes.181 Commentators note that this is an extremely
narrow definition of mercenaries because all six requirements need to be met
cumulatively. 182 The definition is so narrow that it promoted a commentator to

178. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 47.
179. See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Noncombatants, in FLECK, supra note 5, at 69. ("Because
of the prevalence of mercenary activities in post-colonial Africa, in 1972, the Organization of African
Unity adopted The African Mercenary Convention."); OAU Convention for the Elimination of
Mercenaries in Africa, entered intoforce Apr. 22, 1985, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev. L. Annex. 1 (1972).
The convention criminalizes different levels of participation in mercenary activities. See, e.g., id. art.
1(2). It also creates state responsibility. See, e.g., id. art. 5.
180. See Knut Ipsen, Combatantsand Noncombatants, in FLECK, supranote 5, at 69.
181. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 52.
182. See, e.g., id at 50-52.
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suggest "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves
to be shot - and his lawyer with him."18 3
Perhaps as a result of the narrowness of the definition, in 1989, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted an international convention pertaining to
mercenaries, which eliminated the active participation requirement of the
definition of Protocol I quoted above.18 4 This category is discussed in more detail
in relation to private military contractors in Part IV below.
F. The Status ofParties in Non-internationalArmed Conflict
Finally, it is important to note that the same standards by and large apply in
non-international armed conflicts. Although advocacy for the application of
civilized rules of warfare in civil war situations dates back many centuries, 185 it
was not until the mid-twentieth century that international treaties dealing with
situations of armed conflict began to provide formal rules applicable in noninternational armed conflict. 186 That is not to say that there were not historical
instances where customary rules of humanitarian law applied in domestic conflicts.
Historically, the principle of recognition of belligerents within a given state often
prompted the application of some of the same rules that were applicable in
international armed conflict situations.18 7 However, a transformative step was
taken when Common Article 3 was incorporated into the Geneva Conventions of
1949.188 That essentially brought conflicts of a non-intemational nature within the
ambit of IHL. Therefore, the same principles discussed in the preceding
subsections of Part III now generally apply in non-international armed conflicts.
More important for purposes of this article is the application of some of the
same principles for the identification of parties to the conflict. For example,
prisoner of war status in an armed conflict, whether it is of an international or noninternational nature, is limited to those members of a party to the conflict, which
meet the following criteria:

183. See Christopher Weigley, The Privatizationof Violence: New Mercenaries and the State, 1,
available at http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/government/mercenaries-1999.php (last visited June
15, 2007) (quoting Geoffrey Best in DAVID SHEARER, PRIVATE ARIES AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

18(1998)).
184. See id. See also The International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and
Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 34, at 590, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, U.N. Doc.
A/44/43 (1989), art. 1 [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries] (omitting the direct
participationin hostilitiespart of the definition of mercenaries under AdditionalProtocolI, art.47).
185. Writing in 1758, Vattel, for example, suggested that "it was perfectly clear that the
establishment of law of war, those principles of humanity, forbearance, truthfulness, and honor, which
we have earlier laid down, should be observed on both sides in a civil war," ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra
note 3, at 22 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS: OU PRINCIPES DE LA Lol
NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS, A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DE NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 338

(Charles
186.
187.
188.

G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758).
See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 3, at 22.
See id. at 23.
See id at 24; see also the Four Geneva Conventions, supra note 3, common art. 3
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a. that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
b. that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
c. that of carrying arms openly; and
d. that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.189
As discussed in the previous section, members of the armed forces of a state
are ipso facto entitled to combatant status and subsequently prisoner of war status
unless of course they try to confuse the enemy. Other members of a party to the
conflict should meet all the above requirements cumulatively. This will be
discussed more fully in relation to the functions of private military contractors in
Part IV below.
IV. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS

Part III offered a lengthy discussion of almost all of the possible statuses of
individuals and groups under IHL. Some are lawful statuses such as combatants
and civilians accompanying them. Others are unlawful statuses such as spies,
mercenaries and civilians who engage in combat activities without authorization.
Part IV tackles the following question: under which one of the above categories do
private military contractors fall? To answer this question and characterize the
status of private military contractors under IHL, Part IV discusses the typical and
known activities of the private military contractors in a continuum vis-A-vis the
various legal statuses discussed above.
A. Definition and Background
On December 11, 2003, BBC World News contained the following report:
A private UK-based military firm says it is looking for an investor to
fund an operation to seize indicted former Liberian President Charles
Taylor. Mr. Taylor, who has been granted asylum in Nigeria, is wanted
by the UN-backed court on war crimes charges. Northbridge Services
Group says it has people ready to kidnap Mr. Taylor to claim a $2m
reward allegedly offered by the United States Congress. Washington
has said it opposes any violent action to seize Mr. Taylor. "Any
potential investors that are interested in going in together in this
operation, we would be willing to split the profits," Northbridge
Services Group's director Pasquale Dipofi told the BBC's World Today
programme. 190
This report is remarkable not only because it is an explicit admission of the
privatized use of military force for profit, but also the manner of its reporting
makes it seem like any ordinary business transaction.

189. Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 4(2).
190. Military Firm Seeks Taylor Bounty, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2003, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3309203.stn.

2010

STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS

391

Dr. Peter W. Singer of the Brookings Institute reported that in 1996 he met
members of Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a Virginabased private military company, somewhere in Bosnia where the company was
conducting training of the Bosnian military. 191 He expressed his first impression in
the preface of his seminal work, Corporate Warriors, in the following terms:
The members of the firm were polite and generally helpful, but the ambiguity
between who they were and what they were doing always hung in the air. They
were employees of a private company, but were performing tasks inherently
military. It just did not settle with the way we tended to understand whether
business or warfare. 192
No authoritative definition of Private Military Firms could be found. Dr.
Singer offers a fairly broad definition of these firms as "business organizations that
trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare. They are corporate
bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat
operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support,
training and technical skills."1 93 As a matter of fact, by estimates of the American
Bar Association, about 30,000 private contractors now provide various services
including security services in Iraq. 194 The following subsections assess the legality
of the various functions of these entities vis-A-vis IHL.
B. Functions and Categories
As indicated above, private military contractors undertake a variety of
functions. While some of these functions would give them clear lawful status
under IHL, some functions would put them in questionable status. Still other
functions towards the opposite end of the legality spectrum would put them
completely at odds with the law. The following subsections discuss the various
functions and possible statuses.
1. Non-combat functions
The continuum begins with purely and uncontrovertibly civilian functions.
An excellent demonstration of the various functions performed by private military

191. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at vii.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 8.
194. See Chris Lombardi, Law Curbs Contractorsin Iraq, 3 A.B.A.J.E-Rep., May 14, 2004, cited
in Peters, supra note 29, at 382 n.59. If reconstruction and oil workers are added, the figure would
jump to about 50,000 to 75,000. See Max Boot, Commentary, The Iraq War's Outsourcing Snafu, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at B13 (cited in id). In fact, the New York Times recently reported that up to
126,000 American, Iraqi, and other nationals now work for the U.S. government in Iraq. James Risen,
Back from Iraq, ContractorsFace Combat-Related Stress, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2007, at Al. The report
also indicated that since the Iraq war began, about 1,000 civilian contractors were killed, and 13,000 of
them were injured. Id. In fact, they are exposed to the same kinds of danger that military personnel are
exposed to, including post traumatic distress disorder after they return home. Id. See Steve Fainaru,
Ambush in Iraq Last Fall Left 4 Americans Missing and a String of Questions About Company they
Worked for, WASH. POST, July 29, 2007. One member of the civilian contacts in Iraq described his
duties as: "We protect the military. Isn't that mind-boggling? ... And I'm taking about escorting
soldiers, as well. Isn't that frightening?" Id.
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contractors is contained in Lockheed Martin's list of "products" that it offers to
customers. The products are listed under thirteen headings: Air Power, Air Traffic
& Transportation Management, Distribution Systems, Homeland Security,
Information Superiority, Information Technology, Missiles & Missile Defense,
Net-Centric Solutions, Space Systems & Technologies, Surveillance, Radar & Fire
Control, Technical Support Services, Technology Research, Training &
Simulation.1 95
One of the subcategories under "Air Power" capability is "combat"
capability. 19 6 Lockheed Martin describes its "combat" capability as follows:
Lockheed Martin's tactical aircraft respond decisively to the evolving
and complex demands of modem combat situations. Our aircraft are the
most versatile fighters in the world, excelling even in the most
demanding of multi-role missions. We have a proven lineage of air
power dominance, from the experienced F-16, to the F-22, and F-35
next-generation fighters. These aircraft were bom through research and
development efforts underscored by a relentless pursuit of new advances
in technology and low-cost, innovative manufacturing methods.
Through a work ethic dedicated to quality, Lockheed Martin provides
unparalleled design, development production and full systems support
of fighter/attack aircraft. For this reason, our fighters dominate the skies
of the world, extending strong, enduring international defense
partnerships. The next generation of high-performance combat aircraft
will continue to push the envelope further - with design concepts that
expand the definition of multi-role aircraft and mission flexibility. We

develop future technology for implementation today, including stealth
capability, precision weapons delivery, battlespace interoperability and
systems compatibility. Through these endeavors, Lockheed Martin's
fighter aircraft will continue as a dominating force behind national
defense and global security. 197

Existing and prospective consumers of these produces include: Air Force,
Army, Asia/Pacific, Defense Agencies, Department of Defense, Department of
Homeland Security, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Marine Corps, NASA, Navy,
Republic of Korea, Special Operations Command. 198 Although some policy issues

may be raised as to the desirability of the involvement of private companies in
some of these activities, 199 Lockheed Martin's involvement in the development of

195. Lockheed Martin, Capabilities, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/

(last visited 5 Feb., 2010).
196. Lockheed Martin, Air Power, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/air
power/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Air Power].
197.

Id.

198. Lockheed Martin, Customers, available at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/customers (last
visited Feb. 5, 2010).

199. In relation to the public-private dilemma, P.W. Singer writes:
The division of the world into public and private spheres is at the center of the

long debate over what government's role should be. Ever since the rule by kings
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military technology including the advancement of weaponry and the selling of
such weaponry to the above listed consumers does not ordinarily trigger the
applicability of IHL. 2 0 0 However, it gets trickier when the provision of such
products is accompanied by the provision of services such as training, supply, and
maintenance of military equipment in the field. It starts to slowly march into the
gray area. The following section discusses such ambiguous functions.
2. Ambiguous functions (intelligence, training, equipment transportation,
maintenance, interrogation, base construction, protection of civilians)
Training could be one ambiguous function depending on where and how it is
conducted. For example, Lockheed Martin, advertises its training capability as
follows:
The customer's need for readiness is our business. Flight crews and
maintainers must move from training to the real world without
hesitation. To meet this need, Lockheed Martin's end-to-end training
solutions provide experience in the live, virtual, and constructive
domains. Lockheed Martin offers an integrated approach to delivering
total training solutions, creating products that meet specific customer
needs. Our flight and maintenance training systems are world leaders in
training large, widely dispersed student populations operating diverse
fleets of aircraft. Lockheed Martin's proven instructional systems
development, systems engineering, and logistics processes are coupled
with our corporation's intimate knowledge of current aircraft platforms
to ensure a real-world experience in training.201
Another well-known civilian military contactor, MPRI, provides the
following services: "MPRI personnel supplement Region operations across the
entire spectrum of activities to include personnel, training, mobilization, logistics,
force protection, airfield operations, transportation operations, food service,
ammunition management, engineering, environmental operations and human
resources."202

If a couple of air force military officers from India come to Bethesda,
Maryland and receive training as to how to fly and use Lockheed Martin's next
generation F-35 and purchase a few of these aircraft and take them with them to
India, no recognizable issues of IHL would arise. However, consider the following
was replaced by the bureaucratic state in the seventeenth century, there has been
a give-and-take between the public and the private, with the line between the two
constantly in flux. In fact, the debate about where this line should fall has been
described as one of the "grand dichotomies of western political thought."
CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 7.
200. But see Richard T. De George, Non-Combatant Immunity in an Age of High Tech Warfare, in
INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE, supra note 81, at 30 1-10 (discussing the issue of a possible
IHL duty on the part of weapons designers to make weapons smarter with a view to mitigating
unnecessary injury and damage).
201. Air Power, supranote 196.
202. MPRI, Staff Augmentation, available at http://www.mpri.conVmain/recruitingaugmentation.
html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
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scenario. The training takes place in India close to the Kashmir border. Pakistan
shoots down one of the training aircraft and the two states get into a small-scale
armed conflict. Assume further that Pakistan captures three occupants of the
aircraft that was shot down: two Indian trainees and one Lockheed Martin trainer.
Would all of them be considered lawful combatants and as a result entitled to
prisoner of war status?
This is not as farfetched as it might sound. Consider the following real story.
In 1999, when genocide was looming in Kosovo, NATO forces conducted an air
attack against the Milosevic government. 203 These attacks produced thousands of
refugees and created humanitarian emergencies. 204 Because the involvement of the
United States in this conflict was not popular, the administration chose to involve
the Texas-based private military contractor Brown & Roots (KBR).20 5 The
company performed the following activities with efficiency: constructed temporary
facilities on the ground that housed thousands of displaced persons from Kosovo;
ran the supply system for U.S. forces in the area, including transportation of food
and other supplies; constructed bases; and maintained vehicles and weaponry.206
Given the circumstances described above, there was a real possibility that
Milosevic's forces could have attacked one of the bases and captured some of
KBR's personnel while maintaining some of the military equipment or transporting
some of the equipment and weaponry. Had this occurred, what would have been
their status under IHL? Would they have been entitled to prisoner of war status?
Would they have had combatant status or would they have just been persons
accompanying the armed forces? Or would they even be considered mercenaries?
Because this fact pattern would help demonstrate the ambiguity in the status of
these personnel, it is important to test the facts against the rules described in Part
III above.
Assume further that some members of the company were armed with
weapons for their own protection and used the weapons to kill some members of
Milosevic's army before they were captured. The first question that needs to be
asked is whether they would be entitled to combatant status. In other words, may
they be prosecuted for killing Milosevic's soldiers? As discussed in Part III above,
combatant status may only be acquired if the following requirements are
cumulatively met: membership to the armed forces of a party to the conflict with
identifiable uniforms and emblems, the presence of a chain of command wherein
officers are responsible for their subordinates, the existence of internal discipline,
and respect for international law relating to warfare.207

203.

CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 6.

204. Id.
205. Id. Better known as KBR, it is a leading engineering and construction firm. See generally
KBR, http://www.kbr.com/ (last visited June 26, 2007) (describing the KBR "as the largest contractor
for the United States Army and a top-ten contractor for the U.S. Department of Defense, it is currently
the world's largest defense services provider").
206. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 6.

207. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 43.
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The party to the conflict in this case was NATO. All members of the U.S.
military would evidently qualify as members of the party to the conflict by virtue
of the membership of the U.S. in NATO. Members of KBR were evidently not
sworn members of the U.S. military and as such did not qualify as members of the
NATO forces, which was one of the only two parties to the conflict; the second
being Milosevic's army. If they were not members of a party to the conflict,
subject to the chain of command and discipline, then they cannot be considered
lawful combatants. The relationship between the firm and the U.S. military is
purely contractual. Although the details of the contracts are confidential, 208 it is
fair to assume that the contract does not require members of the firm to take an
oath similar to the one that members of the military take, or otherwise incorporate
them as de jure members. As will be discussed below, the U.S. had actually
negotiated immunity for members of the defense forces as well as contractors
operating in Iraq,209 but in the absence of such immunity, they risk exposure to
prosecution as unlawful combatants. More particularly because the lex specialis in
the instant example is IHL, members of KBR may theoretically be prosecuted for
killing Milosevic's soldiers. It is important to reemphasize here that killing in
combat requires legal authorization. Anyone who kills an enemy solider without
authorization lacks immunity from prosecution.
Could such members of KBR claim the status of civilians or non-combatants
accompanying the armed forces and avoid prosecution? To be considered civilians
accompanying the armed forces and claim prisoner of war status, they must belong
to one of the following categories: medical and religious workers, 2 10 Civilian
members of aircraft crew, war correspondents, supply contractors, or members of
labor units.21 ' Moreover, persons claiming civilian status must first be authorized
to undertake their civilian activities by the party to the conflict and carry an

208. Copies of these kinds of contracts are not publicly available. For a copy of an example of a
private military contract outside the U.S., see CORPORATE WARRIORS, note 23, at 245, appendix 2
(providing a copy of the contract between private sector firm, Sandline, and the government of Papua
New Guinea). This contract was signed between the now defunct military firm, Sandline International,
and the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Among the responsibilities undertaken under the
contract were to "gather intelligence to support effective deployment and operations; conduct offensive
operations in Bougainville in conjunction with PNG . . ." See id. at Prmble. The PNG agreed to pay
$36,000,000 for these services. See id. at 251, appendix 2, Fees and Payments. Despite allegations of
illegality, an international tribunal enforced this contract. See Sandline Int'l Inc. v. Papua N.G., 117
I.L.R. 552 (Arb. Tribunal 1998). For commentary on the nature of the contracts and how they may be
used to ensure accountability, see Laura A. Dickinson, Torture and Contract, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 267, 273-74 (2006) [hereinafter Torture and Contract].
209. See The Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 17 (Revised), Status of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, MNF - Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Sec. 2, Iraqi Legal Process,
available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG-1_TheCoalitionProvisi
onalAuthority_.pdf ("Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions,
their Personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants shall be immune from Iraqi
legal process.").
210. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43(2). See also Geneva Convention III, supra
note 3, art. 33.
211. See Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 4(A)(4).
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identity card similar to the one reproduced in Part 111(d) above. 212 They must
properly identify themselves as civilians in that card.213 Whether they could claim
immunity as civilians accompanying the armed forces depends not only on their
belonging to the above categories but also on whether their activities could be
considered as taking direct part in hostilities 214 or causing harmful acts to the
enemy.215
Presumably, members of KBR in the instant example could qualify as supply
contractors with authorization to function as such in a combat zone. It could also
be presumed that they could carry light weapons for their own protection or for the
protection of other civilians.216 Thus, it is obvious that if they are attacked in the
place where they were performing civilian functions, they could use their light
weapons to protect themselves. If in doing so they kill enemy soldiers and get
captured thereafter, they may be entitled to prisoner of war status and, as such,
immunity from prosecution, provided that their conduct does not rise to the level of
217
war crimes.
It may nonetheless be argued that conducting training and
maintaining weaponry near combat areas is taking direct part in hostilities which
rescinds civilian status under article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I. It could further
be argued that even if training and maintenance of weaponry do not qualify as
taking direct part in hostilities depending on where and when they take place, these
activities could possibly be considered as acts that cause harm to the enemy under
the rationale of article 13 of Additional Protocol I.
The two other categories that could raise some ambiguities are mercenaries
and spies. In the above example, would members of KBR qualify as mercenaries?
Mercenary is a carefully defined legal term. As discussed in Part III(e)(ii) above,

the essential requirements include special recruitment for combat, taking a direct
part in hostilities for excessive private gain, and alienage.218 Under the definition
of a mercenary, all of the essential requirements must be met cumulatively.219 In
other words, if any one of the above requirements is not present, the actors are not
considered mercenaries. In the above example, it cannot be said that members of
KBR were specifically recruited for combat. As such, they cannot be considered
mercenaries. Whether they meet the remaining requirements could be disputed.
For example, more facts would be needed to determine the excess in payment or
the nationality of each involved individual member of the team. The requirement
of whether they took a direct part in hostilities may also be disputed. Although

212. See id.4(A)(4).
213. See supraModel Identity Card, reproduced in Part III(D).
214. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 51(3).
215. See id.at art. 13.
216. See id at art. 13(2)(a). Although this provision deals with medical personnel, it may
reasonably be assumed that the same standards would apply to other civilian contractors.
217. This argument is based on the rules that regulate the situations of medical personnel who are
inherently civilian. It appears, however, that the same principles would apply to other civilians. See
Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 13(1)-(2).
218. See Additional Protocol, supra note 3, art. 47.
219. See id
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they do not meet the requirements of mercenary, the ambiguity in their status
remains.
The last category that needs to be discussed in this subsection is the spy
category. Because intelligence gathering is an important function of private
military contractors, it is necessary to understand their status in this regard. For
example, Lockheed Martin advertises its intelligence capabilities as follows:
From the depths of the oceans to the far reaches of space, we serve the
Department of Defense and the intelligence community with leadingedge intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems for
maritime, terrestrial, airborne, and space missions. Lockheed Martin is
a leader in satellite imagery and information systems, air surveillance,
radar, geospatial imagery, mission management, and ground system
operations.
Our focus is on providing joint and multi-agency
organizations with valuable, effective ISR data for a diverse set of
missions ranging from precision targeting to geographic mapping.220

Nothing makes the performance of these activities illegal, even in times of
war. However, if the information is gathered under false pretenses, the intelligence
gathering would become espionage activity. 221 The personnel engaged in the
activity would be considered spies and as such unlawful per se. As a matter of
law, not even members of the armed forces or combatants are immune from such
222
designation, as long as they collect the intelligence under false pretense.
The traditional way of collecting information under false pretense is usually
wearing the enemy's uniforms and infiltrating into enemy held territories. 223 With
the advancement of technology, however, intelligence gathering could be done by
civilians sitting in their offices thousands of miles away from the frontlines. For
example, a civilian contractor sitting in his office in Alexandria, Virginia could
hack into the software of an enemy anywhere and obtain information for the U.S.
military. If the hacker obtains the information under a false pretense, he would
qualify as a spy. 224 If a "cyber-soldier" 225 does the same, he or she would likewise
be considered a spy.226 Such designation could only have significance if the said

220. See Lockheed Martin, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, http://www.lockheed
martin.com/ capabilities/information superiority/ (last visited June 18, 2007).
221. See Hague II, supra note 98, at arts. 29-31; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art.
46.
222. See Hague II, supra note 98, at arts. 29-31; Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 46; see
also supra discussion of spies under Part III(E)(1).
223. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 46(2) (providing: "A member of the armed
forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in the territory controlled by an adverse
Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if,
while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces.").
224. See Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29.
225. This term is borrowed from Professor De George. He provides a brief description of and
commentary on computer hacking from the point of view of situations of warfare. See Richard T. De
George, Non-Combatant Immunity in an Age of High Tech Warfare, in INTERVENTION, TERRORISM,
AND TORTURE 301, 310-13 (Steven P. Lee ed., 2006).

226. See Hague II, supra note 98, art. 29 ("Soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated
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individuals, the civilian or the soldier, fall into the hands of the enemy anytime
thereafter. If that happens, however, the law does not treat the two individuals the
same way.227 While the civilian may be prosecuted for the crime of espionage he
committed in the past, the soldier is immune from such prosecution as long as he
remains a member of the armed forces or rejoins the armed forces after engaging in
the said activities of espionage. In other words, a soldier can be prosecuted as a
spy only if he is caught in the act or before rejoining his unit. 228 To the contrary,
once a civilian is a spy, he is always a spy, and may be prosecuted anytime for any
acts of espionage committed anytime regardless of his current status.229
Because of the foregoing, intelligence gathering is also an area of ambiguity
that requires further reflection. Although technology based intelligence gathering
would not ordinarily expose civilian contractors to danger, situations where such
exposure could ensue is foreseeable. One of the KBR employees captured by
Milosevic's army in the example discussed above could easily be an intelligence
analyst who had engaged in cyber intelligence gathering.
The status issue becomes even more complicated when the private military
contractors get involved to protect civilians from irregular forces in situations
where there is no conventional armed conflict. This is similar to the situation in
Iraq. For example, some 800 armed members of one of the largest U.S. based
security firms, Blackwater, currently guard American diplomats in Iraq.23 0 The
State Department rules allow these contractors to use deadly force if the civilians
they are protecting face "imminent and grave danger."231
Because of the obvious difficulty in identifying the exact course of legal
action that needs to be taken in cases where such a standard is not respected, under
the seemingly no war, no peace situations, policy makers still remain perplexed.
To address the issues of the gap in accountability under these circumstances,
into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not
considered spies.").
227. Id. at arts. 29-31.
228. Id.
229. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 46(4):
A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of
territory occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that
territory shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be
treated as a spy unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to
which he belongs.
It is important to note that the Protocol clearly limits such privilege to members of armed forces.
Compare Hague II, supranote 98, art. 29 ("A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is
subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his
previous acts of espionage.").
230. See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Sees Authority Over Contractors,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/10/17/washington/17blackwater.html [hereinafter Schmitt &
Shanker]. Blackwater was a subject of great media coverage following the fatal shooting of sixteen
Iraqi civilians in Bagdad on September 16, 2007. The company has obtained $1 billion in U.S.
government security contracts since 2001. See Steve Fainaru, How Blackwater Sniper Fire Felled 3
IraqiGuards, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2007, at AO1 [hereinafter Fainaru].
231. Fainaru, supra note 230, at AO1. As of this report, it had 867 security guards in Iraq. Id.
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understandably, various options are being proposed and considered, although as of
the writing of this article no concrete measures have been taken. One of the
options that is being considered is military supervision of contractors.232 However,
such a proposal cannot address the underlying issue of the applicable law in
holding violators accountable.
The legal uncertainty indeed is the following. As discussed above, U.S.
military, as well as civilian contractors, are immune from the Iraqi legal process.
Moreover, the applicability of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is doubtful
because the civilian contractors mostly provide security service to a civilian
agency, such as the State Department, much like a security guard provides services
for a museum in Atlanta or New York. 233 Of course, trying civilians in military
courts also has its own problems.234 The best option seems to be the prosecution of
civilian contractors under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which
permits the prosecution of civilians accompanying the armed forces. 235 Although
this seems to be a better option, it also does not answer the main question this
article raises - do military contractors qualify as civilians under IHL?
Accordingly, therefore, the ambiguity of the statute remains to be the most serious
legal challenge.
3. Combat Functions
The involvement of private military contractors in actual combat is not a
rhetorical scenario. In recent decades, they have been involved in conventional
inter-state as well as unconventional domestic warfare.236 This subsection provides
examples of real stories where military contractors have played a significant role in
conventional and non-conventional warfare and assesses contractors' status in light
of IHL.
A devastating war commenced between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998,
along the western boundary between the two countries. 237 Within a short time the
conventional armed hostilities engulfed almost the entire border between the two

232. See John M. Broder & David Johnston, U.S. Military Will Supervise Iraq Security Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/washington/31contractor.html (explaining
the details of this plan); see also Schmitt & Shanker, supra note 230.
233. For example, in 2006, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was amended to cover civilian
contracts "in declared wars or contingency operations." But this amendment does not address the issue
of whether contractors working for civilian agencies would be covered. See Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von
Zielbauer, Blackwater Case Highlights Legal Uncertainties,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, www.nytimes
.com/2007/10/1 1/world/middleeast/1 1legal.html.
234. See infra section IV.
235. See id.(citing Scott Horton of Columbia University, a specialist in law of armed conflict).
236. See, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 3-6.
237. See Ethiopia's Jus Ad Bellum Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission paras. 14, 16
(Dec. 19, 2005); see also Eritrea's Western Front Arial Bombardment and Related Claims, EthiopiaEritrea Claims Commission para. 22 (Dec. 19, 2005); Ethiopia's Western Front Claims, EthiopiaEritrea Claims Commission para. 25 (Dec. 19, 2005); Ethiopia's Central Front Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea
Claims Commission para. 24 (Apr. 28, 2004); Eritrea's Central Front Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims
Commission para. 30 (Apr. 28, 2004). All of the partial awards cited hereinabove are available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid= 1151 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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238

countries.
The two parties ceased their hostilities in June of 2000, pursuant to a
cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Algiers. 239 During this war an
estimated 70,000 people were killed.240 In addition to that, Eritrea captured and
interned 1,100 prisoners of war, 241 including an air force pilot. 242 Ethiopia
captured and interned 2,600 prisoners of war.243 All the prisoners were later
repatriated to their home countries.244 The prisoners of war taken by each party
were nationals of the other, and as such there were no formal claims of
involvement of private military contractors.245 However, the story does not end
there. What was unique about this African war was the involvement of extremely
sophisticated high-tech fighter jets. According to BBC's Patrick Gilkes, in
December 1999, while Ethiopia acquired eight Sukhoi 27 fighters, Eritrea acquired
eight to ten MiG 29 interceptors.246 Most importantly, Gilkes added that "[n]either
side, however, [had] any pilots qualified for the new planes. They [were] being
flown by pilots from Russia, Ukraine or Latvia and both [were] using Russian
technicians for their maintenance."247 At the time, it was widely understood that
the Russian, Ukrainian, or Latvian pilots, mechanics, or advisers were private
hrta than officials
f
military contractors, 248 rather
formally representing their respective
249
governments.
238. See Ethiopia'sJus AdBellum Claims, Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission para. 19 (Dec. 19,
2005) available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%/o20ET20JAB.pdf
239. See Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the State of Eritrea
and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eri.-Eth., June 18, 2000, 85
U.N.T.S. 2138.
240. See, e.g., Xan Rice, After 70,000 deaths, Eritrea and Ethiopia preparefor war again, THE
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article754553.ece (last visited June
19, 2007).
241. See Ethiopia's Prisoners of War Claim, Ethiopia- Eritrea Claims Commission para. 3 (July 1,
2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ET04.pdf (last visited June 19, 2007).
242. See Emma Jane Kirby, Ethiopia, Eritrea to free all PoWs, BBC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2212159.stm (last visited June 19, 2007).
243. See Eritrea's Prisoners of War Claim, Ethiopia - Eritrea Claims Commission para. 3 (July 1,
2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ER17.pdf (last visited June 19, 2007).
244. Id.
245. Id. at para. 1; Ethiopia's Prisoners of War Claim, Ethiopia - Eritrea Claims Commission para.
1 (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/ETO4.pdf (last visited June 19, 2007).
246. See Patrick Gilkes, World: Africa Analysis: Arms pour infor borderwar, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2,
1999, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/280273.stm (last visited June 19, 2007).
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 11 ("In its war with Eritrea, Ethiopia
leased a wing of jet fighters from Sukhoi firm, along with the pilots to fly them, the mechanics to
maintain them, and the commanders to plan out their attacks.") (citing to numerous sources including:
Charles Smith, Wars and Rumors of War: Russian Mercenaries Flying for Ethiopia: Advisers, Pilots,
Artillerymen Engaged in "Large-scaleoffensives' against Eritrea,WORLD NET DAILY, (July 18, 2000),
available at http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageld=7158; Thomas Adams, The New
Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, PARAMETERS, 103-116 (Summer 1999) available at
http://www.usamhi.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/99summer/adams.htm; Russians Fly for both Sides
in Horn of Africa, LONDON TIMES, (Feb. 19, 1999). Sukhoi is a private Russian company. For the
company's profile and holdings philosophy, see Sukhoi, http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/company/ideology/
(last visited June 19, 2007).
249. Indeed, if they were official representatives of their respective governments, they would have
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The involvement of the private contracts in the sale, delivery, and
maintenance of the equipment as well as the training and advising away from the
conflict zones would not have serious legal consequences. However, once the
Sukhoi pilots started flying the aircraft in combat, the legal status becomes
problematic. Although reports have indicated that the pilots were involved in
actual combat, the truth of these allegations has never been officially recognized
by the involved parties. Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of legal argument
that the allegations were true, what would have been the legal status of a Sukhoi
employee captured by Eritrea after being shot down while flying the Su-27 hightech fighter jet in combat? Would he have been treated just like one of the 1,100
Ethiopian prisoners of war that Eritrea captured? Would there be a difference in
status between a Sukhoi pilot flying an aircraft for Ethiopia, and a pilot belonging
to the Ethiopian air force? The same questions could be asked about private
contractors that might have flown the MiG-29 fighter jets that Eritrea used against
Ethiopia.
The answer to all of these questions is clear. The Sukhoi or MiG-29 pilots
would not be entitled to prisoner of war status and may be prosecuted by the
detaining party for any death, injury, or damage that they might have caused while
flying in combat even if the targets were legitimate military targets. IHL provides
no combatant immunity for private contractors under these circumstances. 25 0 in
fact, this is a classic example of an unambiguous unlawful combatant status of
private military contractors in conventional inter-state armed conflict.
There are several examples of recent involvement of private military
contractors in non-international armed conflicts. The following two instances are

representative of a much wider role they have played particularly on the African
continent.
In 1991, the government of the West African nation of Sierra Leone, a former
British colony, found itself cornered by a violent rebellion. 251 The rebellion, led by
a group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), brought about untold misery
to the civilian population.252 The movement used child soldiers and admittedly
used unlawful means of warfare, including the deliberate targeting of civilians for
253
rape and extermination.
A particularly horrific signature of the RUF was the
malicious amputation of civilians' arms regardless of age and gender.254 Within
approximately four years, the RUF gained ground, controlled the economically
vital diamond mines, and continued to perpetrate atrocious acts.255 In 1995, the

a legitimate status provided that they respected the laws and customs of warfare. See, e.g., Additional
Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 47(2)(f) (excepting a person sent on official duty by the government of his
home country from the definition of the term mercenary).
250. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 47(2)(f).
251. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supranote 23, at 3.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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RUF began advancing towards the capital city, Freetown.256 The government
soldiers began fleeing in disarray and some even joined the RUF.257 As the RUF
closed in on the city, the civilian population was completely engulfed in horror.
Foreign embassies and international organizations evacuated their personnel and
their families, and the situation looked extremely gloomy. 258
However, unexpectedly and inexplicably, an unknown and sophisticated elite
force equipped with precision air and artillery weapons began pounding the
positions of the RUF rebels. 2 59 Immediately followed by mechanized infantry
units, this elite force drove the surprised rebels away from Freetown and the mine
fields. 260 The once powerful rebel forces were obliterated. Within a short period
of time, relative peace and security prevailed in Sierra Leone. It was followed by
democratic elections and the prosecution of war criminals. 2 61 The elite ground
forces and pilots that destroyed the rebels and made this possible wore no uniform,
carried no insignia and flew no flags.262 They were employees of a South African
based private military company called Executive Outcomes.263
Although this might be an oversimplification of the character and resolution
of the predicaments that Sierra Leone faced during its civil war and thereafter, 64 it
is a good example of the nature of transactions that private military contractors are
hired to perform. Because this is a purely combat function, the issue that needs to
be considered in this case is whether the members of Executive Outcome were
lawful combatants. Their performance was undoubtedly efficient and desirable.
However, what was their status under IHL? Did they have lawful combatant
status? The answer to this question is simply no because they meet each and every
requirement of Additional Protocol I pertaining to mercenaries.265 To reiterate the

requirements discussed above, a mercenary is a person who meets the following
requirements: special recruitment for armed conflict abroad, taking part in
hostilities for pay in excess of what might be paid for a regular soldier, not a
national of the party to the conflict, and not sent on official duty by the state of
nationality.266

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 3-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.

261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Of course, the civil conflict in Sierra Leone involved several actors with different motives,
and as such, the situation was not as simple as Singer's description would suggest. For proper
documentation of the history of the civil war, see Sierra Leone Web, http://www.sierraleone.org/history-conflict.html. For more information related to the civil war and the prosecution of
RUF members and other accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, see The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/Default.aspx.
265. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 47.
266. Id.

2010

STATUS OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS

403

In this case, members of Executive Outcomes were specially recruited to fight
in armed conflicts outside of South Africa, presumably for excessive pay.267 They
obviously were not sent by the South African government, which in fact disbanded
them in 1999 following the passage of a law to that effect. 268 Despite the rosy
picture that the descriptive paragraph above paints, the negative adverse role that
mercenaries play in conflicts around the world is almost universally recognized.
Mercenaries complicate matters more rather than help resolve them. 269 That is
precisely why their activities remain illegal.
A scenario by which the legal status of a fighter affiliated with Executive
Outcomes captured by RUF might seem meaningless as he would likely be shot
instantly by his captors before the question even arises. However, the legal status
of the captured individual would certainly affect the status of those RUF members
who captured him when they have to answer to criminal charges. For example, it
is not inconceivable that an RUF member who is on trial now before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone might defend against charges of murdering a member of a
private military contractor by saying that the killing was justified because the
civilian contractor was an unlawful combatant. Of course, he would then be asked
if the killing was performed pursuant to a death sentence after a proper trial as
required by IHL. He may not have a good answer for that, but at least the crime
may not be as severe as killing a prisoner of war.
The lawful status of combatants is never unimportant, particularly when there
is some sort of post-conflict justice, because only a lawful combatant status
justifies the killing of another human being. Obviously, the importance of legal
status increases as the level of lawlessness decreases.

The following example

demonstrates an increased level of importance relating to another African civil
war.
Just about the same time when Executive
Sierra Leone conflict, Mobutu Sese Seko, the
Republic of Congo (DRC), then called Zaire,
military contractors to salvage his authority

Outcomes was involved in the
former ruler of the Democratic
sought assistance from private
which was being increasingly

267. Executive Outcomes' involvement in several civil conflicts in Africa has been reported. See
Military Intelligence, Professional Bulletin, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/tradoc/usaic/mipb/
1999-3/brooks.htm. It advertised its services as: "Military Training, advice and support services. ParaMilitary Services. Peacekeeping Services. Special Security Services." See Executive Outcomes,
Mission & Services, http://web.archive.org/web/19981205202613 /www.eo.com/miserv/miserv2.html
(last visited June 19, 2007).
268. Executive Outcomes was dissolved in January 1999 when South Africa enacted the
Regulations of Foreign Military Assistance Act. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, Bill
54D-97 (GA), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=71747 [hereinafter
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill].
269. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on Human Rights, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and its
Application to Peoples under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, Report on the
Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise
of the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/23 (Jan. 12, 1994) (providing
that mercenaries "tend to increase the violent and cruel nature of specific aspects of the armed conflict
in which they are involved").
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threatened by rebellion. 270 Although Executive Outcomes and MPRI declined his
request, as they considered his situation hopeless, another firm known as Geolink
got involved in the conflict to assist him.271
The leader of the rebellion, Laurent Kabila, finally took over government
power, reportedly with some assistance from another private company.2272 When
Kabila was in turn threatened by a coalition of forces, which included the national
militaries of Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, he hired Executive Outcomes for
military support.273 His adversaries also hired private military contractors
274
including the South Africa based Stabilco and Avient for air combat support.
This complex situation demonstrates a number of different scenarios. The
situations that could have or might have happened include the following: the
capture by Sese Seko forces of one or more of the private personnel aiding Kabila;
the capture by national armed forces of the DRC (after Kabila's take over) of
Stabilco or Avient personnel fighting on behalf of Uganda, Rwanda, or Zimbabwe;
and finally the capture by the national armed forces of any one of the three nations
of Executive Outcomes' personnel fighting for Kabila. In all of the above
examples, the captors would be sovereign governments with national armed forces
who could, if they choose, put the captured on trial for unlawful combatancy.
Additionally, in all of these examples, almost invariably, the private military
contractors qualify as mercenaries under the narrow definition of article 47 of
Protocol I discussed at length above.
In conclusion, it appears that the provision of combat services by private
military contractors is almost always illegal. As such, it would put involved
personnel at risk of being prosecuted for their participation as well as any injury,
death, or damage they might cause, regardless of the legitimacy of the military
objectives.
C. Responsibility
The preceding subsections of this part attempted to put the various activities
of private military contractors in a legal continuum. The continuum shows that
while some activities are perfectly legitimate, others are either ambiguous or
outright illegitimate. The discussion in these subsections was limited to the
identification of the possibility of prosecution for the illegitimate activities
whenever the actors fall into the hands of the governments or other entities against
which they fight. The following section looks at the status of private military
contractors from the perspective of the states that host, employ, and deploy them.

270. See CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 10.
271. Id. Singer notes that this company might have been a cover for the French intelligence rather
than an independent private firm, citing O'Brien, Military Advisory Groups and African Security (does
not provide citation). This would, of course, change the entire status analysis pertaining only to this
particular entity because if there is government involvement, the status of the personnel involved would
be different.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 11.
274. Id.
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It also examines the responsibilities of these states under international law, and sets
the stage for the concluding analysis.
1. Private Military Contractors' Accountability
Two general forms of accountability could be envisaged: individual criminal
responsibility and company civil liability. Both of these options are briefly
discussed in turn.
a. Individual Criminal Responsibility
Holding members of private military contractors criminally responsible in the
states that host them, and employ their services could be very problematic. A
practical example that can demonstrate the difficulty with this regard is the widely
publicized Abu Ghraib situation.275
Private military contractors were involved in the abuses along with uniformed
U.S. military personnel. 276 The abuses clearly constituted criminal acts. While
several military personnel involved in the abuses were prosecuted, convicted, and
sentenced to up to ten years in prison, no criminal prosecution was made against
the civilian contractors who were equally responsible for the crimes. 2 78 That is
primarily because of the very difficult nature of the status of the private actors
under conflict situations. 279 The forum to hold them responsible is simply not
easily available. Understandably, the military personnel were held accountable
before courts-martial. The jurisdiction of the courts-martial did not, however,
extend to the trial of private individuals accompanying the armed forces in this
case. 28 0 The reason for this is complex, and this article does not attempt to provide
a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence in that area. 81
However, it is important to briefly point out that the U.S. has an elaborate
statutory framework for the prosecution in U.S. federal courts of private
contractors who commit criminal conduct abroad.282 The most notable statutes are
275. For a comprehensive discussion of the Abu Ghraib situation, see generally Major General
Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 8 0 0th Military Police Brigade (2004) available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-law.htm#abu ghraib (last visited June 20, 2007).
276. See also Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2004, at Al5.
277. See MSNBC, EnglandSentenced to 3 Years, Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/9492624/ (last visited June 20, 2007). See also CNN, Sentencing Phase Begins in Abu
Ghraib,May 3, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/05/02/ england.plea/index.html (last
visited June 20, 2007); see also Eric Schmitt, Iraq Abuse TrialIs Again Limited to Lower Ranks, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23 2006, at Al (quoting a military spokesperson as saying a total of 251 military personnel
had received varying levels of punishment for prisoner abuse); see also Josh White, Conflicting
Portraitsof Officer ChargedOver Abu Ghraib, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A03.
278. See P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 127, cited in
Peters, supra note 29, at 367. Since then, some contractors were prosecuted for contract fraud, which
had nothing to do with the abuses. See id. at n. 1.
279. See id.at 126-127 (discussing legal dilemmas).
280. Uniform Code of Military Justice, § 802, art. 2.
281. For a thorough discussion of the jurisdictional issue, see generally Peters, supra note 29.
282. Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR CONGRESS, Jan. 7, 2010.
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the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MFJA),283 the Special Maritime and
Territorial Jurisdiction Act (SMTJ),284 and the War Crimes Act (WCA).285
Therefore, individual criminal responsibility, at least from the perspective of the
U.S., could theoretically be pursued in regular federal courts if desired.286 Federal
courts do not seem to be convenient forums for practical reasons unrelated to the
issue of jurisdiction.287 What would have been the most appropriate and
convenient forum, one that has tried the cases of the uniformed personnel, the
military court system, is simply not available for cases involving civilian
contractors in the absence of a declared war.288 This is another important reason
for the proper definition of their status under IHL and the regulation of their
conduct under the domestic laws of the states that host them and employ their
services.

b. Company Civil Liability
Civil liability is perhaps more complicated than holding wrongdoers
criminally responsible. In the U.S., there are limited avenues that victims may
explore. One of the possibilities is a civil suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA").28 9 ATCA grants federal courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 2 90 There are several seeming obstacles to prevailing in a civil suit
against a private military contractor under the ATCA. Three major obstacles can
easily be identified.

283. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3261-3267 (2000).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
285. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
286. For example, the SMTJ gives federal courts jurisdiction for conducts that occur outside of the
U.S. but in facilities run by the U.S. government. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 as amended by USA Patriot Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. VIII, § 894, 115 Stat. 272, 377 (2001).
287. For various reasons, including political, this option does not seem to have been considered
seriously and pursued as it could have been. In fact, there was only one prosecution related to prisoner
abuse by civilian contractors in Iraq or Afghanistan. See Jaime Jansen, Federal TrialBegins for CIA
Contractor Chargedwith Afghan Detainee Abuse, JURIST LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Aug. 7, 2006,

available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/federal-trial-begins-for-cia.php (last visited
June 22, 2007). In an interesting departure from previous practice, five Blackwater Guards were
charged with fourteen counts of manslaughter on December 8, 2008, for their roles in the Nisoor Square
incidents that occurred on September 16, 2007, during which fourteen Iraqi civilians were killed. See
Ginger Thompson & James Risen, Plea by Blackwater GuardHelps Indict Others, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/washington/09blackwater.html.
This case is
likely to raise serious jurisdictional controversy.
288. See United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363 (1970) (cert. denied.) In Averette, the
United States Court of Military Appeals held that the term "in times of war" in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C §. 802(a)(10), limits the federal courts' jurisdiction to conduct occurring in
declared wars. See id at 365. See also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248
(1960) (holding that military jurisdiction did not extend to civilian dependents of military personnel in
peace time); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957) (holding that civilians in times of peace
may not be tried by courts-martial).
289. Also called the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
290. Id.
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The first obstacle is of course overcoming the Supreme Court's strict
29 1
interpretation of the substantive limits of the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that the ATCA is a jurisdictional
statue, raised the standard for the severity of the injury that must be alleged as a
violation of "the law of nations."292 The Court held that the nature of the violation
must be such that it is universally recognized as seriously injurious. 293 To
demonstrate the level of seriousness, the Court borrowed language from several
courts of appeals. For example, it quoted the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
for the proposition that section 1350 of the ATCA applies when the violations
must be "a handful of heinous actions - each of which violates definable, universal
and obligatory norms." 294 It also relied on the holding of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which said that "[f]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind." 295 Given the strict limitation of the ATCA to hostis
humani generis, any private action against private military contractors would
recognizably be very difficult. There are a few pending cases brought by victims
of Abu Ghraib abuses against involved private military companies under the
ATCA.296 Given the current debate about the meaning of torture, it remains to be
seen in the few cases that are now pending, whether the courts will hold that the
abuses met the standards that the Supreme Court set in Sosa.
The second obstacle is establishing a government connection. International
obligations are often defined in terms of government accountability. For example,
under the Convention Against Torture,297 acts of torture may only give rise to
liability if they are committed by a public official or at the acquiescence of a public
official.298 Consequently, to prevail under ATCA, the claimant must establish that
the law of nations has been violated, and prove that there was a nexus between the
injury and government conduct.299
Wherever private military contractors are involved, establishing a government
nexus could be very difficult. For example, would private contractors hired by the
Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) be considered to have been hired by
the U.S. government or an Iraqi government? Or was the CPA a government at
all? If the CPA is not a government, it would mean that there is no civil liability
for private military contractors under the circumstances.

291. Alvarez v. Sosa, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
292. See id.at 735.
293. Id.
294. Id. (quoting Tel-oren v. Libya Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
295. Id. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cit. 1980)).
296. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436
F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006).
297. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984). See also Foreign Affairs and
Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277.
298. G.A. Res. 39/46, supranote 297, art. 1.
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
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These arguments are not hypothetical. For example, in a case against private
contractor Custer Battles LLC for fraud under the False Claims Act, a U.S. federal
judge set aside a jury verdict holding the company responsible for $10 million
precisely because of the ambiguous nature of the status of the CPA during the
initial years of the Iraqi invasion. 300 The only issue in this case was the status of
the CPA as a government entity and its relations with the U.S.301 The government
argued that fraudulent bills presented to the CPA could be considered to have been
presented to the government of the United States because the CPA was created and
financed by the United States to run Iraq and staffed by American personnel. 302
However, despite this, the court held that the CPA was an international entity with
an ambiguous status but may not be considered a part of the United States
government. 03 As such, the fraudulent documents submitted to the CPA cannot be
considered to have been submitted to the United States.304 That meant that the
private contractor was not held responsible for the fraudulent behavior despite a
jury verdict determining the existence of fraudulent activities. 0 5 Because this was
the first test case, the ruling obviously rendered the dozens of others that were
ready to be filed 306 void ab inito, at least from the point of view of this particular
basis of jurisdiction.
Another example that demonstrates the obstacles that the private-government
distinction might create is the D.C. Circuit's June 2006 preliminary decision in
Saleh v. Titan Corp.3 07 In Saleh, several Iraqi nationals brought an action under
the ATCA against the Titan Corporation, a private military contractor which
provided interrogation and translation services in Iraq.308 They alleged that Titan's
personnel abused the claimants in violation of the law of nations.309 The court
essentially held that the claimants did not sufficiently demonstrate the required
degree of nexus between the private actors and the government.310 In other words,
they did not show that they were operating under official capacity or under the
color of law.311 Ironically, throughout history, it is in these types of ambiguous

300. See Jeannie Shawl, FederalJudge Sets Aside Verdict In Iraq Contract Fraud Case, JURIST
LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Aug. 20, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2006/08/federal-judge-sets-aside-verdict-in.php [hereinafter Shawl].
301. Id.
302. Shawl, supra note 300; see also Erik Eckholm, U.S. Judge Sets Aside Verdict of Corporate
Fraud in Iraq on Technical Grounds, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 19, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2006/08/19/world/africa/19iht-web.0819reconstruct.2536456.html? r-1 [hereinafter Eckholm].
303. Eckholm, supranote 302.
304. Id.
305. See id
306. Id. (reporting that there were dozens of others that were ready to be filed at the time this case
was decided).
307. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (2006).
308. Id. at 56-57.
309. See id
310. Id. at 57.
311. Id. at 57-58. (In so holding, the court emphasized that in Sosa, the Supreme Court clearly
held that lower "federal courts should be extremely cautious about discovering new offenses among the
law of nations....") Id. at 57-58.
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situations that the services of the private military contractors are needed the
most. 312 That is an additional reason why their legal status must be properly
defined and their conduct properly regulated.
The third obstacle to the success of civil suits against private military
companies is the government contractor defense. The government contractor
defense was initially endorsed by the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Techs.
Corp.313 The doctrine essentially extends sovereign immunity to private actors
performing services under a government contract. 14 That would evidently create a
gap in accountability. A good demonstration of this is the Abu Ghraib situation,
where the private military contractors were involved under a government
contract. 315 They have essentially escaped any kind of criminal accountability 3 16
for which their military counterparts were punished. This might also invoke
sovereign immunity to avoid civil liability under the Boyle government contractor
doctrine.3 17 That would be a win-win situation for private actors.
2. State Responsibility
We now know that sixteen of the forty-four incidents at Abu Ghraib were
committed by private contractors.3 18
If Iraq were to seek redress under
international law, would the United States be responsible for all of the incidents or
just the twenty-eight incidents that its own military personnel committed? The
answer to this question is not straightforward because some of the same privategovernment nexus issues discussed in the above subsection arise in almost an
identical way. However, this subsection suggests that state responsibility could be
established more easily than the private-government nexus in the domestic law
context.
The International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides the following general
principle: "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that state."3 19 According to the ILC, two important elements must

312. See, e.g., CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 23, at 39 ("Private actors, such as free
companies, contracted units, military entrepreneurs, and charter companies played key roles in statebuilding and often served government interests. These organizations also had the tendency to become
powers unto themselves, however, and often grew superior in power to local political institutions,
particularly in areas of weak governance.").
313. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514 (1988).
314. See id at 12; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1997).
315. P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at B03
[hereinafter The Contract the Military Needs to Break].
316. Id.
317. Professor Laura Dickinson suggests that because Boyle was a products liability case, in which
the contractor followed government specifications relating to design, it could be argued that the doctrine
does not extend to the provision of services where such instructions do not exist. Government for Hire,
supra note 29, at 189. It could also be argued, however, that civilian contractors performing services
pursuant to government instructions would also enjoy sovereign immunity. Pending litigation would
resolve some of these issues. See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C 2006).
318. The Contract the Military Needs to Break, supra note 315.
319. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
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be met cumulatively: a breach of international law and attribution to the state.32
The existence or non-existence of both elements is determined by international
law. 321
The most relevant part of the two-part equation is the attribution requirement.
The question that needs to be answered is thus, when does the conduct of private
military contractors bind the state that employs their services? According to the
ILC, the general principle is that the state would be responsible for the actions of
its own organs, which includes all three branches of government and their political
subdivisions.322 This principle is simple. To go back to the Abu Ghraib example,
the United States would be held responsible for the conduct of its military
personnel under this general principle. The ILC articles also make it clear that
States may be held responsible for the conduct of private actors if the following
requirements are met:
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State
under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that State to

exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an
act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is
acting in that capacity in the particular instance. 323
The most important element here seems to be the empowerment of a private

or para-statal entity to perform an inherently governmental function. In his
commentary on this particular provision, Professor James Crawford offers the
following example: "[i]n some countries private security firms may be contracted
to act as prison guards and in that capacity may exercise public powers such as
powers of detention and discipline pursuant to a judicial sentence or to prison
regulations."324 Providing security services in prisons administered by a state
outside of the territory would not change the equation.

Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, art. 1 (2001) [hereinafter
ILC]. Reprinted with commentary in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 61 (2002) [hereinafter CRAWFORD]. "Text adopted by the

Commission at is fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the
Commission's report covering the work of that session. The report, which also contains commentaries
on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of the InternationalLaw Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part
Two). Text reproduced as it appears in the General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001,
and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. J)/Corr.4." Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%/20articles/9 6 2001.pdf.
320. ILC, supranote 319, art. 2.
321. Id. art. 3.
322. Id. art. 4
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or
any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State,

and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a
territorial unit of the State. 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has
that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.
323. Id. art. 5.
324. See CRAWFORD, supranote 319, at 100.
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The one argument that may be raised is that the private military firms perform
their activities as a matter of contractual obligation, not as a matter of authorization
by law.325 Professor Crawford's commentary suggests that the authorization by
law is essential because the private entities bind their states as they are more or less
partial government entities themselves. He notes that the primary purpose for the
inclusion of these entities is because of the "increasing phenomenon of para-statal
entities, which exercise elements of governmental authority in place of state
organs."326
Although state responsibility for contract based private actions may raise
these kinds of issues, article 8 of the ILC draft provides a clear rule filling the gaps
left by the provisions discussed above. It states: "The conduct of a person or group
of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."327 As long as "the
existence of a real link between the person or group performing the act and the
State machinery" is established, the State would be held liable.3 28 A contractual
relationship between the state and the private entity would obviously establish this
329
link because it would amount to express authorization or ratification.
Nonetheless, a state in whose name violations have been committed by
private contractors would obviously argue that the authority it had given was
exceeded. However, under the ILC articles of state responsibility, the fact that the
private entity exceeded the lawful authority does not exonerate the state.330 Article
7 of the ILC articles provides that: "The conduct of an organ of a State or of a
person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority

shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, person
or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes
instructions."' 31 This is a self explanatory provision, but again, there is nothing
that would prevent the state from holding the private contractor responsible for its
excesses and obtain indemnification for any damages that the state may incur as a
result of the private contractor's excesses.
It can safely be concluded, therefore, that the conduct of private military
contractors could potentially expose the state that employs their services to
325. The civilian almost always gets involved pursuant to contractual arrangements. See generally
Dickinson, Torture and Contract,supranote 208.
326. CRAWFORD, supra note 319, at 100.
327. ILC, supranote 319, art. 8.
328. CRAWFORD, supra note 319, at 110.
329. See IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, VOL. I, 160161:
In certain cases of special need the authorities of a state may supplement their
own actions by authorizing operations by private persons or groups designed as
'auxiliaries' or 'militia'. Such persons are not 'regular' or 'formal' elements in
the state apparatus but they do in fact act on behalf of the state conferring
authority.
330. ILC, supranote 319, art. 7.
331. Id.
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international legal responsibility. Accordingly, that is another important reason for
understanding their status and carefully regulating their conduct.
D. Drawing the Line: What may they do, and what must they not do?
As indicated above, not all activities of private military contractors can easily
be classified as legal or illegal. Most of the private military contractors perform
legitimate activities most of the time. As such, in times of war their legal status
fits nicely into the non-combatant designation of IHL. The serious challenge is,
however, to circumscribe the scope of their activities within the legal limits.
Although private military contractors share some fundamental similarities, it
cannot be concluded that they have a unitary status under IHL. In other words,
their status depends on the activities they perform at a given time and place.
The most important question that needs to be answered here is thus, where
must the line be drawn? Private military contractors that meet the requirements of
mercenaries are clearly banned. The problem with that is the extremely narrow
definition of Protocol I article 47.332 As indicated above, the United Nations
Mercenary Convention has broadened the definition by eliminating the
requirement of taking direct part in hostilities.333 According to this Convention,
therefore, private military contractors may be considered mercenaries if they
recruit personnel for combat and pay them in excess of what a regular soldier
would be paid under the same circumstances.334 This responsibility of the firms
attaches because the Convention holds not only the recruited foot-soldiers but also
the recruiters and financiers responsible for the same offenses.335 However,
perhaps because of the revisions in the definition of mercenary, this Convention
has not been ratified widely. 336 That would mean that in states that did not ratify
this Convention, accountability may not attach until actual participation in
hostilities resumes. Aside from the ambiguity that results from the application of
the two alternative definitions of mercenary, it could safely be concluded that
engaging in combat, for pay, in a foreign land, without being a uniformed member
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, remains prohibited. So, there is a
clear line.
Moving forward with the continuum, the next stage is the involvement of
private military contractors in support services without actually taking part in
actual combat. The standard set forth under IHL is that a civilian accompanying
the armed forces of a party to the conflict may not take direct part in hostilitieS33 7
or use the civilian status to cause harm to the enemy. 338 These are difficult
332. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 47.
333. See International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries, supra note 184, art. 1.
334. Id.
335. Id. at art. 2. ("Any person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenaries, as defined in
article 1 of the present Convention, commits an offence for the purposes of the Convention").
336. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Depositary Notifications (CNs) by the Secretary-General,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/CNs. Aspx (last visited June 25, 2007).
337. See Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 51(3).
338. Id. at art. 13. As indicated above, this standard is extracted from the rules that govem medical
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concepts to define, but unfortunately, under the existing IHL, that is where the line
must be drawn. Nonetheless, this line is extremely important because it offers a
solid foundation for further regulation.339
E. Going Forward: Conduct-basedTime, Place, and Manner Regulation
The discussion so far has made one important matter clear: the status of
private military contractors under IHL depends on what they perform at a given
time and place and how they perform the activities. The legal literature and
international and domestic legislative initiatives presented thus far, by and large,
focus on ways of holding them directly accountable for illegitimate activities they
had already performed, or on the ways of regulating the whole private military
industry as a single unit through international mechanisms. Although both
approaches offer plausible alternatives, they clearly ignore the guidance that
already existing norms of IHL provide for future regulation. Precisely because of
that, they either treat the industry as a holistic unit or emphasize individual
accountability for wrongdoing after its occurrence. These shortcomings would
inevitably make the proposals incomplete. Some examples of these approaches are
briefly discussed below.
One common proposal is extending courts-martial jurisdiction to private
military contractors who engage in misconduct.340 This is a good proposal;
however, it does not resolve the underlying problem of unlawful combatancy,
because one may only be brought before courts-martial for a crime that had already
been committed. That would mean that there would be no penalty for crossing the
line drawn by IHL, for example, taking direct part in hostilities until such time that
a crime is committed. In other words, there would be no grounds to court-martial a
private military contractor who transports ammunition in a combat zone, even if
that conduct may be interpreted as taking direct part in hostilities under IHL.
Although the mere transportation of the ammunition may be prosecuted as aiding
and abetting the enemy while enjoying a civilian status, serious illegality would
ensue if the truck is attacked and the driver kills enemy soldiers and gets
captured. 341 A mere participation or even the killing of an enemy soldier is not a
conduct that would be prosecuted before the courts-martial of the employing state
unless a war crime had been committed. As such, the courts-martial proposal for
units. Although the provision is exclusively dedicated to the regulation of medical units, it is evident
that the principle has a broader meaning, particularly when read together with the other provisions of
the Protocol dealing with the protection of civilians in armed conflict. See id. at art. 67.
339. The ICRC's 2009 interpretive guide on the notion of direct participation in hostilities could be
a very useful tool in determining the nature of activities that would cross the line for this purpose. See
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/

Web/eng/siteengo.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-report res/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009icrc.pdf.
340. A notable proponent of this proposal is professor Wm. C. Peters of the United States Military
Academy, West Point. See Peters, supranote 29.
341. And, of course, the driver would raise the issue of self-defense but the very fact that he took
direct part in hostilities by transporting weaponry may override the defense. This is, however, a matter
for the enemy's adjudication of the details of the case.
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private military contractors is limited to holding wrongdoers responsible from the
point of view of the employer state after recognizable crimes had been committed.
It is an important tool but it does not address the greater need for proper regulation
of the conduct of private military contractors with a view to ensuring compliance
with international humanitarian norms.
The other notable domestic proposal is a contracts-based proposal.342 Under
this proposal, the contract that the private military contractors sign could be used
as a tool to regulate their conduct. This is a very good proposal. However, this
proposal presents four problems. First, the nature of contracts will always depend
on the circumstances, particularly the negotiating powers of the parties at a given
time and place.343 Secondly, because the contracts approach is inherently ad hoc, it
cannot possibly bring uniformity and order to the private military industry.
Thirdly, since it is not a legal requirement, the contracts will always remain open
for re-negotiation. Fourthly, such contracts are almost always confidential and
shielded from public scrutiny. That would mean that the industry would be
governed by unknown sets of contractual terms.
The second set of proposals envisions regulations of an international nature.
For example, Judge Advocate Todd Milliard proposes an international convention
establishing a regime of accountability and licensing.3 44 Similarly, Dr. Singer
argues that given the industry's ability to globalize and avoid domestic
accountability, a successful regulation must be international in nature.3 45 He
recognizes that banning the provision of military services altogether is not realistic
given today's supply and demand environment.346
He then proposes an
international mechanism of registration, licensing, and auditing under the United

Nations Secretary General's Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism.347 He also
proposes that this mechanism be supported by international experts on issues of
regulation, evaluation, and codes of conduct.3 48 According to him, this will help
transform the industry into a sanctioned international business industry.349

342. The proponent of this approach is Professor Laura Dickinson of the University of
Connecticut. See Public Law Values in a Privatized World, supra note 26, at 401 (advocating a
contract-based approach); see also Government for Hire, supra note 29, at 199; see also Torture and
Contract,supra note 208, at 273-74.
343. For example, if the government is badly in need of extinguishing a fire at a military base in
Kuwait within 24 hours and the only company that can do the job is KBR, the company may strike a
deal for additional future contracts in combat zones in Iraq as a condition of accepting the Kuwait
project. And if the Iraq project is awarded in exchange for the badly needed Kuwait project, the
company may risk being considered as having taken direct part in hostilities depending on what was set
ablaze in the Iraqi conflict zone. That would potentially expose KBR personnel to unlawful combatant
status. This is, of course, assuming that the adversary itself is a lawful combatant.
344. Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate
Private Military Companies, 176 ML. L. REv. 1, 79-84 (2003) (recognizing the importance of domestic
regulation).
345. See War, Profits,and the Vacuum ofLaw, supra note 24, at 544.

346. Id.
347. Id. at 545.
34 8. Id.
349. Id. at 545-46.
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There have also been legislative initiatives. Two notable examples are the
2002 United Kingdom Green Paper prepared by the order of the House of
Commons entitled Private Military Companies Options for Regulations,3 5 0 and the
1998 South African Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act.3 51 These two
initiatives are discussed in turn below.
The U.K. Green Paper contains a somewhat thorough analysis of the private
military industry and proposes options for the domestic regulation of the
industry.352 The basic proposal assesses the pros and cons of each option. The
options include banning military activities abroad altogether,353 and also banning
recruitment for military activities abroad.354 Alternatively, it would establish a
licensing regime for military services, which includes registration and notification
requirements.35 The final and additional option contained in the Green Paper is
self-regulation in the form of voluntary codes of conduct.356 The proposal was
written with the following fundamental assumption in mind:
The distinction between combat and non-combat operations is often
artificial. The people who fly soldiers and equipment to the battlefield
are as much a part of the military operation as those who do the
shooting. At one remove the same applies to those who help with
maintenance, training, intelligence, planning and organization - each of
these can make a vital contribution to the war fighting capability. 357
Although this is completely true, the problem with this premise is that it does
not seem to have been properly informed by the standards set forth under the
existing norms of IHL. As discussed in several sections above, IHL actually
makes a distinction between those who fly the aircraft with the authorization to
shoot, and civilian crew members of military aircraft who are not authorized to
shoot. 358 Unlike the assumption made above, their status and treatment is actually
distinct. It is only if the civilian members take direct part in hostilities that their
350. BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS

FOR REGULATION (2002), available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf4/fco_pdf private
militarycompanies [hereinafter BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE]. The Green Paper
was prepared by the order of the House of Commons, however, proposals forwarded were not
considered by the House as of the writing of this article. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2002, H.C. 577.
351. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note 268. South Africa is at the
forefront of this regulation primarily because of its history. Some of the prominent military contractors
that operated in Africa, and elsewhere, in the post-colonial period had their origins in the apartheid
regime. For example, some executives of these firms occupied prominent positions in the Special
Forces of the apartheid regime. Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
InternationalSecurity Companies, InternationalLaw, and the New World Disorder,34 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 75, 93-97 (1998).
352. See BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supranote 350.
353. Id. at 22.
354. Id. at 23.
355. Id. at 24-25.
356. Id. at 26.
357. Id. at 8.
358. See Geneva Convention III, supranote 3, art. 4(A)(4).
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civilian status ceases. 359 The proposal uses the term "vital contribution" 360 which
is not a legally significant phrase as far as IHL is concerned. The proper standard
is "taking direct part in hostilities." 361 The use of different terminology in itself
may not be a serious problem but it demonstrates the lack of reliance on the most
appropriate and most relevant body of law.
The Green Paper could have been properly informed by the standards set
under IHL but it was not. As such, it suffers from that shortcoming. But more
importantly, just like all the other proposals discussed above, the theoretical
foundation of the proposals is based on the desire to regulate the industry as a
holistic unit as opposed to looking at the issue in terms of what conduct may or
may not be performed by whom and when. A reliance on the standards set forth
by international humanitarian law would have suggested such an approach.
South Africa's approach is more or less the same as the proposed U.K. Green
Paper approach, for example, licensing and monitoring of South African private
military service providers.362 The Act does not, however, make it abundantly clear
that South African private military contractors cannot take direct part in hostilities
no matter what the excuses may be.3 63 To be fair, the Act provides that
mercenaries are banned,364 and that the Ministry of Defense of South Africa may
not grant the request for a license if it "would be in conflict with the Republic's
obligations in terms of international law."3 6 5 However, it appears that firms may
359. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 51(3)
360. BRITISH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 350, at 8.
361. Additional Protocol I, supranote 3, art. 51(3).
362. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supranote 268, at Preamble.
363. See id. at art. 1(iii): "foreign military assistance" means military services or military-related
services, or any attempt, encouragement, incitement or solicitation to render
such services, in the form of(a) military assistance to a party to the armed conflict by means of(i) advice or training;
(ii) personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support;
(iii) personnel recruitment;
(iv) medical or para-medical services; or
(v) procurement of equipment;
(b) security services for the protection of individuals involved in armed
conflict or their property;
(c) any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the
constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state;
(d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military interests of
a party to the armed conflict.
364. Id. at art. 2. The Act defines mercenary activity as "direct participation as a combatant in
armed conflict for private gain." Id. at art. 1(iv). It is important to note that "private gain" is a
requirement that could easily be masked with allegations of protection of public order or democratic
institutions or government. It is also important to note that the requirement of "direct participation" is
at odds with the definition of the U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries. See UN Convention Against
Mercenaries, supra note 184, art. 1.
365. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note 268, art. 7(1)(a). It is important to
note here that the manner in which the criteria is stated suggests that combat operations are not
outlawed or excluded in their entirety, but somehow regulated through licensing procedures. It is also
important to note that South Africa is not a signatory to the O.A.U. Convention for the Elimination of
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operate under a lawful license to "do any action that has the result of furthering the
military interest of a party to the armed conflict." 366 The fundamental flaw is thus,
just like the approaches discussed above, the theoretical foundation is not the
standards set by IHL. It also attempts to regulate the industry as a holistic unit.
Apparently, the Ministry would issue the license based on paperwork filed
according to the requirements. The criteria set forth under article 7(1) are not only
very general but also make no reference to IHL in particular,367 which is the most
pertinent body of law that must have guided the drafting of the Act.
All of the above discussed proposals, which fairly represent the proposals
circulating today, have one remarkable characteristic in common - they attempt to
regulate the private military industry as one holistic unit and ignore the valuable
guidance offered by IHL. This article proposes a different approach, a time, place,
and manner regulation based on the standards provided by JHL. More particularly,
it suggests that instead of attempting to regulate the industry as a whole, which is
extremely diverse and in everyone's 401(k) portfolio (to use Dr. Singer's
words),368 compliance could reasonably be attained if the time, place, and manner
of their operations are regulated based on the standards already provided by IHL.
The application and use of these standards, which are discussed at length in the

Mercenarism in Africa. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Convention of the OA Ufor the Elimination
48
5&ps=S (last
of Mercenarism in Africa, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/WebSign?ReadForm&id=
visited June 27, 2007). See Tiyanjana Maluwa, South Africa and the African Union, 2 INT'L ORG. L.
REV 103, 117-22 (2005) (commenting on South Africa's lack of ratification).
"Criteria for granting or refusal of authorizations and approvals
7. (1) An authorisation or approval in terms of sections 4 and 5 may not be
granted if
it would(a)be in conflict with the Republic's obligations in terms of international law;
(b) result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
territory in which the foreign military assistance is to be rendered;
(c) endanger the peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into the
region where the assistance is to be, or is likely to be, rendered or would
otherwise contribute to regional instability and would negatively influence the
balance of power in such region;
(d) support or encourage terrorism in any manner;
(e) contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts;
(fWprejudice the Republic's national or international interests;
(g) be unacceptable for any other reason.
(2) A person whose application for an authorisation or approval in terms of
section 4
or 5 has not been granted by the Minister may request the Minister to furnish
written
reasons for his or her decision.
(3) The Minister shall furnish the reasons referred to in subsection (2) within a
reasonable time." Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supra note
268, art. 7(1)(a).
366. Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill, supranote 268, art. 1(iii) (d). When read with
articles 4 and 5, the meaning stated above is indicated.
367. See id at art. 7(1).
368. War, Profits and the Vacuum ofLaw, supra note 24, at 522.
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previous sections, render illegal certain conduct based on the place, time, and
manner of their performance. A valid regulation would therefore follow this
already existing guidance.
For instance, the two most important areas where the standards set by IHL,
namely, taking direct part in hostilities or causing harm to the enemy, create some
ambiguity are in services that involve transportation of military supplies and
construction of bases. To take the Iraq situation as a demonstration of issues
pertaining to transportation, under the standards of IHL discussed above, it would
appear that while a private contractor may transport weapons and ammunition
from Maryland to Qatar, it may not transport the same package across the
Euphrates River to supply an Infantry Division stationed deep inside Iraq because
the latter could reasonably be interpreted as taking direct part in hostilities.369
Proceeding with the same assumptions (because at least theoretically this is true in
most other conflicts), if a private military contractor is captured while transporting
military equipment, that person would not be entitled to prisoner of war status and
may be prosecuted for whatever conduct he or she had performed. If, however, the
supply was food, water, and medicine instead of ammunition, IHL protects the
driver as a civilian and he must be treated as a prisoner of war and returned
unharmed at the conclusion of the hostilities. 370
Construction is another area of ambiguity. Going back to the Yugoslavian
example, while a private military contractor may build a refugee camp in
Macedonia, it cannot lawfully build a military barricade in Srebrenica, which
would clearly mean taking direct part in hostilities.
Therefore, to the extent some of the conduct they perform might be
interpreted as direct participation in hostilities or causing harm to the enemy, in the
interest of ensuring the legality of the activities of private military contractors,
states that host them and employ their services must in their domestic laws define
the line more clearly and prohibit conduct that would not only expose the firms to
liability and the persons serving on the ground to danger but also lead to the host
state's international responsibility. The easiest and most appropriate regulation
would be a time, place, and manner regulation.
For instance, in the Yugoslavia example discussed above, it may be provided
that while a private military contractor may transport supplies including military
supplies from Maryland to Bonn, it may not fly the same supplies from Bonn to an
airport near Belgrade, where there would be a high risk of becoming involved in an
unauthorized conflict. So, instead of prohibiting the transportation of military
equipment by private contractors altogether, the regulations may provide for a
reasonable limit as to the time, place, and manner of the provision of the services.
That would not only avoid situations whereby private personnel would be drawn or

369. DINSTEIN, supranote 7, at 27.
370. Although the Iraq situation is used as an example because of its current importance, it is
important to note that the nature of the conflict is atypical. Thus, such assumptions need to be made.
Of course, the examples make more sense in conventional inter-state conflicts, where both parties
consider themselves bound by JHL.
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forced into combat activity without lawful authorization, but would also spare the
state using their services of international responsibility for violations of IHL.
Similarly, reasonable time, place, and manner regulation should also work well for
construction services, which is one of the most important services provided by
private military contractors. In this respect, the regulation may provide that
contractors may not perform construction activities within some miles of active
hostilities until such time that the hostilities cease. The details of the regulations
would obviously need to be looked into very carefully.
V. CONCLUSION

Private military contractors will continue to complicate the equation relating
to international peace and security for the foreseeable future. As their reemergence is a twenty-first century phenomenon, their status as a unitary entity is
not directly defined by international humanitarian law whose marked development
preceded the advent of the post-Cold War era proliferation of private military
contractors. However, international humanitarian law defines the status of each
and every person involved in and affected by warfare. When private military
personnel perform war-related activities, whether in the form of the design of
precision weaponry from an office in Bethesda, Maryland, or in the form of
transporting ammunition in Kosovo, or chasing terrorists in Afghanistan, their
status at each given moment and place is well defined under international
humanitarian law. Therefore, what could be concluded about the status of private
military contractors under international humanitarian law is that it depends on what
they do and where, when, and how they do it. That is precisely why attempting to
regulate the industry as a whole without seeking guidance from international
humanitarian law is often a futile exercise.
This article has attempted to demonstrate the status of military contractors in a
continuum. It highlighted not only the two extremes, the perfectly legal activities
and clearly illegal activities, but also described the challenges involved in
classifying certain activities, and attempted to show where the line must be drawn.
As such, states that consider themselves bound by international humanitarian law
should regulate the provision of military-related services by private parties using
the standards set forth under international humanitarian law. The use of these
standards would inevitably require a time, place, and manner regulatory regime.

THE UNPLEASANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
ARIEL ZEMACH*

The prevailing view in the legal literature on the fight against terrorism is
that the current structure of internationallaw-the law enforcement/armed conflict
dichotomy-is ill-suited to address large-scale hostilities between a state and a
terrorist organization. The law enforcement model is governed by international
human rights law. The armed conflict model is primarily governed by the law of
war. Human rights law, it is argued, allows states too little in their struggle
againstterroristorganizationswhile the law ofwar allows them too much.
Hence, many advocate the development of a new body of law, a normative
middle ground between the law of war and human rights law, applicable to armed
conflicts between a state and a terroristentity. According to this approach, largescale hostilities between a state and a terroristorganization are considered armed
conflict. Yet the application of the law of war to such conflicts is qualified by the
principles of internationalhuman rights law. The interaction between the law of
war and human rights law produces a new, distinct set of norms. The permission
to use lethalforce afforded to a state under these norms is broader than the one
afforded to it under human rights law yet narrower than the one available to the
state under the law ofwar.
This article rejects the normative middle ground approach and defends the
traditional law enforcement/armed conflict dichotomy. It advances a very high
threshold for the existence of armed conflict, arguing that only hostilities that
border on full-scale war amount to an armed conflict. Within the sphere of armed
conflict, properly constructed, the law of war does not allow states too much. On
the contrary, it offers the best bargain from a humanitarianperspective, and
therefore its applicationshould not be qualified.
This articlefurther argues that grave, large-scaleviolence thatfalls short of a
full-scale war is governed exclusively by human rights law. This argument is
tenable provided that human rights law presents realisticstandards of conduct for
states in the face ofsuch violence. The author argues that it does. The liberties to
exercise lethalforce requiredin order to contain grave, large-scale violence are,
and should be, available to a state under human rights law. In the course of this
inquiry, the author addresses two questions concerning the scope ofpermission to
kill suspected terroristsafforded to a state under human rights law:
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1. When is the threat sufficiently proximate tojustify the use
of lethalforce againstthe suspected terrorist?
2. Can a state engage in counter-terrorism operations that
are likely to result in the unintentional killing of innocent
persons?
I. INTRODUCTION

The prevailing view in the legal literature is that the current structure of
international law-the law enforcement/armed conflict dichotomy-is ill-suited to
address large-scale hostilities between a state and a terrorist organization. The
law enforcement model is governed by international human rights law.2 This body
of law, the argument goes, is simply not up to the task. The liberties to exercise
lethal force required in order to contain grave, large-scale violence are not, and
should not be, available to a state under human rights law.3 Yet, it is argued, while
human rights law allows states too little in their struggle against terrorist
organizations, the law of war, which governs armed conflicts, allows them too
much.4 Indeed, the permission granted to a state to exercise lethal force is much
broader under the law of war than it is under international human rights law. The
main difference concerns the objects of permissible use of force. Human rights
law allows the targeted killing of individuals only on the basis of their personal
dangerousness.
By contrast, the law of war is governed by the principle of
distinction between combatants and civilians, 6 which allows targeting combatants
on the basis of their status as members of an armed force, regardless of whether
their actions endanger the lives or interests of the other party to the conflict.
Moreover, the principle of proportionality in the law of war grants states a
relatively broad permission to launch attacks that are likely to result in incidental
killings of uninvolved civilians.8 Under human rights law the permission to cause
collateral damage is much narrower.9

1. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-JudicialExecutions or
Legitimate Means ofDefence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 171, 174 (2005); Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R.
Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of
TargetedKillings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233, 289 (2003).
2. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 176.
3. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 181, 201; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 286.
4. See Marco Sassoli, Use andAbuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism," 22 LAW &
INEQ. 195, 195, 213 (2004); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, NationalSecurity Law,
and the Law ofArmed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 719-20 (2004); Kretzmer,
supranote 1, at 200.
5. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 181-82.
6. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257
(July 8) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons].
7. Kenneth Watkin, Canada/UnitedStates Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law
Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and TargetedKilling, 15 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
281, 310 (2005); Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 190-91.
8. David S. Koller, The Moral Imperative: Toward a Human Rights-Based Law of War, 46
HARV. INT'L L.J. 231, 236 (2005) ("The principle of proportionality permits the destruction of civilians
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Warning against the application of the law of war to the conflict between the
United States and al-Qaeda, Marco Sassoli thus observes that such application
would have allowed the United States to kill the suspected terrorist Jose Padilla by
an ambush attack "when he left his plane at a Chicago airport or at his
grandmother's birthday party."10 Hypothesizing potential aerial attacks against
terrorists in the United States, Canada, or Germany, Sassoli concludes, "[t]his
absurd result, permitting targeted assassinations in the midst of peaceful cities,
proves once more that all those suspected to be 'terrorists' cannot be classified as
combatants.""
There is also a formal obstacle to applying the law of war to the fight against
terrorism. The application of the law of war depends on the existence of either an
international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict. 12 yet largescale hostilities between a state and a terrorist organization, which transcend the
territory of the state involved-the recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in
Gaza and the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda represent such
conflicts-do not fall neatly within the customary definitions of either an
international or a non-international armed conflict. The conduct of parties to a
non-international armed conflict is regulated under Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions,13 as well as under the Second Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions1 4 (Protocol II). The definitions of a non-international armed
conflict contained in those treaties refer to a conflict occurring within the territory
of a state party.
Some commentators thus argue that a conflict between a state
and a non-state actor, which transcends the territory of the state party to the
conflict, cannot be regarded as a non-international armed conflict. 16 Considering

or civilian objects in attacks against a legitimate military objective."); COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 187 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) ("The fact that
civilian casualties are caused during an attack does not, of itself, render the attack unlawful as
proportional incidental casualties caused during an attack on a military objective are legally
acceptable.").
9. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 286 ("Human rights law cannot sustain actions that
result in so high a death toll."). Regarding the scope of permission to engage in counter-terrorism
operations that are likely to result in the unintentional killing of innocent individuals, see infra notes
174-188 and accompanying text.
10. Sassoli, supranote 4, at 213.
11. Id.; see also Brooks, supranote 4, at 719-20 ("[]f the law of armed conflict is applicable even
to actions taken by the United States on U.S. territory, there seems to be no legal bar to preemptive
government killings of suspected al Qaeda operatives in the U.S. (including U.S. citizens) .... If such
governmental . . . killings are permissible, this virtually eliminates the rule of law as we have come to
know it.").
12. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, T67 (Oct. 2, 1995).
13. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
14. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art 1, T 1, adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
15. Fourth Geneva Convention, supranote 13, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 14, art. 1, 1 1.
16. See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
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such conflict an international armed conflict is also problematic since, according to
the prevailing definition of an international armed conflict, such conflict is waged
between two or more states.17
The bulk of authority nevertheless favors the view that large-scale hostilities
between a state and a terrorist organization should be considered armed conflict."

Constructionof War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 32 (2004) ("The [9/11] attacks seemed too transborder in nature to be non-international."); Roy S. Schondorf, Extra-StateArmed Conflicts: Is There a
Needfor a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 32, 35 (2004) (arguing that the law of
non-international armed conflict only concerns purely internal conflicts.); Natasha Balendra, Defining
Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2472 (2008).
17. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK INARMED FORCES INTHE FIELD 32
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter COMMENTARY OF THE FIRST CONVENTION]; U.N. Comm'n on
Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including
Palestine: Report of the Human Rights Inquiry Commission Established Pursuant to Commission
Resolution S-5/1 of 19 October 2000, T 39 , U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16, 2001) ("Clearly,
there is no international armed conflict in the region, as Palestine, despite widespread recognition, still
falls short of the accepted criteria of statehood."); Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International
Humanitarian Law: Challengesfrom the "War on Terror," 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 58
(2003); Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20 (2003); Chris
Downes, 'TargetedKillings' in an Age of Terror: The Legality of the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 277, 283 (2004); Balendra, supranote 16, at 2472.
In an effort to equate the legal status of members of national liberation movements with that of the
soldiers of a state, Article 1(4) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions broadens the
definition of an international armed conflict to include "conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist r6gimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1(4), adopted June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, in INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 33 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Protocol I].
However, Article 1(4) generated much controversy. Thus, it is widely agreed that:
[T]he considerable body of opposition in State practice to treating such conflicts,
for the purposes of the ius in bello, as though they were conflicts between States
suggests that Article 1(4) went well beyond customary law . . . and has not met
the criteria for being absorbed into customary law since its inclusion in Protocol
I.
Christopher Greenwood, CustomaryLaw Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols,in HUMANITARIAN LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 93, 112
(Astrid J. M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991). In discussing Article 1(4), Aldrich noted that "in
effect, the provision is a dead letter." George H. Aldrich, Prospectsfor United States Ratification of
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L 1, 7 (1991). As it does not
represent a rule of customary international law, Article 1(4) is inapplicable, for example, to the cases of
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and the recent American occupation of Iraq, those
occupying powers not being parties to Protocol I. Id. at 6, 19.
18. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006) (concluding that the conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda was a non-international armed conflict to which Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied). The Israeli Supreme Court observed that hostilities
between Israel and Palestinian armed groups amount to an international armed conflict. HCJ 769/02
Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2006] (2) IsrLR 459, 479, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/el6/02007690.el6.pdf. See also, William H. Taft, IV,
The Law ofArmed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features,28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (2003)
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To that end, both courts and commentators have stretched the customary definition
of either an international armed conflict (beyond inter-state conflicts) or a noninternational armed conflict (beyond conflict occurring strictly within the territory
of a particular state) to encompass such hostilities. Others advocate the
development of a third, distinct category of armed conflict-that of "extra-state
armed conflict"-to accommodate hostilities between a state and a transnational
terrorist organization. 19
The rationale underlying this approach turns on the alleged impracticality of
the law enforcement model. All agree that a legal regime that imposes on states
unrealistic law enforcement standards in the face of grave, large-scale violence will
inevitably be ignored.20 In reality, where law enforcement is impractical states will
abandon the law enforcement model regardless of the requirements of international
law. Commentators thus caution that unless international law presents realistic
standards of conduct for states, "they will act in an environment infected by the
lawlessness that characterizes terrorism." 21 According to this view, the purpose of
recognizing the existence of an armed conflict is to provide governments with
certain means-of-last-resort to control especially threatening violence. The law of
war steps in, then, when law enforcement is not up to the task.22
Moreover, under the jurisprudence of both international and domestic courts,
the threshold for the existence of an armed conflict between a state and a terrorist
or guerrilla organization, in terms of the intensity of the violence and its level of
organization, is relatively low. 2 3 Indeed, the sphere of armed conflict has come to

("The law of armed conflict provides the most appropriate legal framework for regulating the use of
force in the war on terrorism."); Jinks, supra note 17, at 9 ("I argue that the laws of war applicable in
non-international armed conflict govern the September 11 attacks and that the attacks violated these
laws."); Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 271 (arguing that the hostilities between Israel and
Palestinian armed groups amount to a non-international armed conflict); Amos Guiora, TargetedKilling
as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 327-28 (2004); Emanuel Gross, Thwarting
Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetratorsor Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human
Rights Versus the State's Duty to ProtectIts Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 195, 204-05 (2001);
Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors under InternationalLaw: An
Analysis of the U.S. PredatorStrike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 359 (2003)
(applying the law of war to U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda members); Downes, supra note
17, at 283-84 (arguing that hostilities between al-Qaeda and the U.S. constitute a non-international
armed conflict).
19. Schondorf, supra note 16, at 5-7 (naming such conflicts extra-state armed conflicts,
distinguishing them from inter-state armed conflicts on the one hand, and from purely internal armed
conflicts on the other hand).
20. Id. at 21. The author observes that imposing a legal regime that strictly adheres to the law
enforcement model regardless of the gravity of terrorist threats "will lead states to reject this legal
regime as a whole." Id. at 22; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 212 (warning against the adoption of
"idealistic standards of behaviour" that cannot reasonably be demanded of states).
21. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 212.
22. Commentators who view the hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians as an armed
conflict contend that "[d]efining a conflict as war ... has to do with the gravity of the threat to the vital
interests of a given community and the absence of any other option for this community to defend itself
against this threat." Daniel Statman, TargetedKilling, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179, 197 (2004).
23. It was the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") that tried to lower the threshold

426

UNPLEASANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW VOL. 38:3

encompass hostilities that are far short of a full-scale war. Some courts take this
approach in order to provide states with the broad liberties to exercise lethal force
available under the law of war. 24 Others aim to bring into play the humanitarian
protections afforded to the civilian population under the law of war.25 Under the
prevailing view, the law of war's field of application is thus very broad.

for the existence of an armed conflict as much as possible. See COMMENTARY OF THE FIRST
CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 32. Thus, the ICRC defined an international armed conflict as "[a]ny
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces . . . . It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place." Id. A commission of
experts established by the ICRC to examine the issue of aid to the victims of internal conflicts
concluded that the existence of a non-international armed conflict "cannot be denied if the hostile
action, directed against the legal government, is of a collective character and consists of a minimum
amount of organization."
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 121 (1987).

Similarly, in its Commentary on the Geneva Conventions

the ICRC advocated wide application of Common Article 3. COMMENTARY OF THE FIRST
CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 50.
The criteria for the existence of a non-international armed conflict, pronounced by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, concern the scale of the violence, its duration and the
level of organization of the rival parties. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, T 562 (May 7, 1997). Yet in applying the said criteria the Tribunal
considered internal violence that was far short of a full-scale war as a non-intemational armed conflict.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, T 244, 247 (July 10, 2008). The
Tribunal concluded that hostilities between the forces of the Macedonian government and a guerrilla
group amounted to an armed conflict despite the fact that "there remained relatively few casualties on
both sides and to civilians (the highest estimates put the total number of those killed as a result of the
armed clashes at 168), and material damage to property and housing was of a relatively small scale."
Id. 244.
In Abella v. Argentina, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded that a violent
confrontation of brief duration (30 hours) between rebels and Argentinean government forces amounted
to an armed conflict under Common Article 3. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./VII.95, doc. 7 rev. T 147, 156 (1997). This case concerned an armed
attack by an organized armed group against a government military base, which was an isolated incident.
Id. T 155. The Commission concluded that "application of Common Article 3 does not require the
existence of large-scale and generalized hostilities or a situation comparable to a civil war in which
dissident armed groups exercise control over parts of national territory." Id. T 152.
24. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2006] (2) IsrLR 459, 475,
529, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fles eng/02/690/007/el6/02007690.el6.pdf.
25. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-30 (2006) (concluding that the conflict between the
United States and al-Qaeda was a non-intemational armed conflict to which Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions applied). The Court subscribed to the position of the International Committee of
the Red Cross that "'nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law,"' and hence joined its conclusion
that the scope of application of Common Article 3 "'must be as wide as possible."' Id. at 631 (quoting
COMMENTARY, CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF

WAR. GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949 51 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross ed. 1958); COMMENTARY,
CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949 36

(Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross ed. 1960). It seems that the main concern of the Court was to ensure that
Hamdan, assuming he is not entitled to a prisoner of war status, enjoys a minimum of humanitarian law
protections granted under Common Article 3. See id at 628-630.
See also, Abella, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, T 148. In an attempt to promote the "purpose of
protecting human life and dignity" the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights subscribed to the
view that the law of internal armed conflicts "should be applied as widely as possible." Id. 152,158.
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Several commentators argue, however, that the existence of an armed conflict
between a state and a terrorist group does not entail full application of the law of
war.26 Addressing situations such as the violent confrontation between Israel and
the Palestinians (the "al-Aqsa Intifada"), David Kretzmer advocates the adoption
of a normative middle ground between the law of war and international human
rights law 27 (hereinafter "mixed model" 28). According to the mixed model,
conflicts such as the al-Aqsa Intifada should be recognized as armed conflicts and
members of Palestinian terrorist organizations should be considered combatants. 29
However, Israel's war rights are qualified by the principles of international human
rights law. The interaction between the law of war and human rights law produces
new norms that differ substantially from those of the law of war. Other
commentators share this view. 30
Under this normative model, the relatively broad permission to exercise lethal
force embodied in the law of war's principles of distinction and proportionality
becomes much narrower. The mixed model departs from the law of war in
allowing the targeting of combatants only on the basis of their personal
dangerousness, rather than on the basis of their status. Thus, while the law of war
allows attacking a combatant "whether or not he or she personally endangers the
lives or interests of the other party to the conflict,"31 according to the proposed
mixed model lethal force may be used against terrorists who do not pose an
imminent threat "only when a high probability exists that if immediate action is not
taken another opportunity will not be available to frustrate the planned terrorist
attacks."32 Moreover, the mixed model allows the use of lethal force against
terrorists only where there is no feasible possibility of arresting them (that is,
where the suspected terrorist is not in a territory under the effective control of the
victim state, and the state in which he stays is either unwilling or unable to thwart
the threat he poses).33 According to its proponents, the mixed model departs from

According to the Commission, an approach that allows the application of humanitarian law protections,
in addition to human rights law, is captured by the "most-favorable-to-the-individual-clause." Id. T
164.
26. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 204.
27. Id. at 201-04.
28. Id. at 204.
29. Id. at 208-09.
30. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 288; see also Schondorf, supra note 16, at 32,
64; Balendra, supra note 16, at 2468, 2480-81. In addressing the application of the armed conflict
model to the fight against terrorism Brooks argues that "international human rights law provides some
benchmarks . . . for developing a new analytical framework that can successfully balance the need to
respond to new kinds of security threats with the equally important need to preserve and protect basic
human rights." Brooks, supranote 4, at 684.
31. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 191.
32. Id at 203. See also Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supranote 1, at 280 ("[T]he laws of war seem to
accept the legitimacy of targeting combatants and . .. it is not necessary for Israel to resort to alternative
means in order to prevent them from carrying out their hostile plans or actions."). However, the new
norm that emerges under the mixed model provides that "[c]ombatants are only legitimate targets if all
other means to apprehend them fail." Id. at 290.
33. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 203.
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the norms of human rights law mainly in relaxing the requirement that the threat
posed by the suspected terrorist be imminent as a condition for targeting him.34
Kretzmer further submits that "according to the demands of international
human rights law, in every case of targeted killing a thorough legal investigation
should be conducted."35 Similarly, other commentators submit that the permission
to cause collateral damage is more limited in the context of an armed conflict
between a state and a terrorist group than in the context of other types of armed
conflict.3 6
The Israeli Supreme Court has recently applied a legal regime tantamount to
the mixed model, examining the legality of the Israeli policy of targeted killing of
Palestinian suspected terrorists. 7
The mixed model clearly rests on the assumption that the liberties to use force
available to a state under this model are not available to it under human rights law.
Under this approach the law of war and human rights law play fundamentally
different, complementary roles in the fight against terrorism. It is the task of the
law of war to provide states with the liberties to exercise lethal force required in
order to contain grave, large-scale violence.38 It is the task of human rights law to
qualify those liberties beyond the limitations contained in the law of war itself
The law of war is the engine of a state's struggle against terrorism; human rights
law is the brakes.
This article defends the traditional law enforcement/armed conflict
dichotomy. Contrary to the prevailing view, I argue that the threshold for the
existence of an armed conflict is very high (i.e., the purview of the law of war is
very narrow). Only where the manifestations of the hostilities border on full-scale
war can a conflict be properly termed armed conflict. Hostilities that do not meet
the threshold for the existence of armed conflict-such as the conflict between the
United States and al-Qaeda-are governed by human rights law, which can and
should be imposed with the unpleasant burden of presenting realistic standards of
conduct for states with regard to the targeting of suspected terrorists. Indeed, this
article advances a view of human rights law that is fundamentally different from
that presented by the proponents of the mixed model. The argument presented
here is largely premised on the view that the liberties to use force afforded to a
state under the mixed model (i.e., a permission to target terrorists who pose a lethal

34. Id. at 202-04.
35. Id. at 212.
36. Schondorf, supra note 16, at 66-67. Schondorf argued that in the cases of the al-Aqsa Intifada
and the fight against al-Qaeda "the approach towards collateral damage should be informed, at least to a
certain extent, by the approach applicable to the question of collateral damage in law enforcement
operations ....
[A] higher standard of care, and maybe even a more demanding proportionality test,
should apply."
37. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2006] (2) IsrLR 459, 515-16,
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/el6/02007690.el6.pdf. Also see infra notes
62-91 and accompanying text.
38. See Brooks, supranote 4, at 692.
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threat that is not imminent; a narrow permission to cause the death of uninvolved
civilians as collateral damage) are also available to it under human rights law.
This article further submits that the law of war applies fully whenever a
conflict between a state and a non-state actor amounts to an armed conflict. This
article thus rejects the approach that advocates the development of a normative
middle ground between the law of war and international human rights law.
The proponents of the mixed model submit that there are armed conflicts
governed by a body of law that is more humanitarian than the law of war.3 9 Part II
shows that this assertion is conceptually flawed as the contours of the sphere of
armed conflict are drawn by reference to the law of war: the sphere of armed
conflict encompasses only those factual realities in which the law of war offers the
best bargain from a humanitarian perspective, that is, only those situations in
which violence allowed under the law of war is inevitable.
Part II further argues that the law of war presents the best bargain from a
humanitarian perspective only where the manifestation of the hostilities borders on
full-scale war. Only then can a conflict be properly termed an armed conflict.
Part III argues that while the proponents of the mixed model advocate its
application to armed conflicts between a state and a non-state aggressor, 40 the
mixed model cedes the legitimate aims of a just war, which include obtaining
reasonable guarantees of future security. Such a concession seems unwarranted.
Part IV argues that the mixed model is inconsonant with the principle of
equality in the application of the law of war, as it is only applicable to the conduct
of states, while non-state actors would be allowed to exercise all of the war rights

granted under the law of war.
None of the proponents of the mixed model advocate its application to
traditional inter-state armed conflicts. The mixed model is presented in the
literature mainly in the context of an armed conflict between a state and a terrorist
group.41 Part V argues that there is no sound basis for distinguishing an armed
conflict between a state and a terrorist group from traditional inter-state armed
conflict.
Part VI argues that human rights law presents realistic standards of conduct
for states in the face of grave, large-scale violence that falls short of a full-scale
war. It addresses two questions concerning the scope of permission to kill
suspected terrorists afforded to a state under human rights law:
1. When is the threat sufficiently proximate to justify the use of lethal force
against the suspected terrorist?
2. Can a state engage in counter-terrorism operations that are likely to result
in the unintentional killing of innocent persons?

39. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 185-86.
40. Id. at 171.
41. Id. at 201-202; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supranote 1, at 288-89.
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In the course of this inquiry, Part VI explores the relationship between
domestic criminal defenses and international human rights law. It concludes that
the liberties to use force afforded to a state under the mixed model are also
available to it under human rights law.
II. A CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTY: CAN THERE BE AN ARMED CONFLICT TO WHICH
THE LAW OF WAR DOES NOT APPLY FULLY?

A. The Nature and Purview of the Law of War
The proponents of the mixed model submit that there are armed conflicts to
which the law of war does not apply fully. 42 Yet the contours of the sphere of
armed conflict are drawn by reference to the law of war.
Some commentators posit that the law of war's role "is primarily not one of
opposition [to war] but of construction-the facilitation of war through the
establishment of a separate legal sphere immunizing some organized violence from
normal legal sanction."43 Yet the prevailing view is that the primary purpose of the
law of war is promoting humanitarian protections.44 The law of war exists mainly
in order to set limits to wartime violence. According to the International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), the law of non-international armed conflict
"has a purely humanitarian purpose and is aimed at securing fundamental
guarantees for individuals in all circumstances." 45
But why doesn't the law of war offer a better bargain from a humanitarian
perspective? Why did it set the limits of wartime violence where they are now,
rather than further constraining such violence?
War represents a reality in which large-scale violence is inevitable. Indeed,
"[w]ar necessarily places civilians in danger; that is another aspect of its
hellishness."46 The law of war recognizes that the law cannot "unhell" the factual
reality of war. Rather, it is designed to allow only that violence which is
inevitable. It is tailored around a core of wartime violence that the law cannot
realistically prevent. As stated by Yoram Dinstein:
The paramount precept of the [Law of International Armed Conflict]-to
reiterate again the language of the St Petersburg Declaration . . .- is
'alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war' . . . . However,
42. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 255; Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 201-204.
43. Nathaniel Berman, PrivilegingCombat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction
of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1 (2004).
44. Christopher J. Greenwood, InternationalHumanitarianLaw (Laws of War): Revised Report
for the CentennialCommemoration of the FirstHague Peace Conference 1899, in THE CENTENNIAL OF
THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: REPORTS & CONCLUSIONS 161, 229 (Frits Kalshoven

ed., 2000) (observing that the provisions on the conduct of hostilities contained in Protocol Additional
II to the Geneva Conventions "are intended exclusively for the benefit of the civilian population.");
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1350 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (observing that
the protection granted to victims of non-international armed conflicts is the raison d'etre of Protocol II).
45. Id. at 1344.
46. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 156 (4thed. 2000).
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the thrust of the concept is not absolute mitigation of the calamities of
war (which would be utterly impractical), but relief from the tribulations
of war 'as much as possible' .....47

In other words, the law of war was tailored to offer the best bargain, from a
humanitarian perspective, in a factual reality in which widespread violence is
inevitable. This bears on the construction of the sphere of armed conflict: the
function of the definition of an armed conflict is to delineate the boundaries of a
factual reality in which the law of war represents the best realisticbargain from a
humanitarian perspective; that is, the boundaries of a reality in which the violence
allowed under the law of war is inevitable.
In severing, at least in part, the definition of an armed conflict from the law of
war the mixed model is thus conceptually flawed. Simply put, a factual reality in
which the law of war's principles of distinction and proportionality do not offer the
best bargain from a humanitarian perspective (i.e., a reality in which the mixed
model is realistic), cannot be characterized as armed conflict.
The humanitarian nature of the law of war informs its relationship with
human rights law: the law of war applies as lex specialis, taking precedent over
human rights law,48 only where it offers the best bargain from a humanitarian
perspective. Some commentators posit that the application of the law of war has
become much less attractive from a humanitarian perspective since the rise of
human rights law, which applies to armed conflicts as well. 49 Those commentators
observe that most of the humanitarian protections contained in the law of war are
also available under human rights law.5 0 However, the law of war has no
alternative from a humanitarian perspective, not because it offers protections that
cannot be found in human rights law but, rather, because it presents the strictest
realisticlimitations on violence in the face of the factual reality of war. It is the

47. YoRAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 17 (2004).

48. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
49. Balendra, supra note 16, at 2470 ("When the provisions of the Geneva Conventions were
drafted, the protections available under [human rights law] were not taken into account. Nor had the
ICCPR and the ICESR, the first legally binding human rights instruments of universal applicability,
been adopted yet. At that time, [international humanitarian law] was probably viewed as the only source
of protection for individuals during times of violent conflict. However, if [human rights law] is also
applicable in armed conflict, as appears to be the case, then individuals might be protected even in the
absence of [international humanitarian law]. Therefore the humanitarian goals of the Geneva
Conventions are not always furthered by a broad interpretation of the term 'armed conflict.'"); David
Kretzmer, Rethinking Application of IHL in Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 42(1) ISR. L. REv. 32
(2009) ("With the development of [international human rights law], we no longer need to introduce
elements of [international humanitarian law] in order to place constrains on the use of force by States
faced with internal armed conflicts . . . . While the original intention behind extension of [international
humanitarian law] to non-intemational armed conflicts was to enhance the protection granted to
potential victims of such conflicts, given the dramatic development of [international human rights law],
categorization of a situation as one of armed conflict, rather than internal unrest, may serve to weaken
the protection offered to potential victims rather than to strengthen it."). Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 202.
50. Id.
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inevitability of wartime violence that renders the law of war the best bargain from
a humanitarian perspective.
But how is violence that triggers the application of the law of war inevitable?
How do we draw the line between situations in which violence allowed under the
law of war is inevitable and situations in which it is not? Here I return to the main
feature that distinguishes the mixed model from the law of war, which concerns the
permissible basis for attacking people. While the law of war allows attacking
combatants on the basis of their status, under both the mixed model and human
rights law persons may only be targeted on the basis of their personal
dangerousness.
Yet it is not entirely accurate to say that the law of war is indifferent to the
question of the personal dangerousness of combatants. The warring parties are
always bound by the requirement of military necessity." An unnecessary killing
of any individual,that is, a killing that does not tend to undermine the war effort of
the enemy, and thereby facilitate victory, is always prohibited.5 2 In other words,
the law of war only allows the killing of individuals who are dangerous in the
sense that they lend a meaningful contribution to the war effort of the enemy. This
is the reason why soldiers who are wounded, and therefore are unable to fight, may
not be attacked.5 3
A strict application of the military necessity requirement would preclude the
killing of soldiers solely on the basis of their status. However, a reality of actual
warfare-a clash of two armies-does not lend itself to individualized assessment of
the dangerousness of each person. Under the pressure of actual warfare, an extrajudicial individualized assessment of dangerousness-the second best to due
process-is also not feasible. It is this feature of war that renders the indiscriminate
targeting of soldiers inevitable. The principle of military necessity was relaxed to
allow the killing of combatants at all times because of this lack of capacity to
determine, with regard to each enemy soldier, whether and to what extent he
actually contributes to the enemy's war effort.54
Yet not all situations of grave violence between organized parties preclude an
individualized assessment of dangerousness.
The criteria for distinguishing
situations that are amenable to such assessment from those that are not mainly
concern the size of the parties' armed forces as well as the volume and intensity of
the violence. The violence allowed under the law of war's principle of distinction
is inevitable only in situations that are not amenable to an individualized
assessment of dangerousness. Only such situations can be properly termed armed
conflict.

51. DINSTEIN, supranote 47, at 18.
52. Id.
53. Fourth Geneva Convention, supranote 13, art. 3.
54. Similarly, the permission granted to a state engaged in an inter-state armed conflict to detain
all captive enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict presupposes lack of capacity for an
individualized assessment of the dangerousness of each combatant. Curtis A. Bradley, The United
States, Israeland Unlawful Combatants, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 397, 409-410 (2009).
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The inevitability of violence allowed under the law of war inheres in a violent
clash of two armies. The author submits that the reality of Israel's confrontations
with the Hezzbullah in Lebanon (2006) and Hamas in Gaza (2009) precluded
individualized assessment of dangerousness. The Israeli army that entered
Lebanon and Gaza was facing thousands of fighters simultaneously engaging in an
intense war effort. 5 The manifestations of the hostilities between Israel and those
organizations bordered on full-scale war.56 Under such circumstances, the
targeting of individuals on the basis of their affiliation to the military forces of
Hamas or Hezzbullah was inevitable. Those conflicts are situations in which the
law of war's principle of distinction between combatants and civilians represents
the best bargain from a humanitarian perspective, and they must therefore be
termed armed conflicts.
By contrast, it seems that the violent conflict between the U.S. and al-Qaeda,
notwithstanding its high death toll, cannot be characterized as an armed conflict, as
it does not produce the unique pressure of warfare that precludes individualized
assessment of dangerousness.
My analysis presents a very high threshold for the existence of an armed
conflict: for a conflict to be considered an armed conflict, it must not stray far from
the paradigm of a full-scale war, that is, a clash of two armies.
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the years 2001-2007 (the
"al-Aqsa Intifada"), prior to the Hamas takeover of Gaza, is a difficult, borderline
case. Considering the scale and organization of the violence in the case of the alAqsa Intifada, commentators observed that the said conflict "is a full-scale 'armed
conflict,' even under the harshest of terms." 57 Relying in particular on the scale
55. See Jill Lawless, Hezbollah Arsenal Growing in Size and Punch, SEATTLE TIMES, July 20,
2006, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003137807_webhezbollahl9.
html; Amos Harel & Avi Issacharoff, Analysis: A HardLook at Hamas' Capabilities,HAARETZ, Dec.
26, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050282.html.
56. Hostilities between Israel and the Hezbollah lasted for one month. During this period, nearly
4,000 Hezbollah rockets hit northern Israel. According to Lebanese officials, one million people were
displaced by the conflict. The conflict resulted in approximately 1200 Lebanese deaths and 159 Israeli
deaths, according to authorities in the two countries. Maher Chmaytelli & Daniel Williams, Hezbollah,
Israel Try to Play Down Lebanon Rockets, For Now, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 9, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aa8phfEhs3.M (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
In the course of this conflict, the Israeli Air Force launched more than 7,000 air strikes on targets in
Lebanon. Amnesty Int'l, Lebanon: DeliberateDestruction or "CollateralDamage"? Israeli Attacks
on Civilian Infrastructure, Al Index MDE 18/007/ 2006, Aug. 22, 2006, available at http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE18/007/2006/en [hereinafter Report by Amnesty International]. With
regard to the size of Hamas' military forces in Gaza, which took part in the fighting during the
confrontation in January 2009, see ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA:

FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS,
73-80 (2009), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation Gaza Context of Operation 5 Aug_2009
.htm#E.
57. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 259. Ben-Naftali and Michaeli elaborate:
There can be little doubt that the Palestinian Authority qualifies as an "organized
armed group." The Palestinian Authority, far from resembling an unorganized
insurrection group, is as close to a State as an entity can be. It is the undisputed
leader of the Palestinian people, retaining control over the Palestinian population
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and duration of the violence, the Israeli Supreme Court observed with regard to the
al-Aqsa Intifada, "[s]ince the end of September 2000, fierce fighting has been
taking place in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. This is not police activity. It is
an armed conflict. Within this framework, approximately 14,000 attacks have been
made against the life, person and property of innocent Israeli citizens .

. .

. The

Palestinians have also experienced death and injury."58
Indeed, it seems that the manifestations of the hostilities between Israel and
the Palestinians throughout the years 2001-2003 warrant the application of the law
of war. Yet, as noted by one commentator, hostilities between an occupant and
guerrilla forces "often go through a variety of phases, involving greater or lesser
resemblance to military conflict, ranging from organized to disorganized actions,
from violent to non-violent confrontations, from war-like periods marked by high
intensity violence to less turbulent periods marked by erratic violence, civil
disobedience, or even relative quiescence."5 9 Indeed, the scale of hostilities
between Israel and the Palestinians has been substantially reduced since 2003.60 It
thus seems that the later phases of the al-Aqsa Intifada (2004-2007) prior to the
Hamas takeover of Gaza did not meet the threshold for the existence of armed
conflict advanced here.
The conceptual difficulty arising with regard to the mixed model's severing of
the definition of an armed conflict from the law of war only underscores the main
problem with the mixed model: it fails to provide realistic standards of conduct for
states where the manifestation of the hostilities between the state and a terrorist
entity borders on full-scale war, as were the cases of Israel's confrontations with
the Hezzbullah in Lebanon (2006) and Hamas in Gaza (2009). Applied to such
conflicts, which clearly qualify as armed conflicts, the mixed model would prohibit
violence that is inevitable. As proponents of the mixed model themselves observe,
an international legal regime that does not present realistic standards of conduct for
states will inevitably be ignored.61

and, at least until the recent reoccupation of the territories, it exercised control
over most of the Palestinian designated territory, especially the "A" territories.
Note that while only the Tanzim Organization is officially affiliated to the
Palestinian Authority, all other military organizations operating in the
Palestinians territories are united by the same goals of self-determination and
compose a united front of resistance. These groups are highly organized, thus
fulfilling the condition of "organized military force under responsible command."
There can also be little doubt as to the severity of the conflict, as indicated by the
high number of casualties and the massive use of arms on both sides.
Id. at 258.
58. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSc 56(6) 352, 1, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/150/070/Al5/02070150.al5.pdf.
59. Berman, supra note 16, at 26.
60. Hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians in the year 2002 resulted in the killing of 1,019
Palestinians and 420 Israelis. Hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians in the year 2005 resulted in
the killing of 190 Palestinians and 50 Israelis. See B'tselem - The Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Statistics: Fatalities, http://www.btselem.org/English/
Statistics/Casualties.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
61. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 212.
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B. The IsraeliSupreme Court's Construction of the Law of War: The Equivalent of
the Mixed Model
A decision of the Israeli Supreme Court seems to implicitly adopt the mixed
model. In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel62
the Court examined whether the Israeli policy of targeted killing of Palestinian
suspected terrorists, carried out in the course of the al-Aqsa Intifada, was lawful
under international law.6 3 Concluding that the hostilities characterizing the alAqsa Intifada amounted to an armed conflict, the Court opined that this conflict is
64
of internationalcharacter.
It then proceeded to examine the status of Palestinians
taking part in the hostilities.65
The customary definition of combatants in international armed conflicts is
provided by the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land ("Hague Regulations").66 According to Article 1 of the Hague Regulations,
the category of combatants extends beyond the regular armed forces of a state and
includes members of "militia and volunteer corps" provided that they fulfill all of
the following conditions:
a. being under responsible command;
b. wearing a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
c. carrying arms openly; and
d. conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. 67
The same definition of "combatants" may be inferred from the categories of
persons who have the right to prisoner of war status pursuant to Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.68
The Court observed that members of Palestinian terrorist organizations do not
meet all of the above conditions, as they do not wear a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance and, moreover, as they do not refrain from targeting
civilians and therefore do not meet the requirement that their operations be "in
accordance with the laws and customs of war." 69 The Court thus concluded that
members of Palestinian terrorist organizations cannot be considered combatants,
and must therefore be considered civilians.
The law of war prohibits attacks

62. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2006] (2) IsrLR 459,
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/el6/02007690.el6.pdf.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 476-77.
65. Id. at 486-90.
66. Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, T.I.A.S. No. 539, art. 1 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
67. Id.
68. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; see also Kretzmer, supranote
1, at 191.
69. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. at 485.
70. Id. at 486-88.
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directed at civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."71 Applying this rule, the Court broadly interpreted the circumstances
under which a member of a terrorist organization should be viewed as directly
participating in hostilities and thus subject to targeting.72 The Court reasoned that
this concept includes not only persons who carry out terrorist attacks but also those
who recruit them and provide them with weapons as well as those who plan and
direct the attacks. The Court further concluded that persons involved in ongoing
terrorist activities are subject to targeting even during the time in between hostile
acts.74
Finally, the Court concluded that the law of war permits the targeted killing of
civilians who are, at the time, directly participating in hostilities only where the
following cumulative requirements are fulfilled. First, reliable and verified
information is needed regarding the identity and activity of the civilian who is
allegedly taking part in the hostilities, which places a heavy burden of proof on the
attacking army. 5 Second, even a civilian who is taking a direct part in hostilities
cannot be attacked if less harmful means, such as arrest, interrogation and trial, can
be employed.76 Third, after each targeted killing, a retroactive, thorough and
independent investigation must be conducted regarding the precision of the
identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack. And fourth, any
collateral damage inflicted must withstand the proportionality test.78
The Court did not explicitly accept the main argument advanced by the
proponents of the mixed model, namely, that the application of the law of war is
qualified by its interaction with human rights law. Having concluded that an
armed conflict exists between Israel and the Palestinian organizations, the Court

observed that the law of war applies fully as lex specialis, taking precedent over
human rights law.79 At the end of the day, however, the liberties to use lethal force
afforded to the state by the Court are similar, if not identical, to those available to it

71. Protocol I, supra note 17, art. 51 (providing that civilians "shall not be the object of attack ...
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."). This rule is now considered a
customary norm of international humanitarian law. See, e.g. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW, VOL. 1: RULES 19 (2005).
72. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. at 494-98.
73. Id. at 496-99.
74. Id. at 499-500.
75. Id. at 500-01.
76. Id. at 501.
77. Id. at 502.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 476-77. The Court observed that "[t]he normative arrangements that apply to the armed
conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations . . . [is the] international law concerning an
international armed conflict . . . . These laws constitute a part of the laws of the conduct of war (fus in
bello). From the humanitarian viewpoint, they are a part of international humanitarian law." Id. The
Court emphasized that "humanitarian law is a special law (lex specialis) that applies in an armed
conflict," and that only "[w]here this law has a lacuna, it can be filled by means of international human
rights law." Id. Throughout its analysis, the Court exclusively applied the customary norms of the law
of war. Id.
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under the mixed model: members of the enemy's armed forces may only be
targeted on the basis of their personal dangerousness, rather than on the basis of
their status; they may be targeted even when the threat they pose is not imminent,
provided that use of lethal force is the only way to thwart that threat; and an
independent, retroactive investigation must follow each targeted killing operation.
The legal regime laid out by the court is clearly the equivalent of the mixed model.
The classification of the terrorists by the Court as civilians resulted from the
Court's decision to consider the hostilities an international, rather than a noninternational, armed conflict.o There is no doubt that in applying the principle of
distinction in non-international armed conflict, all full-fledged members of the
armed forces of parties to the conflict are considered combatants, regardless of
whether they distinguish themselves from the civilian population and abide by the
laws of war." Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court considers large-scale hostilities
between a state and a transnational terrorist organization-al-Qaeda-a noninternational armed conflict, and therefore regards members of this organization as
combatants.82 This seems to be the prevailing view among commentators.83
It is striking, then, that the Israeli Court failed to provide any reasoning to its
decision to consider the conflict an international, rather than a non-international,
armed conflict. As noted by one commentator:
[T]he Court's preliminary assumption that the targeted killing of
Palestinian non-State actors must be governed by [international
humanitarian law] applicable to international, rather than noninternational, armed conflict remains largely unsubstantiated and
alternative approaches, though mentioned, are discarded without
discussion. The very same assumption subsequently forces the Court to
qualify all Palestinian armed actors as civilians.84
Moreover, the Court failed to provide any reasoning to its holding that
civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities may only be targeted when there
is no feasible possibility of arresting them, as well as to its determination that an
attack directed at a civilian who is taking a direct part in hostilities must be
80. Id. at 516.
81. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supranote 1, at 271; Watkin, supra note 7, at 313; Protocol I, supra
note 17, at 1453; Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 197-198 ("The logical conclusion of the definition of a noninternational armed conflict as one between the armed forces of a state and an organized armed group is
that members of both the armed forces and the organized armed group are combatants. While these
combatants do not enjoy the privileges of combatants in an international armed conflict, they may be
attacked by the other party to the conflict. This is indeed the view adopted in the ICRC Commentary on
[Additional Protocol II], which states that '[tIhose who belong to armed forces or armedgroups may be
attacked at any time'. According to this view, if an armed conflict exists between the United States and
al-Qaeda, active members of al-Qaeda are combatants who may be targeted. Similarly, if an armed

conflict exists between Israel and Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Fatah/Tanzim in the West Bank and
Gaza, active members of these groups are combatants who may legitimately be attacked.").
82. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-32 (2006).
83. Jinks, supra note 17, at 9; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 258-59; Downes, supra
note 17, at 282-83; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 204.
84. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (2008).
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followed by a retroactive investigation regarding the circumstances of the attack.
Such requirements are not contained in any of the humanitarian law conventions
and are not mentioned in the Commentary of the ICRC on Customary International
Humanitarian Law.
Clearly, the Court took the view that the liberties to use lethal force afforded
to a state engaged in an armed conflict with a terrorist organization should be
narrower than those available to a state engaged in a "traditional" inter-state war,
subscribing to the view of the proponents of the mixed model regarding the scope
of permissible use of lethal force. While the Court purported to fully apply the law
of war, it endeavored to construct it in a manner that produces a legal regime
equivalent to that of the mixed model. The Court opted for an internationalarmed
conflict legal regime, as only such regime allows the classification of Hamas
militants as civilians. The central feature of the law of war-the permission to
target combatants on the basis of their status-was taken from it, simply because
under the Court's construction of the law of war, an armed conflict between a state
and a terrorist group is one in which only one party to the conflict has combatants.
This construction seems peculiar. As noted by David Kretzmer, "[w]hen the armed
conflict is essentially between a state and the terrorist group, the theory that the
terrorists are civilians simply does not make sense. An armed conflict model of
law . . . cannot be applicable if only one party to the conflict has combatants." 8 6
Curtis Bradley further observes that the Israeli Court's construction of the law of
war "may create perverse incentives. One of the central purposes of the laws of
war is to encourage fighters both to distinguish themselves from civilians and to
avoid attacking civilians." Yet under the approach taken by the Israeli Court, "a
nation engaged in an armed conflict has less ability to target and detain fighters
who fail to wear uniforms or who purposefully target civilians than if those
fighters observe the principles of distinction." " This approach thus "seems to
reward the very conduct that the laws of war are designed to prevent."8 9

85. See, e.g., HENCKAERTS & DoSWALD-BECK, supranote 71, atl9-23.
86. Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 194; Curtis A. Bradley, The United States, Israel, and Unlawful
Combatants 276 (Duke Law School Public Law & Theory Paper No. 249, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1408135. Professor Curtis Bradley elaborates that:
[T]he conception of'civilians' in the Geneva Conventions does not fit well with
the reality of an armed conflict with a terrorist organization. While the
Conventions envision that civilians might sometimes take part in hostilities, they
envision that this combatancy is a temporary deviation for these individuals, and
that there is some separate group of full-time fighters. For a terrorist
organization engaged in an armed conflict with a nation, however, the
involvement of the members of such an organization in hostilities is not some
temporary deviation from their normal circumstances . . . . Nor is there any

separate set of full-time fighters - the members of the terrorist organization are
themselves the full-time fighters.
Id.; see also, Watkin, supranote 7, at 312-13.
87. Bradley, supra note 86, at 275.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 275-76.
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But more importantly for the purposes of this article, the legal regime laid out
by the Court, which is premised on a perception of the terrorists as civilians,
crumbled under the weight of hostilities between Israel and Hezzbullah in Lebanon
("Second Lebanon War") and between Israel and Hamas in Gaza ("Operation Cast
Lead"), which followed the Court's holding. In the face of a reality bordering on
full-scale war, which was not amenable to an individualized assessment of
dangerousness, the official rules of engagement issued by the Israeli army during
Operation Cast Lead explicitly considered Hamas fighters as combatants that can
be targeted at all times. 90 Applying the law of war's principle of distinction, the
Rules of Engagement stated, "[s]trikes shall be directed against military objectives
and combatants only. It is absolutely prohibited to intentionally strike civilians or
civilian objects (in contrast to incidental proportional harm)." 91
Those experiences prove that the legal regime envisioned by the proponents
of the mixed model-or any other equivalent legal regime-is unrealistic where
hostilities between a state and a non-state actor resemble a traditional, inter-state
war.
III. THE MIXED MODEL AND THE AIMS OF A JUST WAR

The proponents of the mixed model advocate its application to armed
conflicts between a state and a non-state aggressor. Yet the mixed model cedes the
legitimate aims of a just war.
The purpose of a wartime military operation is to facilitate victory. Exploring
the meaning of victory in a just war (i.e., the legitimate ends of a just war),
Michael Walzer concludes:
'The object in war is a better state of peace.' And better, within the
confines of the argument for justice, means more secure than the status
quo ante bellum, less vulnerable to territorial expansion, safer for
ordinary men and women and for their domestic self-determinations.
The key words are all relative in character: not invulnerable, but less
vulnerable; not safe, but safer. Just wars are limited wars. 92
This means that "[i]n responding to an armed invasion, one can legitimately

aim not merely at a successful resistance but also at some reasonable security
against future attack."93 Reasonable guarantees of future security include
"disengagement, demilitarization, arms control, external arbitration, and so on.
Some combination of these, appropriate to the circumstances of a particular case,
constitutes a legitimate war aim."94

90. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND LEGAL

ASPECTS
245 (2009), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/
Hamas+war+against+Israel/Operation in Gaza-Factual and Legal Aspects .htm.
91. Id. at 1222.
92. WALZER, supra note 46, at 121-22.
93. Id. at 118.
94. Id. at 121.
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These ends obviously extend far beyond short-term cost-benefit analysis that
concerns the loss of lives. A state fighting a just war is entitled to sacrifice the
lives of its own soldiers, intentionally kill enemy combatants and cause the
incidental death of non-combatants in order to obtain reasonable long-term
guarantees of its future security.
Whilst it is doubtful whether there exists ajus ad bellum of non-international
armed conflicts, 95 the legitimate purposes of a just war arguably apply to armed
conflicts between a state and a non-state aggressor. Note that obtaining guarantees
of its future security was the main aim of Israel's military operations throughout its
recent large-scale confrontations with the Hezzbullah in Lebanon (2006) and
Hamas in Gaza (2009).
When it comes to the grounds for using lethal force, human rights law stands
in sharp contrast with the law of war. While the purpose of the use of lethal force
under the law of war is to facilitate the winning of the war, under human rights law
"the primary aim of the operation should be to protect lives from unlawful
violence."9 6
With regard to the purpose of the use of force, the mixed model is not really
mixed. Rather, it is indistinguishable from human rights law. The mixed model
allows the killing of a terrorist only where such action is necessary to thwart a
concrete plan to commit a terrorist attack and where the benefit in terms of saving
human lives outweighs the risk to human lives inherent in the operation.97 In other
words, the mixed model allows resorting to lethal force on no other basis than
short-term cost-benefit analysis that concerns the loss of human lives.
The permission to resort to lethal force granted to a state under the mixed
model does not correspond with the legitimate purposes of a just war as described
by Walzer. Under the mixed model, a state fighting a just war is not entitled to
exercise lethal force in order to advance aims such as obtaining guarantees of
future security (through, say, disarmament of the terrorist entity). In other words,
the mixed model cedes even the limited concept of victory defined by Walzer's
Just War Theory.
Such concession seems unwarranted. "In a just war, its goals properly
limited, there is indeed nothing like winning. There are alternative outcomes, of
course, but these are accepted only at some cost to basic human values." 98
Indeed, one could argue that even the limited aims of a just war presented by
Walzer are largely unrealistic in the context of an armed conflict between a state
and a terrorist organization. Such factual assertion is debatable. However, it is
important to note that only under such view is the mixed model tenable.

95. William Abresch, A Human Rights Law ofInternalArmed Conflict: The European Court of
Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 741, 765 (2005).
96. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 836 (2005).
97. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 203-05, 211.
98. WALZER, supra note 46, at 122.
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IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY INTHE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF WAR
The mixed model represents a departure from a basic principle of
international law: The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has repeatedly held
that the law of war governs within its field of application as lex specialis, taking
precedent over the norms of international human rights law. 99 The ICJ's decisions
do not distinguish between international and non-international armed conflicts.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has recently relied
on the jurisprudence of the ICJ in concluding that the law of war governs noninternational armed conflicts as lex specialis 00 Importantly, in the Israeli Wall
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ expressly recognized the status of international
humanitarian law as lex specialis in the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada.101 Hence,
while the law of war may be interpreted in light of the general principles of
international human rights law, it is not amenable to substantial amendments as a
result of its interaction with the latter. The mixed model is inconsistent with the
superiority of the law of war as lex specialis. There is, however, a substantive
argument for maintaining such superiority.
Recognizing the law of war as lex specialis is an essential guarantee of the
principle of equality in the application of the law of war. A fundamental principle
of the law of war is the equal application of its rules (i.e.,jus in bello) to all parties
to an armed conflict. 102 This principle applies to both international and noninternational armed conflicts.103 As noted by Lindsay Moir:
[T]he humanitarian laws of internal armed conflict are equally binding
upon the government and insurgents, and can also ... apply to a conflict
99. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8) (observing
that, while human rights law applies in principle to armed conflicts, the war rights embodied in
humanitarian law are lex specialis, taking precedent over general human rights norms); see also Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136, 177-78 (July 9); Jochen Abr. Frowein, The Relationship Between Human Rights
Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation, in 28 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 9-10 (1998); Balendra,
supra note 16, at 2482 ("The consensus among many international tribunals and international
organizations appears to be that both [human rights law] and [international humanitarian law] are
directly applicable in armed conflict but when the two sets of laws conflict, [international humanitarian
law] takes priority as the more specialized law or the lex specialis.").
100. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 178 (July 10, 2008). The tribunal
observed that in situations falling short of an armed conflict human rights law restricts the usage of
lethal force by state agents "to what is no more than absolutely necessary and which is strictly
proportionate to certain objectives." Id. However, when hostilities amount to an armed conflict "the
question what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life is interpreted according to the standards of
international humanitarian law, where a different proportionality test applies." Id.
101. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 177-78 (July 9); see also Adam Roberts, Transformative Military
Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 593 (2006).
Roberts explains that where the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are inconsistent with those
of the ICCPR, the former "has to be considered the lex specialis for occupations."
102. Judith G. Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391,
394 (1993); Marco Sass6li, Use andAbuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism", 22 LAW &
INEQ. 195, 196 (2004).
103. Sass6li, supranote 102, at 196.

442

UNPLEASANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW VOL.

38:3

between two parties, neither of which is the government of the State
concerned. There is therefore a degree of reciprocity as far as the
application of humanitarian law is concerned. 104
Such equality between state and non-state actors does not exist, however, in
the context of international human rights law. The obligations contained in this
body of law are binding on governments only.105 As noted, the mixed model
contains norms inconsistent with the law of war, which are largely based on
principles of international human rights law. Thus, the mixed model can only
apply to the conduct of states, while non-state actors would be allowed to exercise
all of the war rights granted under the law of war. This would render the principle
of equality in the law of war meaningless. Upholding this principle requires
rejecting the mixed model.
V.

ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN A STATE AND A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION V.

INTER-STATE ARMED CONFLICT

None of the proponents of the mixed model advocate its application to
traditional inter-state armed conflicts. The mixed model is presented in the
literature mainly in the context of an armed conflict between a state and a terrorist
group. 106 Kretzmer views the al-Aqsa Intifada as such a conflict, defining
terrorism as "the deliberate causing of death, or other serious injury, to civilians for
political or ideological ends,"107 and a terrorist group as one that "regularly
employs terror as a means of achieving its aims." 08 The proponents of the mixed
model generally classify a conflict between a state and a terrorist group as a noninternational armed conflict. 109
But what is the basis for distinguishing an armed conflict between a state and
a terrorist group from traditional inter-state armed conflict? Commentators mainly
proffer a practical argument in support of such distinction. 10 This argument points
to risks in the application of the law of war that are unique to a conflict between a
state and a terrorist group. 1 According to such an argument, the application of
the law of war to such a conflict would result in adverse consequences that were
not contemplated by the framers of the laws of war. Presenting the practical
argument, Kretzmer argues:

104. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 194 (2002).
105. Id. ("[H]uman rights obligations are binding on governments only, and the law has not yet
reached the stage whereby, during internal armed conflict, insurgents are bound to observe the human
rights of government forces."); Abresch, supra note 95, at 752-53 ("Under humanitarian law, the rules
apply to all parties to a conflict - government forces and dissident armed groups alike. Under human
rights law, the rules apply only to the government.").
106. See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 201-204; see also Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at

287-91.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 175.
Id.
Id. at 210; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 257-59.
See Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 200; See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supranote 1, at 257-58.
Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 200.
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How can we be sure that the targeted persons are indeed real terrorists?
Doesn't this licence [sic] [to target terrorists] create an incentive for
victim states to jump as soon as possible from the law-enforcement to
the non-international armed conflict model, thus allowing them to
ignore due process guarantees and to enjoy almost unrestricted
discretion in targeting their suspected enemies? 112
Other commentators submit that as counter-terrorism operations are often
carried out in densely populated areas, such operations involve an especially high
risk of incidental injuries to innocent civilians.113
Yet the assertion that an "almost unrestricted discretion in targeting . . .
suspected enemies"11 4 is more dangerous in the context of the war on terror than in
other types of armed conflict seems unfounded. The experience of recent
traditional wars demonstrates that the number of uninvolved civilians either
erroneously targeted or killed as collateral damage in such wars exceeds the
number of innocent civilians erroneously targeted or collaterally killed in the war
on terror. 15 The argument that soldiers of regular armies wear uniforms or other
distinguishing marks that preclude erroneous targeting of civilians weakens in an
age where thousands are killed by long-range precision weapons. As for collateral
damage, the targeting of a suspected terrorist in the heart of a Palestinian
residential area obviously entails a high risk of such damage. Such a risk must be
brought into account in applying the proportionality requirement under the law of
war. However, such a risk by no means exceeds the risk of collateral damage that
existed (and materialized) in the cases of the American aerial bombardments of

112. Id
113. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 1, at 291 ("In light of the fact that the Palestinian
territories are densely populated, and that most [targeted killing] operations can only take place within
these territories, only exceptional circumstances will enable the execution of such operations that have
little harmful effects."); see Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for
Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 801, 888 (2005); see also, Schondorf, supra note 16, at 66-67.
114. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 200.
115. Jefferson D. Reynolds, CollateralDamage on the 21" Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation
of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56 A.F. L. REv. 1, 43-44
(2005) (reviewing surveys indicating that at least 3,420 civilians were killed as collateral damage in the
course of the American invasion of Iraq in spring of 2003); Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in
the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War,
Introduction, (1991), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/gulfwar/INTRO.htm
(alleging up to 3,000 civilians were killed during the 1991 Gulf War); Human Rights Watch, Civilian
Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, Summary, The Civilian Deaths, available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/index.htm (concluding that as few as 488, and as many as
527 civilians were killed in approximately ninety incidents of collateral damage during the three months
of NATO operations against Serbia); Marco Roscini, Targeting and Contemporary Aerial
Bombardment, 54 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 411, 420 (2005) ("[T]he Iraqi Al Firdos bunker was bombed by
the Allied forces on 13 February 1991 as it was thought to be the headquarters of the Ba'ath Party's
secret police: unfortunately, also their wives and children were there and 200-300 civilians died in the
attack"). It should be noted, however, that the military operations carried out by Israel in the course of
its recent conflicts with the Hezbollah in Lebanon (2006) and Hamas in Gaza (2009) resulted in a
number of civilian casualties characteristic of a full scale inter-state war.

444

UNPLEASANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF INT'L HuMAN RIGHTS LAW VOL. 38:3

Baghdad in the course of the two Gulf wars, and in the case of the NATO
bombardments of Belgrade. 1 6
VI. THE PERMISSION TO USE DEADLY FORCE UNDER HuMAN RIGHTS LAW
Under the mixed model, a state may use lethal force against terrorists who
pose a threat that is not imminent when there is no feasible possibility of arresting
them and it is likely that "if immediate action is not taken another opportunity will
not be available to frustrate the planned terrorist attacks."' 17 The author agrees that
this standard of conduct is both realistic and desirable with regard to situations
such as the confrontation between the United States and al-Qaeda. Yet the author
argues that the unpleasant burden of sanctioning such killings should be placed on
international human rights law.
This part rejects the assumption, which underlies the mixed model, that the
liberties to use force available to a state under the mixed model are not available to
it under human rights law. The analysis below addresses two questions concerning
the scope of permission to kill suspected terrorists afforded to a state under human
rights law:
1. When is the threat sufficiently proximate to justify the
use of lethal force against the suspected terrorist?
2. Can a state engage in counter-terrorism operations that
are likely to result in the unintentional killing of innocent
persons?
A. The temporal requirement
Human rights law allows a state to exercise lethal force against a suspected
terrorist where such use of force is "no more than absolutely necessary" in order to
protect the lives of other persons." Exploring the scope of this permission, David
116. See supratext accompanying note 115.
117. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 203.
118. Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms provides:
Article 2
(1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
(a) in defense of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits deprivation of life only
where such deprivation is "arbitrary." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966 art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. It was observed that Article 2 of the European
Convention "provides a fair statement of cases in which such force may be regarded as non-arbitrary."
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Kretzmer subscribes to the view that such permission is limited to "cases in which
lethal force is used to thwart an imminent attack. Absent imminency, pre-emptive
targeting of a suspected terrorist will be regarded as not being absolutely
necessary, or as an arbitrary deprivation of life, no matter how strong the evidence
that he is planning further terrorist attacks and how high the probability that there
may not be another opportunity to prevent such attacks."1 1 9
Yet neither the language of the main human rights conventions nor the
jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals provides ample support for
such conclusion.
1. The Approach Taken By Human Rights Treaty-Bodies
The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has produced
extensive case law regarding the limitations on the use of lethal force imposed on a
state under human rights law. Applying Article 2 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 120 ("European
Convention"), which allows a state to use lethal force "which is no more than
absolutely necessary .

.

. in defense of any person from unlawful violence," the

Court has stressed that "[t]he circumstances in which deprivation of life may be
justified must therefore be strictly construed." 121 Hence, use of lethal force against
an aggressor is only permitted when absolutely necessary in order to thwart a lethal
threat he poses to others. 122 Such use of force must be "strictly proportionate" to
the achievement of this aim. 123 The Court has repeatedly held that use of lethal
force against a person whom it is possible to arrest would never be "absolutely
necessary."124 Yet the Court has never held that a state's use of deadly force
against a person who poses a lethal threat that is not imminent violates human
rights law even where there is no feasible possibility of arresting him and there is a
high probability that if action is delayed there will not be another opportunity to
thwart that threat.125
In its periodic report of Israel in July 2003, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee addressed the question of whether Israel's policy of targeted killing of
suspected terrorists violates Israel's obligations under human rights law. 126 Israel's
representative submitted to the Committee that "[i]t would, of course, be preferable
to arrest such persons, but in areas like the Gaza Strip, over which Israel had no

Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 177.
119. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 183.
120. European Convention, supranote 118, at art. 2.
121. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 832 (2005).
122. Id. at 836 ("[T]he primary aim of the operation should be to protect lives from unlawful
violence.").
123. Id. at 832; McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 98 (1996).
124. See McCann, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 97-98; see also Ergi v. Turkey, App.
No. 23818/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 388, 430-31 (1998).
125. See McCann, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 97-98; see also Ergi v. Turkey, App.
No. 23818/94, 32 Fur. H.R. Rep. 388, 430-31 (1998).
126. U.N. Human Rights Comm. [U.N.H.R.C.], Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Israel,T 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003), [hereinafter UNHRC].
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control, his Government did not have that option." 127 Israel's representative
further assured the Committee that Israel carried out targeted killing operations
against suspected terrorists "only if there was reliable evidence linking them
directly to a hostile act" and only "when no less harmful alternative was available
to avert the danger posed by the terrorists." 128 Israel's description of the
circumstances underlying its targeted killing operations clearly provided the
Committee with ample opportunity to state plainly and explicitly, had it chosen to
do so, that human rights law always prohibits the targeted killing of a terrorist who
poses a lethal threat that is not imminent, "no matter how strong the evidence that
he is planning further terrorist attacks and how high the probability that there may
not be another opportunity to prevent such attacks." 129 The Committee, however,
clearly chose to refrain from such determination. In its Concluding Observations
the Committee stated: "The Committee is concerned by what the State party calls
'targeted killings' of those identified by the State party as suspected terrorists in
the Occupied Territories. This practice would appear to be used at least in part as a
deterrent or punishment, thus raising issues under article 6."
The Committee then proceeded to recommend:
The State party should ensure that the utmost consideration is given to
the principle of proportionality in all its responses to terrorist threats and
activities. State policy in this respect should be spelled out clearly in
guidelines to regional military commanders, and complaints about
disproportionate use of force should be investigated promptly by an
independent body. Before resorting to the use of deadly force, all
measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the process of
committing acts of terror must be exhausted.131 (emphasis added)

The first part of the Committee's observation seems to suggest that the
exercise of lethal force against a terrorist, which is not used as a deterrent or
punishment but, rather, as a means of preventing an attack that cannot be otherwise
thwarted, does not violate human rights law. In its recommendation, the
Committee refers to use of deadly force against a "person suspected of being in the
process of committing acts of terror." 132 Yet this does not suggest that the
Committee took the view that under human rights law preventive lethal force may
only be used in the face of an imminent attack. It is important to recall that the
Israeli practice of targeted killing of suspected terrorists, addressed by the
Committee, was largely directed against individuals who recruited suicide
bombers, planned or ordered the suicide attack, or manufactured the explosives

127. MELZER, supra note 84, at 31 (quoting U.N. Human Rights Comm., InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Summary Record of the 2118th Meeting, T 40, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.2118 (July 23, 2003)).
128. Id.
129. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 183.
130. UNHRC, supranote 126, T 15.
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
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used by the suicide bombers. 133 It seems that those individuals are "in the process
of committing acts of terror"1 34 when performing their part in the terrorist scheme,
even though their role is typically performed when the threat is not yet imminent.
It is hardly arguable that those who are "in the process of committing acts of
terror" are only the suicide bombers themselves.
In its Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,135 the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights addressed the limitations on the use of lethal force
against suspected terrorists under Article 4 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, which provides that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 13 6
Even proponents of a strict imminence-of-harm requirement in human rights law
concede that the Commission's observations regarding this matter were
"ambiguous." 3 7 The Commission stated:
[I]n situations where a state's population is threatened by violence, the
state has the right and obligation to protect the population against such
threats and in so doing may use lethal force in certain situations. This
includes, for example, the use of lethal force by law enforcement
officials where strictly unavoidable to protect themselves or other
persons from imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to otherwise
maintain law and order where strictly necessary and proportionate. 138
The first example of permissible use of lethal force provided by the
Commission seems to suggest that in the Commission's view the targeted killing of
a suspected terrorist is generally allowed only where the terrorist poses an
imminent threat. The second example (" . . . to otherwise maintain law and
order"), with regard to which the Commission does not mention the imminence
requirement, seems to imply, however, that in the face of large-scale, organized
violence between a government and a terrorist or guerrilla group, or other types of

large-scale violence, the imminence requirement is relaxed.
The Commission then proceeded to provide examples of impermissible use of
lethal force against suspected terrorists:
[T]he state may resort to the use of force only against individuals that

threaten the security of all ... in their law enforcement initiatives, states
must not use force against individuals who no longer present a threat as
described above, such as individuals who have been apprehended by
authorities, have surrendered, or who are wounded and abstain from
hostile acts. The use of lethal force in such a manner would constitute

133. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 172.
134. UNHRC, supranote 126, 15.
135. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, at T 22,
OEA/Ser.L/VII. 116 (Oct. 22, 2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/exe.htm.
136. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673.
137. Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 180.
138. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, supranote 135, at 1 87.
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extra-judicial killings in flagrant violation of Article 4 of the Convention
and Article I of the Declaration. 139
The Commission's observations "left matters unclear." 140 Kretzmer notes that
"[t]he examples given are impeccable. However, what about suspected terrorists
who have not been apprehended or wounded and have not surrendered? If there is
an assessment that they 'threaten the security of all' may lethal force be used
against them?" 14 1
2. The Relationship Between International Human Rights Law and Domestic
Laws
The author submits that the construction of the right to life under human
rights law should be informed by the domestic laws of the various states.
The prevailing interpretive approach to human rights conventions looks to the
standards and values commonly accepted by Member States. The European Court
of Human Rights has thus noted that in determining the scope of the prohibition on
"degrading punishment" contained in Article 3 of the European Convention, 142
"the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted
standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this
field."1 43 Commentators have observed that the European Court's interpretive
approach "is closely linked to a search for common European standards on the
basis of domestic law and practice in the Member States of the Council of
Europe,"l44 and that the Court interprets the Convention "to accommodate
changing social attitudes." 145 This interpretive approach also applies to the human
right to life. 146 As noted by one commentator, the legal regime applicable to the
use of force by law enforcement agents should not be examined "from an either/or
perspective-either as an international law issue or as one of domestic law. In fact,
it is an issue that resides equally in both spheres, and decisions made as to legal
characterizations and authorizations in each sphere are neither independent nor
discrete. Such issues must be looked at holistically and the consequences of a
legal characterization in one sphere must be traced through the other."1 47
The domestic law of self-defense is indicative of the social attitudes in the
various states toward the use of lethal force. The criminal defense of self-defense

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at TT 90-91.
Kretzmer, supranote 1, at 182.
Id. at 181.
European Convention, supranote 118, art. 3.
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A No. 26) at 10 (1978); RICHARD CLAYTON

& HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 270 (2000); see also P. VAN DUK & G.J.H. VAN
HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 78 (1998).
144. VAN DuIK & VAN HooF, supranote 143, at 78.

145. CLAYTON & TOMiLINSON, supranote 143, at 270.
146. Rob McLaughlin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating
Under A United Nations Security Council Chapter VII Mandate Authorizing 'All Necessary Means,' 12
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 389, 395-97 (2007).
147. Id. at 392.
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is a justificatory, rather than an excusing, norm. 148 Hence, the availability of the
defense of self-defense with regard to certain killings indicates that society
considers the conduct that resulted in such killings a desirable conduct. 149
Explaining the nature ofjustificatory norms, Antonio Cassese observes that:
When the law provides for a justification, an action that would per se be
considered contrary to law because it causes harm or damage to
individuals or society is regarded instead as lawful and thus does not
amount to a crime. Society, and the legal system it has created,
positively wants a person to do the otherwise illegal act . . .. [S]ociety

and its legal system make a positive appraisal of what would otherwise
be misconduct.150
To be sure, a state's domestic law of self-defense may simply violate human
rights law.151 Yet where numerous democracies parties to a human rights treaty
pronounce a certain conduct desirable, by affording it a self-defense justification,
such conduct can hardly be considered contrary to the standards and values
commonly accepted by Member States. Hence, such conduct should not be
considered a violation of the human right to life. This view is also supported by
the status of the human right to life as a customary norm of international law. 15 2
Customary international norms are only those that have gained broad acceptance,
which is largely reflected in domestic laws. 15 3 Hence, any assessment of the scope
of permission to use lethal force available to states under human rights law should
be informed by the domestic laws of self-defense. 154
Some domestic jurisdictions recognize a right to use force in self-defense only
where the threat posed by the aggressor is imminent.155 Other jurisdictions,
148. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 132-133 (1998).
149. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 255 (2nd ed. 2008).

150. Id.
151. See, e.g., FIONA LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENSE 192-94 (2006) (arguing that English
law, which affords the defense of self-defense to a person who killed another in the unreasonably
mistaken belief that the latter was an aggressor, violates the United Kingdom's obligation under human
rights law to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction).
152. With regard to the status of the human right to life as customary international law, see
MELZER, supranote 84, at 189; Kretzmer, supra note 1, at 184-85 ("some of the substantive norms in
human rights treaties that have been ratified by the vast majority of states in the world, have now
become peremptory norms of customary international law. The duty to respect the right to life is surely
one of these norms."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 702(c)

(1987) ("A state

violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones . . . the
murder ... of individuals.").
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (7th ed. 2008).

§

102 (1987);

IAN BROWNLIE,

154. McLaughlin, supra note 146, at 389 ("The 'law enforcement' paradigm . . . essentially
countenances the use of lethal force within the limitations of self-defense.").
155. LEVERICK, supra note 151, at 88. An imminence of harm requirement exists in Scotland.
Thus, the Scottish Appeal Court held that "self-defense is made out when it is established to the
satisfaction of the jury that the panel believed that he was in imminent danger and that he held that
belief on reasonable grounds." Owens v. HM Advocate 1946 J.C. 119, 125. A requirement that harm
be imminent can also be found in the self-defense laws of some US states. See Whipple v. Indiana 523
N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (1988); ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a) (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-606(a)(1)
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however, do not introduce an imminence requirement and only require that force
used in self-defense be "necessary."156 This is the approach taken in English law
where imminence of harm is one factor for the jury to take into account in deciding
whether or not defensive action was reasonably necessary.5 7 This approach also
prevails in Canadian law. 158 The Supreme Court of Canada thus held in R. v.
Petel: "There is . . . no formal requirement that the danger be imminent.

Imminence is only one of the factors which the jury should weigh in determining
whether the accused had a reasonable apprehension of danger and a reasonable
belief that she could not extricate herself otherwise than by killing the attacker."1 59
The holding in Petel addressed a case involving a battered woman.160 Yet in a
later case, R. v. Cinous, the Supreme Court held that the approach taken in Petel
represented the law in all cases of self-defense. 16 1
Similarly, the American Model Penal Code ("MPC") as well as the Israeli
Penal Code substituted a requirement that the use of force in self-defense be
"immediately necessary" for a requirement of imminence. 162 The approach taken
in the MPC was followed by a number of U.S. states. 163 Many commentators
believe that "immediately necessary" will encompass those cases in which the
violence is not imminent, but the need to use lethal force in order to prevent that
violence is immediate, since if such force is not used now it may not be possible to
prevent the violence later. 164
Yet even proponents of a strict imminence requirement agree that this
requirement presupposes the availability of non-lethal law-enforcement measures
when the danger is not imminent. George Fletcher argues that what underlies the
imminence requirement is the notion that the citizen may use force in self-defense
only when the state lacks the opportunity to do so. 165 Hence, according to Fletcher,

(1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(1) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (2001); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108(1) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (2009); NY PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)
(McKinney 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.209 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(1) (1953).
156. See LEVERICK, supranote 151, at 96.
157. Id.; Shaw v. R [2001] UKPC 26, 19; Palmer v. R [1970] A.C. 814, 831.
158. LEVERICK, supranote 151, at 96.
159. R. v. Petel, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); see also R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.).
160. See Petel, 1 S.C.R. 3.
161. R. v. Cinous [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3, 40 (Can.); LEVERICK, supranote 151, at 97.
162. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (2001); Penal Law of Israel § 34(J) (1996).
163. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (Vernon 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404(A)
(1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(a) (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1409(1) (1972); 18 PA CONS.
STAT. §505(a) (1972).
164. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in CriminalLaw, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
105, 127 (1990); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 78-79 (1984); Peter D.W. Heberling,
Justification: The Impact of the Model PenalCode on Statutory Reform, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 914, 932
(1975).
165. George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory ofJustificationand Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
553, 570 (1996) ("[T]he imminence requirement expresses the limits of governmental competence:
when the danger to a protected interest is imminent . . . the police are no longer in a position to
intervene and exercise the state's function of securing public safety. The individual right to self-defense
kicks in precisely because immediate action is necessary.").
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the imminence requirement "properly falls into the domain of political rather than
moral theory. The issue is the proper allocation of authority between the state and
the citizen."1 66
This fundamental premise of the imminence requirement is invalid, however,
where the suspected terrorist is not in a territory under the effective control of the
victim state, and the state in which he stays is either unwilling or unable to thwart
the threat he poses. Commenting on the conditions for a state's right of selfdefense (which are similar to the conditions for a right of self-defense under
domestic law1 67 ), Mordechai Kremnitzer argues that under such circumstances the
imminence requirement ought to be replaced by a more relaxed requirement that
the use of lethal force by the state be "immediately necessary" in order to thwart
the threat. 16 8 The latter requirement allows the state to act even where the threat
posed by the terrorist is temporally remote if there is a high probability "that
delaying action will prevent the possibility of eliminating the threat later on."1 69
In Tennessee v. Garner, the U.S. Supreme Court examined the constitutional
limitations on the use of lethal force by law enforcement agents attempting to
apprehend a fleeing suspect.1 70 The Court held that "[w]here the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others .

.

. deadly force may be used if necessary to

prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given."17 1 The
Court determined that a law enforcement officer may conclude that a suspect poses
such threat not only where "the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon," 172 but
also where "there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm . . ."173
The author submits that permission to use lethal force against a fleeing suspect in
order to thwart a threat inferred solely from her alleged past conduct is inconsistent
with an imminence-of-harm requirement.
B. CollateralDamage
1. The Approach Taken By the European Court of Human Rights
The issue of collateral damage in the course of anti-insurgency operations was
discussed by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Isayeva v.
Russia.174 Engaging a group of over a thousand Chechen insurgents, the Russian
military resorted to air bombardment using heavy, free-falling, high-explosive
bombs with a damage radius exceeding 1,000m, notwithstanding the proximity of
166. Id.
167. Id. at 557.
168. Mordechai Kremnitzer, Are All Actions Acceptable in the Face of Terror? Israel's Policy of
Preventative (Targeted) Killing in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (Israel Democracy Institute, Policy
Research Paper 60, 2005).
169. Id.
170. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
171. Id. at 11-12.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id.
174. See Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 791 (2005).
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the fighters to civilian population.175 There is little doubt that the large-scale
hostilities in Chechnya qualified as an armed conflict. However, as neither Russia
nor the Applicants in those cases argued for the existence of an internal armed
conflict, the Court did not recognize the existence of such conflict. 176 Applying
human rights law, the Court observed that the Russian military activity was carried
out "outside wartime"177 and thus "has to be judged against a normal legal
background." 178 The Russian military, held the Court, was bound to exercise "the
degree of caution expected from a law enforcement body in a democratic
society." 179
Article 2 of the European Convention, which protects the right to life,
permitted Russia to use deadly force against the Chechen fighters provided that
such force was "no more than absolutely necessary" in order to protect either the
lives of the Russian soldiers or the lives of Chechen civilians in the hands of the
insurgents. 8 o The Court observed that Article 2 further requires that the use of
force be "strictly proportionate" to the achievement of this aim.81
Yet, while the Court concluded that the indiscriminate use of lethal force by
Russia violated Article 2 of the European Conventionl82 -indeed, the Russian
operation stood in clear violation of the law of war as well18 3 -its judgment implies
that human rights law does not always prohibit military operations that involve
significant risk to the lives of innocent persons.
Applying the "strict
proportionality" standard, the Court held that human rights law requires a state to
"take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security
operation mounted against an opposing group with a view to avoiding and, in any
event, minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life" 8 4 (emphasis added - A.Z.). The
Court recognized that "the situation that existed in Chechnya at the relevant time
called for exceptional measures on behalf of the State in order to regain control
over the Republic and to suppress the illegal armed insurgency.""' These
measures, the Court added, "could presumably include employment of military
aviation equipped with heavy combat weapons," as well as artillery. 18 6 The limited
requirement merely to "minimize" incidental loss of civilian lives, read together
with the permission to use weapons that inherently create substantial risk of
collateral damage, is inconsistent with the view that any foreseeable incidental

175. Id. at 794, 817.
176. See id.at 824-30.
177. Id. at 836.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 832; European Convention, supranote 118, art. 2(2).
181. Isayeva, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 832.
182. Id. at 791.
183. David Kaye, Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia; Isayeva, Yusupova & Bazayeva v. Russia,
Isayeva v. Russia, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 881 (2005).
184. Isayeva, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 832.
185. Id. at 833; Isayeva, Yusopova and Bazayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00,
57949/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 847, 884 (2005) [hereinafter Isayeva II].
186. Supra note 185; See also Kaye, supranote 183, at 879.
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death of an innocent person in the course of a military operation amounts to a
violation of Article 2.187
The Court emphasized that "the primary aim of the operation should be to
protect lives from unlawful violence."
The Court's holding is not inconsistent
with the view that, in situations of large-scale violence such as the Chechnya
conflict, human rights law allows foreseeable incidental killing of innocent persons
in the course of a military operation that is guided by a cost-benefit analysis in
terms of loss of innocent lives. Such permission is not narrower than the one
afforded under the mixed model.
The author submits that where a law enforcement operation is likely to result
in the unintentional killing of innocent bystanders, human rights law requires a
society to cede its interests in preserving law and order only to a certain point.
Indeed, asserting the contrary would render most hostages rescue operations a
violation of human rights law, as the risk to the lives of innocent individuals
inherent in such operations can often be avoided simply by yielding to the
demands of the hostage-takers.
Thus, no international tribunal has ever suggested that human rights law
requires state law enforcement agencies to refrain altogether from confronting a
guerrilla group, a criminal organization, or any other armed group illegally
operating within the borders of the state, where there is no possibility to conduct
such law enforcement operations without a high risk to the lives of innocent
individuals. All that is required from state forces initiating a military operation
against guerrilla forces is to plan and conduct such operations in a manner that
minimizes as far as possible incidental injuries to uninvolved individuals.18 9 Only
where law enforcement operations do not demonstrate such an effort does a
violation of the right to life occur.
2. Domestic Laws
The domestic laws of the various states do not reveal a commonly accepted
attitude toward law enforcement operations that are likely to result in the incidental
death of innocent persons, and which are carried out on the basis of cost-benefit
analysis in terms of the loss of human lives. The German Federal Constitutional
Court seems to have taken the position that such operations are never permissible
in situations not governed by the law of war. 190 Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the German legislature passed a new aerial security law
which expressly authorized the German armed forces, as a law enforcement
measure of last resort, to shoot down civil aircraft which have come under the
control of individuals intending to use them as weapons by deliberately causing

187. Id. Kaye notes that the language of the Isayeva Court "could just as well come from a court
doing the typical balancing of military requirements and humanitarian concerns required under
[international humanitarian law]." See also Abresch, supranote 95, at 762.
188. Isayeva, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 836.
189. See Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in
ContemporaryArmed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1, 18 (2004).
190. Melzer, supranote 84, at 17-18.
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them to collide with selected targets. 191 The German Federal Constitutional Court
declared the said law unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted the incidental
killing of innocent crew and passengers on board of the "renegade" aircraft. The
Court reasoned that such killing would degrade the innocent individuals on board
of the airplane to mere objects of state actions, and would thus be incompatible
with the notion of human dignity, enshrined in the German Basic Law. 192
Moreover, in some jurisdictions no criminal justification applies to
unintentional injuries suffered by innocent third parties in the course of selfdefense. 193 This, however, is not the prevailing approach in U.S. criminal law.
Under the laws of most U.S. jurisdictions, a person using a firearm in the exercise
of self-defense is not liable for an injury unintentionally inflicted on a bystander
unless he acted carelessly or negligently. 19 4 In this regard, the fact that the
defending party knew of the presence of the bystander does not of itself render his
conduct careless or negligent. 19 5 The defense available to the defending party
relies on the doctrine of transferred intent. 196 According to this doctrine, "the fact

191. Id. at 16.
192. Id. at 17-18.
193. This is the position taken by German law as well as by English law. See Klaus Bernsmann,
Private Self-Defense and Necessity in German Penal Law and in the Penal Law Proposal - Some
Remarks, 30 ISR. L. REV. 171, 176 (1996); Re: A (Conjoined Twins Case) [2001] 2 WLR 480.
194. Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Unintentional Killing Of or Injury to Third Person During
Attempted Self-Defense, 55 A.L.R. 3d 620 (2008):
If, then, the perpetrator of the homicide or of the assault had no criminal intent in
attempting to injure or kill another person, as where the perpetrator was lawfully
defending himself from the harm sought to be inflicted upon him by such other
person, the fact that, on that occasion, a third person was unintentionally injured
or killed by the perpetrator would not make him liable, unless the perpetrator
acted carelessly or without regard to the safety of innocent bystanders. This view
has been applied in a variety of circumstances in which the perpetrator of the
homicide or assault has been prosecuted for murder, manslaughter, or assault,
based upon injury to, or death of, a third person.
See also 13 AM JUR. 3D ProofofFacts219, § 7 (comment).
195. 13 AM. JUR. 3D ProofofFacts219, §7 (comment):
A person using a firearm or other weapon in the exercise of self-defense is not
liable for an injury unintentionally inflicted on a bystander unless he is guilty of
some negligence or folly in the use of the weapon. Thus, when a person, in
lawful self-defense, shoots at an assailant, and, missing him, accidentally wounds
an innocent bystander, he is not liable for the injury if not guilty of negligence. It
has been held in such circumstances that the fact that the person knew or was
chargeable with knowledge of the presence of the bystander does not of itself
constitute want of due care or actionable negligence per se. (emphasis added A.Z.)
196. Tinio, supra note 194:
The general rule in criminal law that one who does an unlawful act is liable for
the consequences even though they may not have been intended may have a more
specific counterpart in the rule in homicide and assault cases that a homicide or
assault partakes of the quality of the original act, so that the guilt of the
perpetrator of the crime is exactly what it would have been had the blow fallen
upon the intended victim instead of the bystander. Under this rule the fact that
the bystander was killed or injured instead of the intended victim becomes
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that the bystander was killed or injured instead of the intended victim becomes
immaterial, and the only question at issue is what would have been the degree of
guilt if the issue intended had been accomplished; the intent is transferred to the
person whose death or injury has been caused." 197 It thus seems that the defense
available to the defending party is the criminal justification of self-defense. In the
words of one commentator, "[i]n essence, the defendant's privilege of self-defense
is transferred from the attacker to an innocent bystander injured by the defendant's
response."198
A similar approach prevails in American tort law. It has been observed that
"[u]nder established tort principles, the reasonable use of force in self-defense does
not create liability for any resultant bodily injuries, even if suffered by an innocent
bystander." 199 In this context, Mark Giestfeld noted that "as a matter of law,
abnormally dangerous activities involve reasonable risks."200
Indeed, the
jurisprudence of U.S. courts indicates that a substantial risk to the life of an
innocent third party is not necessarily an unreasonable one: if shooting at an
aggressor is a necessary means of self-defense, such use of force does not create
liability for resultant injuries suffered by an innocent bystander, even if the risk of
such injuries was foreseeable and substantial.20 1 It seems, then, that "tort law has
immaterial, and the only question at issue is what would have been the degree of
guilt if the issue intended had been accomplished; the intent is transferred to the
person whose death or injury has been caused.
197. Id.
198. Alan Calnan, The Fault(s) in Negligence Law, 25 QUINNPIAC L. REv. 695, 712 n.91 (2007).
199. Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation,and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 585,
596 (2003); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 77 (2000) ("[T]he defendant must not be held liable if
his conduct was protected by a privilege and the plaintiff is injured without fault. For example, the
defendant may act intentionally in justified self-defense; if his act of self-defense causes injury to a
bystander, there is no reason to impose liability unless the defendant was negligent.").
Section 75 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) thus provides:
An act which is privileged for the purpose of protecting the actor from a harmful
or offensive contact or other invasion of his interests of personality subjects the
actor to liability to a third person for any harm unintentionally done to him only
if the actor realizes or should realize that his act creates an unreasonable risk of
causing such harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 75 (1965).
200. Mark Geistfeld, Tort Law and CriminalBehavior (Guns), 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 335 (2001).
201. Whittington v. Levy, 184 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. Ct. App. 1966) ("If, in defending himself, the
defendant accidently shoots a stranger, there is no liability in the absence of some negligence, and on
the issue of negligence, the necessity of defending against the assailant must be considered in
determining whether he has acted reasonably.").
The example provided in the Comments on Section 75 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) is
illuminating:
A points a pistol at B, threatening to shoot him. B attempts to shoot A, but his
bullet goes astray and strikes C, an innocent bystander. B is not liable to C
unless, taking into account the exigency in which A's act placed B, B fired his
self-defensive shot in a manner unnecessarily dangerous to C. (emphasis added A.Z.).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 75 cmt. (1965).
This example clarifies that if shooting at an aggressor is a necessary means of
self-defense, such use of force does not create liability for resultant injuries
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decided in favor of self-defense," 202 so that "[t]he interest in self-defense has
priority, for purposes of tort liability, over the competing security interest of a third
party."203 Importantly, some decisions indicate that this also applies to the use of
defensive force by a law enforcement agent.204
It seems, then, that domestic laws do not reflect a common sentiment in the
international community that regards an attack directed at an aggressor, which
involves a substantial risk of unintentional injury to an innocent third party, as
always unreasonable. At the very least, it can be said that domestic laws do not
preclude an interpretation of human rights law that grants a state the same
permission to kill afforded to it under the mixed model.
C Should We Keep Human Rights Law "Unstained"?
The language of the human rights conventions allows us a choice: we can
place the burden of relaxing the imminence requirement either on human rights
law or on a new body of law-the mixed model-created in order to shield human
rights law.
We saw that classifying hostilities between a state and a terrorist group as an
armed conflict requires stretching the customary definition of either an
international armed conflict or a non-international armed conflict. As indicated
above, there is a good reason to stretch the definition of armed conflict to
encompass violence that borders on full scale war. In such situations it is essential
to apply the law of war as it represents the strictest realistic limitations on violence.
But what about conflicts characterized by a scale of violence that is somewhere in
between peace and full scale war, such as the conflict between the U.S. and alQaeda? Is there a good reason to stretch the definition of an armed conflict in
order to apply the mixed model to such conflicts?
In the wake of September 11th, human rights law was hurried to a secured
location, while other bodies of international law-the law of war or the mixed
model-were dispatched to do the dirty work. The proponents of the mixed model
go long way in order to keep human rights law unstained. Is there a good reason to
relieve human rights law of the unpleasant responsibility to sanction realistic
standards of conduct in the fight against terrorism?
One could argue that sanctioning targeted killing under the mixed model
rather than under human rights law is necessary in order to protect the legal

suffered by an innocent bystander, even if the risk of such injuries was
foreseeable.
202. Geistfeld, supra note 200, at 313.
203. Id. at 335. See also Calnan, supra note 198, at 712 ("In cases of self-defense, the imperiled
party is entitled to use whatever force is necessary to stop an aggressor in her tracks. However, her
entitlement does not stop there. She also may commandeer the interests of innocent bystanders. For
example, a party claiming self-defense may endanger or even injure a passerby. The only limit is that
she act reasonably under the circumstances. In this situation, the passerby cannot recover damages for
her harm. Instead, she must sacrifice her interests for those of the privilege-holder.").
204. Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 363 So. 2d 235, 241 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Gordon v. City of
New Orleans, 371 So. 2d 768, 768 (La. 1979).
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structure of "due process - rule, extrajudicial killings - exception." Removing a
norm that relaxes the imminence requirement with regard to targeted killing from
the body of law that mainly regulates situations of normalcy, and confining it to a
body of law that regulates armed conflicts, emphasizes the norm's status as the
exception. It provides a buffer between that norm and situations of normalcy.
Yet this argument presupposes the exceptional nature of large-scale violence
that renders due-process law enforcement measures impractical. It relies on "a
vision of spasms of crises-episodic and sporadic events, albeit very serious in
nature-that last for a relatively brief period of time before the restoration of
normalcy." 205 Such vision hardly comports with reality. As observed by Oren
Gross with regard to the Derogation Regime in human rights law, "the exception
has swallowed the general rule . .

.

. Crisis and emergency are no longer sporadic

episodes in the lives of many nations; they are increasingly becoming a permanent
,,206
hrosre
ht"
fixture in the unfolding story of humanity.
Gross further observes that "a
substantial number of states of emergency in the modem world do not follow the
'normalcy-rule, emergency-exception' paradigm. Rather than provisional and
temporary emergencies, the world increasingly faces de facto, permanent,
institutionalized, or entrenched emergencies."207
Grave, large-scale hostilities between a state and terrorist or guerrilla
organizations have become in many regions of the world the rule, not the
201
exception.
It seems, therefore, that a careful yet realistic application of the
concepts of "absolute necessity" and "strict proportionality" in human rights law
would not compromise the legal structure of "due process-rule, extrajudicial
killings-exception" more than a model that stretches the definition of an armed

conflict so that it encompasses conflicts such as the one between the U.S. and alQaeda.
The main rationale for the mixed model turns on the impracticality of due
process law enforcement measures in the face of grave, large-scale violence.
Opting for the mixed model on the basis of this rationale seems to be precluded by
the derogation regime applicable in international human rights law: The main
international human rights conventions allow a signatory state to derogate from
some of its human rights obligations "in time[s] of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation ...
Such derogation must be limited "to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."2 10
An adoption of the mixed model triggered by the impracticality of due
process law enforcement measures would circumvent the derogation regime. The
205. Oren Gross, "Once More Unto the Breach": The Systematic Failure ofApplying the European
Convention on Human Rights to EntrenchedEmergencies,23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437, 453 (1998).
206. Id. at 443.
207. Id. at 455.
208. See Savitri Taylor, Guarding the Enemy from Oppression: Asylum-Seeker Rights PostSeptember 11, 26 MELB. U. L. REv. 396, 406 (2002).
209. ICCPR, supra note 118, art. 4; European Convention, supra note 118, art. 15(1); American
Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673.
210. See ICCPR, supranote 118, art. 4.
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derogation regime contained in human rights law was conceived precisely for
situations such as large-scale violence that threatens the life of the nation (i.e.,
violence that renders the law enforcement model impractical). 211 It implies a
judgment, made by the framers of the human rights conventions, that such violence
does not warrant a shift from a legal regime governed by human rights law to any
other legal regime. Rather, such violence should be tackled within the contours of
human rights law and its derogation regime. This judgment also suggests the
confidence of the framers of the human rights conventions that human rights law
and its derogation regime present realistic standards of conduct for states in the
face of violence that threatens the life of the nation.212
In this regard, it is of no significance that the right to life is not subject to the
special derogation regime.213 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which protects the right to life, prohibits only "arbitrary"
killings.214 Given the loose language of this provision, it is clear why the
derogation regime does not apply to it. Obviously, no emergency justifies arbitrary
killings.
The analysis in this part suggests, then, that international human rights law
allows states to target and kill terrorists who pose a lethal threat that is not
imminent, provided that there is no feasible possibility of arresting them and there
is a high probability that delaying action will prevent the possibility of thwarting
the threat later. Moreover, human rights law does not contain an absolute
prohibition on law enforcement operations that are likely to result in the
unintentional killing of innocent persons. Rather, state forces engaging a terrorist
or guerrilla group are required to plan and conduct their operations in a manner
that minimizes, as much as possible, incidental injuries to uninvolved individuals.
Hence, the liberties to use force afforded to a state under the mixed model are also
available to it under international human rights law.
VII. CONCLUSION

This article argues that terrorism should be tackled within the contours of the
traditional armed conflict/law enforcement dichotomy. The application of the law
of war is triggered where hostilities border on full-scale war. Within the law of
war's proper field of application it does not allow a state too much. It represents

211. The derogation regime contemplates the harshest of circumstances. See Gross, supra note
205, at 453-54 ("[T]he emergency must threaten the very existence of the nation, that is, the 'organized
life of the community constituting the basis of the State."); see also Joan F. Hartman, Derogationfrom
Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1981).
The derogation regime may apply to the conduct of security forces only where normal due-process
measures are impractical. See Gross, supra note 205, at 453 (Addressing the conditions for the
application of the derogation regime to situations of grave violence, Gross observed, "normal measures
available to the state should be manifestly inadequate and insufficient to respond effectively to the
crisis.").
212. Ariel Zemach, Taking War Seriously: Applying the Law of War to Hostilities Within an
Occupied Territory, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REv. 645, 677 (2006).
213. See, e.g., ICCPR, supranote 118, art. 4(2).
214. Id. art. 6.
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the best bargain from a humanitarian perspective regardless of whether the conflict
is an inter-state conflict or a conflict between a state and a non-state entity.
Outside the purview of the law of war, human rights law does not allow states too
little. It provides states with realistic standards of conduct even in the face of
grave, large-scale violence, so long as the reality of hostilities lends itself to an
individualized assessment of dangerousness.
The development of a new body of law, a normative middle ground between
the law of war and human rights law applicable to armed conflicts between a state
and non-state actors, is therefore superfluous. Furthermore, such new body of law
would suffer from a number of inherent flaws: it cedes the legitimate ends of a just
war, compromises the principle of equality in the application of the law of war, and
is, most importantly, unrealistic where hostilities between a state and a non-state
actor resemble a full-scale war, as it requires an individualized assessment of
dangerousness in a reality that is not amenable to such assessment.

EXPORTING THE RULE OF LAW To MONGOLIA: POSTSOCIALIST LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORMS
SEBASTIAN R. ASTRADA*

This article analyzes Mongolia's legal andjudicial reforms and the efforts of
international organizations and outside states to assist or encourage those
reforms. Most internationalorganizationsand outside states predicate their legal
assistance on establishing the "rule of law, " but they rarely operate from a
developed definition of this concept. This article analyzes what the concept of
"rule of law" commonly means, and establishes a cogent and tangible, and
procedurally-minimalist, rule of law definition. This article then uses this
formulation to analyze Mongolia's legal and judicial reforms. Mongolia's
experiences demonstrate four important best practices for future rule of law
promotion: (1) judicial independence is the cornerstone of the rule of law; (2)
formal government action plans offer "more bang for your buck; " (3) public
participationand sentiment is a proxy for the institutionalizationof the norms and
culture of the rule of law; and (4) the leverage of donor coordination pays
dividends.
I. INTRODUCTION

From the time of its independence on July 11, 1921,1 and throughout 70 years
as a socialist state, Mongolia was something of an enigma to the rest of the world,
having withdrawn inward. Mongolia engaged in diplomatic relations almost
exclusively with one state: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R. or
Soviet Union).2 Then, after the Sino-Soviet split, Mongolia primarily acted under
Soviet direction as a buffer state between the U.S.S.R. and its other large
communist neighbor, China.3 During that time, only the U.S.S.R. knew anything
about Mongolia and its people. 4 Mongolia stumbled onto the world scene during
the remarkable antecedents which led to the dismantling of the Soviet Union and

* Sebastian R. Astrada, J.D., American University, Washington College of Law; M.A. in International
Affairs with a concentration in International Politics, American University, School of International
Service. Mr. Astrada worked at the Supreme Court of Mongolia in the summer of 2005. Mr. Astrada is
an attorney at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington D.C. The views
expressed in this article are solely the views of the author and should not be attributed to the Supreme
Court of Mongolia or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
1. Thomas E. Ewing, Russia, China, and the Origins of the Mongolian People's Republic, 19111921: A Reappraisal,58 SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 399, 421 (1980).
2. Henry S. Bradsher, The Sovietization of Mongolia, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 545, 548 (1971-1972);
Tom Ginsburg, PoliticalReform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China, 35 ASIAN SURV. 459, 459
(1995).
3. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 461.
4. See Bradsher,supranote 2, at 548.
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its satellites. Only then did the world awaken to Mongolia and its status as an
independent state.
Following the lead of the former satellites, in 1990, Mongolia undertook a
joint transition from socialism and a centrally-planned economy to democracy and
a free-market economy.6 At its outset, the parliamentary leaders envisioned a
sustainable and modest transition. After the transition began with a basic
amendment to the Constitution to provide for a multi-party state, subsequent events
enlarged the initial scope of the shift.7
Put simply, Mongolia collapsed.
Mongolia's economic implosion and social structure dissolution resulted from a
unique combination: Eastern Europe's rejection of communism; the Soviet
Union's disintegration; the resultant destruction of the Soviet trading bloc, the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA"); and the Soviet Union's
cessation of aid to Mongolia.' As a result, Mongolia probably suffered the worst
peacetime economic collapse of any nation this century.9 By the time the dust
settled, the transition had to undertake the goal of completely rebuilding all of
Mongolia's internal structures.
As a result, Mongolia's leaders lacked the advantage of gradual change.
Instead, they chose a "shock therapy" approach by opening its borders, dismantling
trade barriers, ceasing price controls, and privatizing the state's holdings.10
Throughout this process, over the last twenty years, Mongolia received massive
influxes of donor aid in the form of human, technological and financial capital."
Surprisingly, Mongolia's transition has been lauded as achieving remarkable
success; and its institutions are democratic, widely-established and domestically
and internationally respected.12 However, Mongolia still cannot stand on sturdy
legs if the support of donor aid is reduced or retracted.
In order for the government of Mongolia to understand how foreign aid
influences its economy, society and government, and what level of dependence or
interaction exists, this article addresses certain questions. How did foreign aid
influence, assist and advance Mongolia's legal transition? Was foreign aid
predicated on a firm understanding of what Mongolia's economy and legal system
needed, or did foreign donors merely advance general, and western notions of
legal, democratic and capitalistic reforms? Are these systems appropriate for the
Mongolian people, its culture and its institutional history?
5. Julia S. Bilskie & Hugh M. Arnold, An Examinationof the Politicaland Economic Transition
of Mongolia Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 19 J. OF THIRD WORLD STUD. 205, 209 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 2, at 459; id.
7. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 209.
8. Id. at 211.
9. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 459.
10. See e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 465; Tae Ming Cheung, The Cure Hurts, 153 FAR E.
EcoN. REv. 70, 71-72 (1991); Hari D. Goyal, A Development Perspective on Mongolia, 39 ASIAN
SURV. 633, 635-43 (1999); Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 211-12.
11. Goyal, supra note 10, at 647.
12. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
(November 21, 2005), available at http://www.mongolianembassy.us/mongolia and usa/us_presidents
visit to mongolia.
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Most international organizations and outside states predicate their legal
assistance on establishing the "rule of law," but they rarely operate from a wellthought definition of this concept. This article analyzes what the concept of "rule
of law" commonly means, and establishes a cogent and tangible rule of law
definition. This article then uses this procedurally-minimalist formulation to
analyze Mongolia's post-socialist rule of law reforms that focus on the judiciary in
particular.1 3
This article is divided into five parts. Part II discusses the concept of the rule
of law and conceives of an appropriate rule of law formulation for post-socialist or
transitional states. Part III provides a brief summary of Mongolia's institutional
background. Pursuant to the procedurally-minimalist rule of law definition that
this article establishes, Part IV addresses Mongolia's legal and judicial reforms and
the efforts of international organizations, states and domestic NGOs to assist or
encourage those reforms, and identifies lessons learned and significant issues or
stumbling blocks that remain in Mongolia's reform process. Finally, Part V offers
some conclusions. For a more in depth analysis to Mongolia's transition, this
article provides various appendices. Appendix A lays the institutional and legal
bases of Mongolia's socialist times. Appendix B delineates the specific reforms
that Mongolia and the donor community implemented.
II. THE THEORY OF RULE OF LAW REFORM

The rule of law is a concept that gained widespread credence and revival
following the dismantling of the former Soviet Union. 14 Prior to September 11,
2001, the United States and other members of the international community began a
massive program of foreign aid (including rule of law programs) to states that were
transitioning to democracy or that were newly democratic, particularly the former
republics of the U.S.S.R. 15 The post-911 environment further intensified the
exportation and implementation of law reforms - mostly under the rubric and with
the final goal of establishing a "rule of law." 16 In the present international relations
environment, there is an increased emphasis on creating and sustaining democratic
states. Western powers in particular believe they can accomplish this through the
exportation of the rule of law to states which lack democracy or market-friendly
institutions or where they are emerging from conflict.1 7 Thus, rule of law
13. This article derives from my experience working at the Supreme Court of Mongolia, and my
many months of research and studies afterward. It owes its completion to a great many people who
guided me during my time in Ulaanbaatar and again back in Washington D.C. I'd like to thank
Ganzorig Gombosuren, who initiated this experience, Chief Judge Ganbat Chimedikham, Munkhbold
Ganbat and their families, who took me in as one of their own, Judge Ts. Tsogt, Judge Enkhbayar and
Munkhzorig for their guidance and explanations, and Eggy, who provided me with warm housing for
my stay in Ulaanbaatar.
14. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule ofLaw Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 110 (1998).
15. Id.
16. See Dan E. Stigall, The Rule of Law: A Primer and a Proposal, 189 MIL. L. REv. 92, 92
(2006).
17. See Id.; Jane Stromseth, Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States Symposium: PostConflict Rule of Law Building: The Needfor a Multi-Layered, SynergisticApproach, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2008); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the
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promotion becomes an element of foreign policy or an unofficial response to the
rise of the leftists in Latin America, the autocracies in the remaining communist
states, and the dictatorships and sultanates of Africa and the Middle East.18
Additionally, rule of law reform has been an important by-product of
globalization. In fact, the concept of the rule of law in modem times invariably is
tied to the recent phenomenon of globalization of law. Globalization of law is the
"degree to which the whole world lives under a single set of legal rules." 19 It refers
to the trend where "what is sought globally is increased transparency of, and
increased public participation in, bureaucratic decision-making."20
Before the globalization of law, most states did not require a legal system or
legal rules that complemented or interlocked neatly with the global economic rules
in place. In no small part due to increased globalization, states increasingly have
been encouraging their allies and development organizations to assist in their
domestic reform process. 2 1 Normally, their purpose is to leverage the expertise of
their allies and the international community to their specific needs and general
benefit.22
This process is compounded by the fact that, in the last twenty or so years, a
number of regions naturally have undergone catastrophic implosions or drastic
changes.23 Countries in the former Soviet Union, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin
America and parts of Africa all have undertaken recent transformations, mostly
resulting in the creation of democratic institutions, if not democracy itself.24
Complementing these transformations has been a high degree of donor activity,
and of course, what generally follows, rule of law reform.25
However, as frequently and rightly noted, donors have spent billions of
dollars promoting the rule of law without fully understanding or defining the
concept.26 Regardless, the promotion of the rule of law has become a defacto rally
cry for the international development, human-rights and foreign-policy

"Rule of Law ", 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275,2275-77(2003).
18. See, e.g., Carothers, supranote 14, at 97-99; Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, 33
FLETCHERF. WORLD AFF. 49, 50-51 (2009).

19. Martin Shapiro, GlobalizationofLaw, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (1993).
20. Id. at 46 (describing the demise of the technocracy, where the government was the technical
expert in all fields - that gave rise to the new globalization of law, where law is the instrument for
achieving greater transparency and participation in bureaucratic decisions). Given the responses to the
credit crisis that began in 2007, however, the technocracy of national governments is resurgent.
21. See Carothers,supra note 18, at 50-5 1.
22. See id.at 49-51.
23. Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 14, at 100-101; see Carothers,Rule of Law
Temptations, supranote 18, at 50.
24. See Carothers,supra note 14, at 100-02.
25. In their use of rule-of-law ideals, legal and development scholars, western governments and
multilateral organizations have attacked one another for being imperialistic, ethnocentric, or motivated
by partipris.
26. Brooks, supra note 17, at 2283 (describing the confusion and conflation of those who claim to
promote the rule of law).
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communities. For instance, the mission statement of the international section of
the National Center for State Courts of the United States is "to strengthen the rule
of law and administration of justice throughout the world." 28 To be sure, most aid
donors operate with a common sense understanding the concept of the rule of law,
but their assumptions rarely are grounded in empirical research. 29 Nor is there
consensus on the rule of law's definitive academic conception.
Thus, this section conceives a working rule of law definition for analysis of
post-socialist or transitional legal reforms. The benefit of proceeding from a
developed conception of the rule of law is that its use can be understood easily for
subsequent comparative studies of post-Socialist or other transitional states
undergoing legal and judicial reforms.30
A. What is the Rule ofLaw?
The original meaning of rule of law is simply that persons and institutions
should be accountable to predetermined standards - and that those standards must
apply to everyone equally.31 However, scholars strongly differ over the character
and the elements of the rule of law in modem conceptions.32
This article's formulation represents a refinement of the best procedurallyminimalist definitions of the rule of law. This minimalist approach encompasses
two essential requirements or values: (1) transparency of government decisions and
law-making, which creates a system of rules; and (2) meaningful access to redress
and justice through an independent judiciary or other body.33
27. Id.
28. National Center for State Courts, Mission and History, http://www.ncsc.org/Web Document
Library/AboutUs Mission.aspx (last visited March 4, 2010). The National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) works with the USAID in Mongolia on the Judicial Reform Project. Such an exercise could be
undertaken for many institutes, organizations or government ministries.
29. John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter? 1 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Paper No. 26,
2002), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/wp26.pdf
30. The alternative would be to proceed with a common sense understanding of the rule of law. In
that case, however, subsequent studies would struggle with an analysis based on uncertain formulations.
31. William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 724 (2000) (explaining the
roots of the term).
32. See e.g., Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31-73 (Thomas Carothers ed., 1996) (discussing

the different conceptions and their implications).
33. See Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Review and Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 484
(1995) (reviewing ANTHONY CARTY, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (1992), and SAMMY ADELMAN &
ABDUL PALIWALA, LAW AND CRISIS INTHE THIRD WORLD (1993)) (setting forth two elements: first,
that the government acts pursuant to rules produced in the political arena and respects the civil rights of
its citizens; and second, that there is a judicial party to resort to that embodies the ethic of treating all
before it neutrally and fairly). See also Carothers,supra note 14, at 96 (reaching the same procedurallyminimalist rule of law as Tamanaha albeit with more defining substance. Carothers defines the rule of
law as a system, where laws uphold the political and civil liberties pursuant to universal human rights
recognitions, which are clear in meaning and apply equally to everyone. Further, he calls for the central
institutions of the legal system to be fair, competent, and efficient, and for an accused to have the right
to a fair, prompt trial with a presumption of innocence. Finally, governance must be integrated into the
legal framework and officials must be subject to and accepting of the law); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The
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Additionally, there are primary qualities that support the two essential
requirements. These bedrock concepts advancing the minimalist definition are:
procedural fairness in the passage of fair, equal and nondiscriminatory laws and
decisions with the effect of law; and procedural fairness in access to the courts or
other body for meaningful, fair, impartial and equal redress and justice. 34
Apart from the bedrock concepts, there is a penumbra of other secondary or
supporting qualities. 35 For the most part, academics conceive of elements that
primarily support the procedural quality of rule of law.36 Importantly, the rule of
law is a system of rules - rules should govern certain relationships and events.
Thus, the rule of law: must theoretically and actually guide people through legal
rules, standards and principles; must be reasonably stable; must be supreme; and
must utilize impartial justice through courts or other bodies with fair procedures.37
Further, supporting the condition of transparency is the principle that people
should know what the government's decisions are - they must be pre-announced,
preexisting (no retroactive laws) and made publicly available. 38 Additionally,
meaningful access to justice requires the practical availability of process to judge
the government's action with the law.3 9 Institutionally, actors must have regular
availability of tribunals, agencies or courts to resolve disputes, which have
impartial judges, and whose decisions are promptly and effectively implemented.40
The agency that judges the government's actions must be independent from the
actor being evaluated. 4 1 Accessibility, usually found through the courts, should be
supported by an active and independent bar association. A series of strictly
procedural standards sustain these principles: "adequate record-keeping, fair trial
practices, the publicity of proceedings, seasoned explanations of results, and the
right of appeal."42

Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997) (explaining
that definitions of the rule of law generally consist of three values: protection against anarchy; the
creation of conditions where people have confidence in their knowledge of the legal consequences of
their actions; and protection against official arbitrariness); David Kairys, Searchingfor the Rule ofLaw,
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 307, 318 (2003) (listing "three essential requirements for the rule of law: certain
relationships, events and transactions should be subject to rules; the rules laid down should be followed
and should apply to everyone, including limits on the government and on the powerful; and the rules
should be enforced with some mechanism for seeking redress").
34. See Kairys, supra note 33, at 312-14.
35. Id. at 311-14 (collecting and detailing the fourteen most oft-listed conceptions of the rule of
law, which includes some substantive elements and some western beliefs, such as the need for judicial
decision-making and judicial review).
36. See, e.g., id. at 312-14; Brooks, supra note 17, at 2284 n.43.
37. Brooks, supranote 17, at 2284 n.43 (contrasting other authors' conceptions of the rule of law).
38. Whitford, supra note 31, at 725-26 (discussing how laws must be made ex ante, or before they
are applied).
39. Id. at 726 (noting that this is a practical condition - an aggrieved person or someone on their
behalf must be able to complain).
40. John V. Orth, Exporting the Rule ofLaw, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71, 79 (1998).
41. Whitford, supra note 31, at 726 (explaining that independence means freedom from fear).
42. Orth, supra note 40, at 79 (discussing the "policy framework" of the rule of law).
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The benefit of a minimalist, procedurally-oriented conception of the rule of
law is that it moderates charges of ethnocentrism or cultural imperialism.43 In
particular, any substantive conception inherently brings into a definition the values
and ideals of the culture or professional and personal background of the definer. A
minimalist definition also defends against the criticism that a substantive
conception leads to transplantation of large bodies of law that may not suit the host
environment, and certainly does not suit every host environment.44
The value of such a minimalist, procedural rule of law is generally
recognized, but not frequently applied.45 Practitioners frequently jump directly
into a substantive conception of the rule of law. Importantly, such a practice skips
the creation of a foundation for a substantive conception. Overall, the rule of law
is grounded firmly in procedural fairness - categorically referred to as justice.
Anything above that would be a substantive or normative addition to the
procedural foundation of the rule of law.46 The lesson here is that any normatively
coherent or defensible substantive conception of a just legal system should be
predicated on the pre-existence of a procedurally-just conception of the rule of
law.47 As such, any substantive conceptions above this basic structure are
appropriate only after the minimalist, procedurally-oriented rule of law has been
established.
Writers and scholars have advanced the notion of the rule of law from
imperialism onwards and imperialist states transplanted their legal codes onto their
subjects pursuant to this notion.48 So why has the world once again turned to
expounding the benefits of and exporting the rule of law?

43. Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The PoliticalEconomy of Rule of Law Reform in
Developing Countries,26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 105 (2004).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Brooks, supranote 17, at 2283-84.
46. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 107.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the TransplantEffect,
47 EuR. ECON. REv. 165, 165 (2003) (analyzing the determinants of effective legal institutions in fortynine countries).
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THE RULE OF LAW - MINIMALIST APPROACH4 9

2 Essential Values
Transparency of government decisions and lawmaking, which creates a system of
rules,
AND
Meaningful access to redress and justice through an independent judiciary or other
body.
PRIMARY

QUALITIES

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN:

Passage of fair, equal and nondiscriminatory
laws and
decisions with the effect of law,
AND
Access to the judiciary or other body for meaningful, fair, impartial and equal
redress and
justice.

SECONDARY

QUALITIES

System of Rules that
Govern relationships and events,
Actually guide people,
Are reasonably stable, AND
Are supreme.

Transparency
Principles
Government Decisions, that
Are preannounced,
Are preexisting, AND
Are publicly available.

in

Meaningful Access to Justice Principles:
Practical availability of process,
Active and independent bar,
Regular availability of tribunals, agencies or
courts to resolve disputes,
Impartial judges, AND
Prompt and effective implementation of
decisions.

Procedural Standards:
Adequate record-keeping,
Fair trial practices,
Publicity of proceedings,
Seasoned explanations of results,
AND
The right of appeal.

49. This is the author's conception of a minimalist, procedurally-oriented conception of the rule of
law, distilled from the best academic formulations as discussed above.
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B. What is the Role ofRule ofLaw Reform?
Western legal theorists believe that rule of law reform will allow states to
transition from "the first stage of political and economic reform to consolidate both
democracy and market economics."50 The "rule of law revival" occurred with the
political openings of different regions - Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, parts
of the Middle East, and parts of Asia.51 The escalation of rule of law reform
appears to have grown principally with the fall of the ex-Soviet satellites, whose
transitions to market economies and democracy (or some vestige of it) spurred a
newfound interest in the role of the rule of law in the development of the twin
towers of political and economic reform.52
Because of the total or near absolute dismantling of the economies and social
institutions of the ex-Soviet states, they immediately needed large amounts of
donor aid, primarily in the form of money and technical advisors.53 Legal
advisors, motivated partly by altruism and partly by self-interest, literally poured
into the former U.S.S.R. from donor states, bilateral aid agencies, multilateral
development banks, and nongovernmental aid organizations.54
Some legal
advisors came from government agencies to assist in the development of their new
systems. Others were sent by multilateral donor agencies as strings attached to
much needed large-scale financial aid. 5 Of course, legal and development
theorists followed their lead in devising new formulations of the proper scope and
strategy of legal reform.56 In any case, the rhetoric of rule of law was used as a
catch-all phrase to embody or consolidate democracy, achieve economic growth
and expand social progress.
1. Democratic Reform
Democracy is the (broadly speaking) principle of "popular control over public
decision making and decision makers; and equality between citizens in the exercise
of that control."57 The institutional means of accomplishing the basic democratic

50. Carothers, supra note 14, at 97. But see Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law
Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 6 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34,
2003) (explaining how the proposition that rule of law is necessary for economic development and
democracy is not as axiomatic as first appears).
51. Carothers, supranote 14, at 97-98.
52. Id. at 95.
53. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, PoliticalReform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China, 35 AsIAN
SURV. 459, 459-60 (1995).
54. Carothers, supranote 14, at 103.
55. Id. at 103-04.
56. See, e.g., Orth, supranote 40, at 71; Whitford, supranote 31, at 723; Kairys, supranote 33, at
307-08; Brooks, supranote 17, at 2276-79.
57. Int'l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance [IDEA], Democracy Assessment: The Basics
of the InternationalIDEA Assessment Framework, at 3 (2002), available at http://www.idea.int/
publications/sod/upload/demo ass inlayengL.pdf (providing a methodology for citizens of any
democracy in the world to assess the functioning of their own democratic systems. The Government of
Mongolia invited representatives from all over the country, officials, civil society and private sector on
June 30 - July 1, 2005, to discuss a Draft National Plan of Action to Consolidate Democracy in
Mongolia. The focus of this plan is a national research project conducted according to the Democracy

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

470

VOL. 3 8:3

principle are realized through legal institutions. 58 Rule of law reform is
intrinsically attached to democratic ideals, if not to democracy itself. Democratic
institutions are protected by law and necessarily dependent on the rule of law.59
States that have backslid - or are struggling with weak rule of law reform - are
generally those that are becoming authoritarian or disrespectful of their
constitutional underpinnings and thus, undemocratic. 60
Additionally, the
globalization of the humanitarian regime and human rights law has influenced the
definition of a rule of law. The consecration and protection of individual rights is a
core tenet of democracy, and has become intertwined irreducibly from the rule of
law ideal.61 Overall, there is a substantial grey area between democracy and the
rule of law. Nonetheless, undertaking rule of law reforms invariably strengthens
and consecrates already-established democratic institutions.
Mongolian citizens understood that they had joined the worldwide democratic
movement. The government of Mongolia's denouncement of the communist state
62
and its subsequent successful elections with full suffrage signaled so much. To a
great extent, the impetus for change took place in Ulaanbaatar, in the universities
and with the young, moderate leaders. 63 Although the state began a democratic
transition, the countryside itself still was mired in its communist recent past, and
most, if not all of the population still was attached to Mongolia's socialist
institutions. 64 In Mongolia, the attainment of procedurally-minimalist rule of law
65
would encourage and assist the success of their democratic transition.
2. Economic Reform
It is "regarded as a truism that the 'rule of law' is causally related to economic
development." 66 At the very least, legal reforms of post-Leninist or postAssessment methodology).
58. Id. at 3-4 (describing the values that create democratic legal institutions; examples of
democratic legal institutions include civil and political rights systems, economic and social rights,
electoral and party systems, NGO rights, anti-discrimination laws, effective and appropriate avenues to
legal redress, and an appropriate domestic and international human rights framework).
59. See United States Agency International Development [USAID], Rule of Law Program,
http://www.usaid.gov/our work/democracyand governance/technical areas/rule of law/ (last visited
Feb. 11, 2010) ("The rule of law is the cornerstone for all other elements of democracy. A free and fair
political system, protection of human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and
the courts and economic development all depend upon accountable governments, fair and accessible
application of the law and respect for international human rights standards. In post-conflict settings,
reestablishing the rule of law is the first step in the rebuilding process. Establishing peace and security
and rebuilding justice institutions can help to develop the necessary climate for reconciliation, public
confidence and subsequent economic growth.")
60. Carothers, supranote 14, at 98 (describing regional experiences with rule-of-law reforms).
61. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1-2

(2004).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
between
negative

See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 53, at 463; Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 205.
Ginsburg, supranote 53, at 462-63.
Id. at 463-64.
See Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5.
Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 102 (referring to evidence of a negative correlation
individuals' perceptions of judicial unpredictability and growth and investment; evidence of a
correlation between corruption and investment; and evidence of positive correlation between

2010

EXPORTING THE RULE OF LAW

471

authoritarian societies are necessary to establish a fair, functioning market
economy. 67 In other developing or transitional countries, extensive legal reforms
are undertaken to establish more market-friendly legal systems, rather than to
create a market economy from scratch.68
The rule of law is essential because it provides the necessary elements to a
market system, including: "universal rules uniformly applied, which generates
predictability and allows planning; a regime of contract law that secures future
expectations; and property law to protect the fruits of labor." 69 With the largescale promotion of rule of law by the international aid community, the
conventional understanding is that a fair, transparent, stable and accountable legal
and judicial system is necessary to attract foreign direct investment, itself a crucial
factor in economic growth and development in transitional and developing states. 70
The pressure to create this framework comes not just from institutional advisors
and requirements within the aid packages, but from the organic demands that
economic globalization puts on governments to accommodate or lose out.7 1
In Mongolia, economic collapse was the primary influence on the minds of
the population. Resultantly, to achieve the long-term goals of a market economy
and a political democracy, Mongolia's leaders realized that its initial reforms must
achieve, in the short term, economic stability and a fundamental change in the
psychology of its citizens. 72 The procedurally-minimalist rule of law would
achieve these necessary economic reforms.
It is important to note that the economic agenda of the rule of law also
achieves democratic benefits. For instance, the rule of law protects the functioning
of major economic institutions and guards businesses and individuals from
discriminatory, inefficient or illegal actions of government in the economy.
Indeed, as there are substantial political, economic and social benefits from rule of
law reforms, a more appropriate view is that the rule of law achieves integrated
benefits.

de facto independence of a state's highest court and economic growth).
67. See Hewko, supranote 29, at 3.
68. Id.
69. Bilder & Tamanaha, supranote 33, at 473. See also id. at 484 (arguing that beyond protecting
economic development and the liberal-democratic framework, law is of secondary status, where
lawyers are "technicians who effectuate decisions made by others").
70. See Hewko, supra note 29, at 3. Of course, when accounting for the realities of economic
globalization - there is an increased need for a country to create the legal and judicial framework to
take advantage of the free flow of goods, labor and capital. Without this framework in place and
protected, risk-averse investors will refuse to invest.
71. Governments that do not accommodate globalization through liberal foreign investment laws,
accession to the WTO and its obligations, etc., invariably lose the benefits of globalization like
increased trade and investment.
72. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 459; Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 205; Goyal, supra
note 10, at 633.
73. Carothers, supranote 14, at 97.

472

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

3. Integrated View of Reform
The rule of law fulfills more than the creation of a democratic or economic
framework. Development should be seen in a comparative integrated view, and
legal development should not be analyzed in isolation nor only connected to
economic development. Amartya Sen argues that there is a need for conceptual
integrity in the development of a successful legal and judicial system, one that
views legal development not merely by its achievements through the passage of
laws and their successful exercise, but through the enhancement of personal
capabilities - "[the] freedom - to exercise the rights and entitlements that we
associate with legal progress."74 In this integrated view, the development of a
successful legal and judicial system has a peripheral effect on all aspects of
development, and should be valued and judged by its peripheral as well as its
intrinsic effects. 75
Legal reforms of stable states generally have a specific focus, such as
76
amendment to the constitution or the modernization of the criminal code. In a
post-socialist environment like that of Mongolia, the government tables every
aspect of society for reform. After completing its constitution, Mongolia engaged
its political, economic and social spheres in a comprehensive reformation, to
achieve its goals of a political democracy and a market economy. 77
Transformation to a market economy and a capitalist system results in winners and
losers, and resultant social inequities occur. Particularly because socialism ensured
that most (if not all) Mongolians had basic necessities, for legal reforms to be
successful, any arising social concerns in a transition must also be countered.
The goal of rule of law initially must be the achievement of the minimalist
requirements. However, the rule of law reform should be valued by its
fundamental effects arising from its definition, as well as its peripheral effects primarily social progress. Having discussed both the elements of a procedurallyminimalist rule of law and the judgment methodology, the actual consummation of
the rule of law reform program is the critical problem for post-Socialist or
transitional states.
C How Do We Achieve the Rule ofLaw?
Simply conceptualized, to achieve the rule of law, a state must undergo
judicial and legal reforms with the intent of realizing its minimalist requirements. 79
74. Amartya Sen, Keynote Address, World Bank Conference- Comprehensive Legal and Judicial
Development: What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process? (June 5,
2000), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legaland judicial
.pdf (explaining that legal development, like economic or political development, is a constitutive part of
development as a whole, which resembles a "thickly interwoven textile").
75. Id.
76. Carothers, supranote 14, at 99-100.
77. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 459; Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 205; Goyal, supra
note 10, at 633.
78. See, e.g., Sen, supranote 74.
79. See, e.g., Orth, supranote 40, at 71; Whitford, supra note 31, at 725; Kairys, supra note 33, at
307; Brooks, supranote 17, at 2275.
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For post-autocratic states, the central task is to introduce the over-arching concept
of accountability that "requires public officials to obey laws and their own rules
and calls them to account when they do not."8 0 To achieve this, the reforms have
to be sanctioned and supported from above - from those who categorically lead the
state, politically and economically.
Ultimately, rule of law reform is (at least
partly) a political enterprise aimed at constraining public authority. The danger
inherent in holding accountable public authority is that those who wield public
power generally will resist any reforms which deny them the benefits of their
authority.82 Consequently, reforms have to combat or temper such resistance at the
outset. In addition to being a political exercise, achieving a rule of law is a
process-oriented development.
1. Rule of Law Realization Theories
Rule-Based Economic Realization: Richard Posner advocates a strict rule-based
reform, whereby existing institutions, however inefficient themselves, will
administer newly created, efficient rules. 83 The benefit lies in the small fixed costs
of creating and instituting a rule, as compared with the very costly and timeconsuming reforms of legal institutions.84 Thus, legal reform can stimulate
economic growth through rule reforms, at a smaller expense. Increased economic
growth will in turn add stability to the nation, increasing its human and economic
resources, and creating a framework for more ambitious legal reforms in the longer
U.85
8
run.

Posner seems to advocate a more ambitious rule-based reform at the expense
of legal institutional strengthening - particularly of the judiciary.86 However,
Posner's rule-based reform agenda leans heavily on a substantive conception of the
rule of law, thus it encounters the difficulties of transplantation and cultural
imperialism. If the rules are not appropriate for the host country or enforceable,
then all is practically for naught, at the expense of possible institutional
strengthening.8 8 Especially in the face of a poor-track record of rule of law reform
over the past two decades, it appears rather more propitious to hedge the risk of
failure through active reforms of multiple sectors. Because of these criticisms, the
realization theory that this article promotes does not include this formulation.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Shapiro, supranote 19, at 57.
See Carothers,supra note 14, at 96.
Id.
Richard Posner, Creating a Legal Frameworkfor Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK

RES. OBSERVER 1, 4-5 (1998).

84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 5-7.
87. Id. at 6.
88. But cf Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 101-09 (criticizing the typical conception of
viewing institutional strengthening as a necessity to attract FDI, and arguing for legal reform to
emphasize the details and not general concepts; e.g., specific, even mundane changes that are necessary
for "existing legislation to function within the cultural, political, and economic realities of the host
countries"). This argument seems to defend against charges of cultural imperialism while advocating a
rule-based reform agenda.
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Rule-Based Formalistic Realization: Carothers forcefully argues that the
concentration of donors and reforming states should be on the depth of the reforms,
in three categories: type-one reform concentrates on the laws themselves; type-two
reform strengthens the law-related institutions to make them more competent,
efficient, and accountable; and type-three reform has a deeper goal of enforcing
government's compliance with law. 89 This reformation agenda is rule-driven as
well, concentrating on technical and institutional reforms that primarily affect the
formalistic legal system.
Norm-Creation Realization: There is little evidence that formalistic reforms or
institutional strengthening is effective without a culture of support for the rule of
law. 90 Another and perhaps more cogent methodology of rule of law reform
operates from a general rule of law theory to specific applications. First, there are
norms of universal application, usually stated in great generality - in particular the
notion of fairness which underlies transparency, accountability and inclusionwhich must permeate the bureaucratic decision-makers and the legal culture. 91
Second, there are specifically-tailored reforms that achieve particular, defined
goals while continuing to uphold the norms of universal application. 92 Aptly, this
type of reform focuses on norm creation. Institutional strengthening, while
certainly necessary, is neither a condition precedent nor a by-product of norm
creation.
Particular rules should be reformed or created only to meet particular societal
challenges or shortcomings in the existing framework. 93 In this formulation, the
rule of law is a culture, and the stimulation and creation of that culture is the overarching goal within which the state undertakes the judicial and legal reforms.94

Integrated Realization: However, these models are not in a zero-sum game. A
more appropriate methodology for realizing the procedurally-minimalist rule of
law combines formalistic reform theory with the norm creation theory.95 If the
umbrella paradigm of norm creation is indeed the universal and ubiquitous concept
that it seems, institutional strengthening and formalistic reforms will help expand
and support it. 96 In this view, norm creation is the umbrella paradigm overseeing

89. Carothers, supra note 14, at 99-100 (discussing rule of law reforms by focusing on the depth
of reforms).
90. See Brooks, supra note 17, at 2284-85 (positing that Thomas Carothers' "Rule of Law
Assistance Standard Menu" is an untenable model and arguing that rule-of-law reform is fundamentally
an issue of norm creation); Stromseth, supranote 17, at 1443-44.
91. Brooks, supra note 17, at 2285 (criticizing the formalistic rule of law conception: "[t]he rule
of law is not something that exists "beyond culture" and that can be somehow added to an existing
culture by the simple expedient of creating formal structures and rewriting constitutions and statutes").
92. Id.
93. Thus, specific rule-creation controls the typical problem of adequate or well-formulated laws
with inefficient enforcement mechanisms which undermines the rule of law by lowering individual or
investor confidence in the sanctity of the legal system.
94. See Brooks, supranote 17, at 2285.
95. This is the authors' conception distilled from the best academic formulations as discussed
supra.
96. See also Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 484 (urging the importance of the development
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the long and difficult process of creating efficient legal institutions, which requires
heavy doses of capital and expensive, educated labor.97
Of course, the criticism of the rule-based and formalistic conceptions is that
they work at the expense of concentrating on norm creations, since the rewriting of
laws and upgrading of the courts does not cause judges, ministers and
parliamentarians to "absorb" the doctrines underlying the rule of law. 98
In an integrated view, the focus is on norm creation, but the typical
formalistic reforms are both suitable and needed to establish an appropriate legal
culture. The actual reforms should follow the integration and development of the
intellectual norms - not only the training in market economics and democratic
institutions - but also a thorough understanding of governmental and judicial
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and accessibility. To put it another
way, the focus should be on the creation of a rule of law culture while
accomplishing necessary institutional and particular reforms.
2. The Path of Realization
The reform of legislation is a natural starting point in transforming a society
from socialist legal traditions and a centrally-planned economy to a market
economy. In Mongolia, before legal reforms could occur, Mongolia's leaders had
to meet the preconditions to reform discussed above, which culminated with the
establishment of a multi-party system and the adoption of a new Constitution. 99
The difficulty then lay in conveying the provisions of this modem Constitution to a
restructured economic, political and legal system that could implement and enforce
these new rights. 00
Many donor organizations and academics utilize a version of the following
chronology for the undertaking of rule of law reforms.101
Stage One: Rewrite the constitution, laws (including modernizing the civil
and criminal code) and regulations.
Stage Two: Undertake judicial reforms through: creating an independent
judiciary; professionalizing the bar and the bench; increasing judicial efficiency;
increasing judicial accessibility; increasing the competence and professional
standards of the judiciary through a reformed law school curriculum, support for
bar associations, and judicial training; and establishing alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.

of the body of legal doctrine in addition to the basics of institution building).
97. See, e.g., Brooks, supranote 17, at 2275.
98. Id.
99. See also, B. Chimid, Advisor to Parliament, Speech at Conference in Celebration of Tenth
Anniversary of Asian Foundation's Mongolian Program, (Sep. 11, 2000), in THE ASIA FOUNDATION,
MONGOLIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES,

18-22

(2000).
100. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 2, at 459; Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 205.
101. In addition to this chronology, and what is not focused on by donors, the rule-of-law definition
and realization theory proposed by this article require overarching emphasis on norm creation.
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Stage Three: Encourage legislative and executive reform through good
governance programs.
Stage Four: Increase legal representation and accessibility through legal aid
programs and nongovernmental organizations.
Stage Five: Embark on other institutional reforms such as police, prosecutor,

and prison reforms. 102
Additionally there are other factors, not perfectly congruent with the universal
notions embodied in rule of law, but tangential and supportive. First, an
independent, active media can do much to push for transparency of government
decisions and advance meaningful participation in the decision-making. 103 At the
least, an independent media can create a meaningful dialogue that can lead to
increased participation in governance. An active media can make public
criticisms, raise awareness levels, be a voice to the poor and vulnerable, and most
importantly, force the government to be accountable, transparent and inclusive. 104
Of course, the right of free speech must be judicially protected for this outlet to
carry its weight. Second, public interest in social responsibility can create social
challenge and change, thus stimulating a rule of law culture.1 05 Further, sensitivity
to the actual social environment is an important aspect in these legal reforms.
3. The Problem of Constraining the Leaders
Owing to the limited successes by rule of law reforms over the last two
decades, it is commonly accepted that "rule of law reform will succeed only if it
gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law." 1 06
Emphasis on a notion-based rule of law aims to achieve precisely this - to reduce

and eventually eliminate unreceptive leaders and officials.1 0 7 To be sure, these
individuals will only surrender their "traditional impunity" under great
pressures.10 8 More often than not, domestic pressure alone will not suffice in
achieving this surrender, thus there is a clear role for foreign sources. 109 The
underlying assumption, as discussed above, is that rule of law reform is a political
endeavor and not a technical or bureaucratic enterprise, so its success is subject to
inherent and internal political uncertainties. 10 Changing the mindset of leaders is
102. See, e.g., Orth, supranote 40, at 77; Whitford, supranote 31, at 725; Kairys, supranote 33, at
312-14; Brooks, supranote 17, at 2284-85; Carothers, supranote 14, at 99-100.
103. See Sen, supranote 74, at 19 (arguing that a vigorous media can strengthen economic security,
political liberties, legal and human rights, etc., but judicial guarantees must protect the right of fair
speech, fair comment and public criticism).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Carothers, supranote 14, at 96.
107. See id. at 100.
108. Id. at 96 (describing the primary obstacles to achieving the rule of law).
109. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 128-34 (arguing that because of the importance of
historical, cultural and social impediments, rule-of-law reforms need effective monitoring and
assessment by a credible, and likely multilateral, institution). One need only look at the example of
Mobutu in Zaire / Democratic Republic of the Congo to see what could occur when foreign donors do
not exert pressure on leaders to surrender their impunity.
110. See id.
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necessarily a political exercise, where the actors will weigh the benefits, costs, and
realities of ceding to the rule of law. Consequently, this formulation leads
credence to the general understanding that the success of reforms relies not on
technical or financial support, but on combating political and human obstacles.111
4. The Use of Pre-Conditions for Constraining the Leaders
Leaders and non-receptive officials can be constrained through a combination
of domestic and foreign influence. Domestic interest groups play an important role
in exerting bottom-up pressures.
Nongovernmental organizations, domestic
investors, minorities, and entrepreneurs should agitate for suitable changes and
form broad coalitions with the populace and government officials. The goal is to
stimulate change horizontally and ultimately vertically using a broad section of
alliances, rather than fractured interest groups clamoring for specific favors and
changes, what usually supports or results in corruptive political exchanges.
To augment domestic efforts, there is a clear role for international pressure.
Foreign governments, multilateral banks, bilateral organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and foreign citizens should exert top-down pressures on the leaders
of host countries through conditionality, to push for specific and traceable rule of
law reforms. Of course, by no means does this formulation intend for loans and
grants to be conditioned on the creation of a rule of law program. The host
country should conceive of and establish a rule of law program on its own, lest the
reforms be reduced to mere formalities. Only after a consensus of high-level
support is in place will international pressure serve any purposes. In the absence
of upper-level sponsorship, or at least acceptance, rule of law reforms will be
diametrically opposed by those whose power, influence, or economics will be
affected. 112
When domestic support for a rule of law program is lacking, legal advisors
should forgo imposing or conditioning donations on legal and judicial reform, and
focus on encouraging a grass roots movement for reform, through discourse with
the host country's bar associations, nongovernmental associations and government
officials. 113 However, where a rule of law program is in place, foreign
organizations and groups should exert influence to set in motion a rule of law
culture. 114
Use of condition precedents is a potentially successful method for foreign
donors and states to achieve the rule of law.115 To illustrate, consider the area of
nongovernmental organizations. Where restructuring is taking place, and some
elites do not want a comprehensive nongovernmental organization law for fear of

111. Carothers, supra note 14, at 96 (explaining the human obstacle as the central difficulty in the
establishing the rule of law); see also Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 119 (creating a five-part
strategy to address the political barriers to rule-of-law reform).
112. Carothers, supranote 14, at 96; Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 119.
113. Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14
THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 117, 123-28 (1999).

114. See id. at 124-25.
115. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 132.
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losing political control, serious pressure should be placed on those elites to cede
their opposition through conditions precedents. 116 Condition precedents can be
desirable benefits from industrialized countries, the international aid community,
accession to regional trade blocs, bilateral trade deals, or accession to the WTO.
These pressures should be used to disrupt opposition only to the reforms which are
necessary to create the rule of law culture and framework - in this case, the legal
basis for nongovernmental organizations to operate domestically.
Even though the underlying doctrine will surely not be the influential factor in
an actor ceding opposition, there are fringe benefits that actually support the
creation of a rule of law culture. Younger generations will have a needed reform
in place (the inclusion of nongovernmental organizations in the dialogue of
society), thus increasing transparency, participation and redress in the future. 117 At
least in this way, the notion of inclusive governmental rule will be experienced by
the individuals who publicly participate in society and those in government who
are receptive to such ideas. Resultantly, the rule of law culture increasingly
develops, deepens and strengthens.118
D. The Role of the Judiciaryin Implementing the Rule ofLaw
"The Rule of Law depends on judges willing to decide cases in
accordance with principle, despite occasionally incurring official
displeasure,and sometimes at realpersonalrisk" 119

While the rule of law necessitates the constraint of leaders, it depends on the
judiciary. A close study of the rule of law chart demonstrates that the judiciary is
the focus of most of the rule of law reforms. 120 By and large, judicial reforms play
a determinative role in the establishment of a rule of law culture.
An underlying goal of judicial reforms is to achieve government compliance
with the law and create acceptance of the rule of law values at the top echelon of
government. 12 1 This is possible through the integrated combination of institutional
reforms and the creation of norms. 122 Institutional judicial reforms are capital and
labor intensive, and demand sophistication and patience.
An impartial
administration of the rule of law is only accessible through the creation of a strong

116. Id. at 129-33.
117. See Carothers,supra note 14, at 100.
118. It appears that many Central Asian post-Leninist states that embraced rule-of-law reform
during their transitions and that have backslid into increasing authoritarianism, would have benefited by
a more strict and principled focus on rule-of-law doctrine and the creation of a notion-based legal
culture. This study is formulated precisely for such purpose - to create a theoretical framework to
compare the experiences of post-socialist states. Here, the author focuses on Mongolia, probably the
least written about ex-Soviet "satellite."
119. Orth, supranote 40, at 81.
120. This assessment is pursuant to the author's formulation for the rule-of law chart. Other ruleof-law formulations do not necessarily focus on the judiciary though it is hard to conceive a formulation
that does not impact the judiciary.
121. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 110-11.
122. See Brooks, supranote 17, at 2283-87.
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legal culture that supports the rule of law notions. 123 The following factors
constitute the principal judicial reforms that a country can undertake and that assist
in the establishment of a procedurally-minimalist rule of law.
Judicial Independence: Principally, achieving judicial independence is a key
reform that ensures a strong apolitical judiciary, which is free to mete out
justice. 124 Judicial independence is one of the essential values to the above
formulation of a procedurally-minimalist rule of law. The constitution or other
legislation usually assures judicial independence. Above all, a strong and
independent judiciary embodied with the ethos of rule of law will have the
freedom and strength to challenge governmental actions that hinder the rule of law.
Thus, a high level of support is necessary from the ministry of justice, judges and
judicial employees, in addition to the legislature and senior executive branch
officials, for judicial reform to succeed. 125 Judicial independence reforms in
societies which previously lacked it depends on executive and legislative actors
126
willing to allow an independent judiciary.
This usually occurs through the
provision of a sufficient budget, compliance with judicial decisions and support for
institutional strengthening. 127
Judicial Council: The creation and implementation of a judicial council supports
an independent judiciary. 128 This reform is of particular importance in postSocialist societies that historically have not had an independent judiciary. 129 The
institution of a judicial council assists judicial independence, since a cross-section
of government screens judicial appointments, monitors the judiciary, institutes
disciplinary proceedings and sets the budget.130 The procedures for selection of
judges must be refined to limit improper influence and achieve genuine judicial
independence. If judges and judicial employees are sufficiently secure in their
tenure, and have a sufficiently high salary, they will be more independent,
competent, and honest. 13 1
Judicial Efficiency: Increasing judicial efficiency embraces the notion of fairness,
which underlies the rule of law culture. Technical and material aid increases the
resources and capabilities of courts, by disseminating computers, copiers and fax
machines; streamlining court processing times; and creating a framework for
public access to printed judicial decisions.132 These reforms are fundamentally
123. Id.
124. Danielle Conway-Jones, Mongolia, Law Convergence, and the Third Era of Globalization,3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 63, 71 (2004) (expressing that the flexibility inherent in the
Mongolian Constitution under Article 49, judicial independence, is a hallmark of common law
traditions). Indeed, judicial independence is grounded in the ideal of fairness.
125. See Messick, supra note 113, at 117-36 (summarizing a six case study of USAID judicial
reform projects and holding so).
126. See Messick, supranote 113, at 124; Thomas Carothers, supranote 14, at 96.
127. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 120-21.
128. Id. at 120.
129. See id. at 120-21.
130. Id. at 120.
131. See id.at 120-21.
132. But see Messick, supra note 113, at 124-25 (explaining that the authors of the six case study
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important as they increase judicial efficiency. "Protracted case processing times
and overburdened administrative staff may lead to resource-privileged individuals
dominating the court's time to the detriment of those who have fewer resources
with which to exert influence."1 33 Reforming judicial procedures also can increase
efficiency by eliminating duplicative or contradictory procedures. 134 Overall,
judicial efficiency reduces possibilities for corruption, increases accessibility to the
courts, and ensures that decisions are consistent throughout the country.135
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Mechanisms and the Informal Society:
Improving access to justice through new procedures and the creation of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms increases individuals' ability to achieve meaningful
redress - and hold government and other individuals responsible for their
actions.136 In many countries, informal dispute mechanisms must be studied and
brought into the formal legal environment, so that extra-judicial remedies are
limited in size and context, thus entrenching the rule of law firmly in the
judiciary.137 Of course, these informal mechanisms can be kept in local or
neighborhood governments or councils, but reforms at the least should create the
ability to appeal decisions to a judicial body.
Professionalizing the Judiciary: Professionalizing the judicial system is an
important reform for creating a fair and impartial judiciary.138
Raising
accreditation standards, reforming legal education, creating ethics standards and
monitoring committees, increasing the status of bar associations and raising the
status of the judge in society will contribute to both an increased professionalism
within the judiciary and an increased public perception of the profession. 13 9
Leizal Education: Reforming and modernizing the curriculum of the legal
education creates a new awareness of modem legal norms, issues, and the nuances
of a market economy, and encourages a more sophisticated rule of law culture.140
As well, reformation of legal education ensures that all law schools offer
coursework that meets predetermined standards. There is a need to coordinate the
legal education so that law schools teach substantially the same subject matter, to
reduce discrepancies in knowledge and in the practice of law once the students
become accredited lawyers. The creation of a required bar examination will ensure
that these minimum standards are met by all legal graduates.

found that these types of reforms have little impact where there is a lack of a consensus for judicial
reform).
133. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 111.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. USAID, OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PRACTITIONERS GUIDE 1 (1988), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracyand

governance/publications/pdfs/pnacp335.pdf
137. See id.at 28, 49.
138. See Carothers,supra note 14, at 100.
139. See id.; OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, supra note 136, at 35.
140. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 117-18.
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Bar Associations: Bar associations regulate the legal profession, and create and
administer the standards for accreditation and professional licensing. 141 Increasing
their scope and role as an oversight committee will generate an infrastructure of
accountability and professionalism. Bar associations also provide Continuing
Legal Education (CLE) programs, which help to educate the judiciary in how to
understand, implement and judge newly-passed legislation and ensure that
accredited attorneys continue to meet minimum knowledge and training
requirements.142 Perhaps most importantly, CLE programs can emphasize rule of
law notions, and over time these can influence acceptance for the rule of law.
Accountability: Since rule of law reform is in part a political activity, proper
performance is dependent on political actors deciding to comply or being forced to
comply with the law. Thus, accountability of officials is predicated on the
psychological willingness of the individual judge to rule honestly and
professionally. 14 But it would be folly to predicate the establishment of the rule of
law wholly on the judiciary, since ultimately high-level officials must accept living
subject to the law. As such, weak judicial commitment to rule of law reform will
undermine the efficacy of the whole premise.144
Overall, the judiciary is fundamentally important for achieving a procedurally
minimalist rule of law. The judiciary is prevalent in the rule of law's essential
values (meaningful access to redress and justice through an independent judiciary),
in its primary qualities (access to the courts or other bodies for meaningful, fair,
impartial and equal redress and justice), and overwhelmingly so in its secondary
qualities (procedural standards and meaningful access to justice principles). 145
"Rewriting constitutions, laws, and regulations is the easy part. Far-reaching
institutional reform, also necessary, is arduous and slow." 146 The accumulation of
the appropriate legal doctrine and professional norms and institutional "upgrading"
takes time, and necessarily, donor organizations must be patient and supportive of
the whole process of legal assistance, and host states must be committed to the full
stage and scope of reforms.
III. MONGOLIA'S TRANSITIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

147

The reformists agitating a transformation to democracy advocated four main
policy changes: a multiparty system and free and fair elections - i.e. inclusion in
the government; a free-market economy; democracy; and the end of bureaucratic

141. Id. at 115-16 (describing several functions of a bar association in the legal system of a
nation).
142. Id. at 116.
143. Orth, supra note 40, at 81.
144. See Carothers, supra note 14, at 100-03 (painting a global picture of rule-of-law reform by
making continental and regional observations, and opining that the movement toward rule of law is
broad but shallow); Carothers, supra note 18, at 50 (noting that over the last 10 years, political leaders
worldwide have asserted a commitment to building the rule of law).
145. See supratext accompanying note 49.
146. Carothers, supranote 14, at 95-96.
147. See infra pp. 80-86.
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control. 148 Indeed, when the reformists in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary
Party ("MPRP") persuaded the party to accept the democratic demands, the
government's subsequent acts primarily sought to establish a (facially) democratic
system. 149

The first parliamentary act inspired by the reformists' pressure was purely
symbolic. In 1990, Parliament amended its 1960 constitution, deleting the article
which stated that the MPRP was the guiding force of the Mongolian state and its
society - Mongolia was to be a multi-party, democratic society. 5 o During July September of 1990, Mongolia experienced its first free parliamentary elections,
following other amendments that restructured the government and that allowed the
legal formation of opposition parties."' The MPRP earned a majority of the seats
in the People's Great Hural, but the Little Hural (the lower house of Parliament,
subsequently abolished) was representative of the competing political parties. 15 2
The first sessions of the Mongolian People's Great Hural (the new unicameral
Parliament) formally abolished the directives, ordinances and decisions that
constituted Mongolian law.153 "The society had once and for all decided to take a
leap from the rule of leaders to the rule of law."154
The first MPRP government's level of inclusiveness was astounding for a
party accustomed to full political control - the MPRP assigned four cabinet posts
to opposition parties.15 5 Much has been speculated about the reason for this
inclusive governing style. 156 Suffice it to say, it also invited a coalition
government after sweeping local elections two years later, in 1992.5
At a
minimum, the MPRP leaders have proven more adept at massaging the democratic
institutions to their favor than have the opposition leaders that initiated those
institutions.
Further, immediately following the elections, then-President Ochirbat created
a Constitution Drafting Commission, led by three majority MPRP members, but

148. Joseph E. Lake, First Resident U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia, Perspectives on Early Political
Change, Speech at A Conference in Celebration of Tenth Anniversary of The Asian Foundation's
Mongolian Program (Sep. 11, 2000), in THE ASIA FOUNDATION, MONGOLIA'S POLITICAL AND
EcoNOMIC TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2000).
149. Id. at 4-5.
150. Alan J.K. Sanders, Mongolia's New Constitution, 32 ASIAN SURV. 506, 510 (1992)
(explaining how amendments to the 1960 constitution created a bicameral government for a short time
and created the posts of president and vice-president).
151. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 463.
152. Id. at 464.
153. Sanders, supra note 150, at 506.
154. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT 5 (2000).

155. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 464.
156. Id. at 464-65 (listing the possibilities as such: first, because of a generational change in the
MPRP, the young party leaders actually had more in common with their opponents; second, that the
only free-market economics experts were in opposition parties, thus necessitating a coalition
government; and third, that the MPRP deftly put opposition leaders in charge of economics posts, in
order to have a scapegoat in the inevitable case of economic decline).
157. Id. at 467.
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with representation from all political parties.1 5 8 Additionally, any proposed
amendments to drafts were open to the public, with the only requirement that they
be submitted through the proper channels to the Commission by September 1,
1991.159

Mongolia's natural path towards effective democratic governance was
impressive, given its history. Not only did Mongolia's initial reforms kick off with
panache, the government officials in charge were serious about the thoroughness of
their tasks, completely remaking their constitution in the modern mold after the
Constitutional Committee reviewed one hundred foreign constitutions for

comparison.160
Mongolia's new constitution was formally ratified in early 1992, rescinding
immediately the 1960 constitution. 16 1 The 1992 constitution is a modern
constitution in the new European style, giving elevated status to human rights and
social safety.
The Asia Foundation supported the drafting of the new
constitution.162
The Foundation assisted the delegation of Mongolian
parliamentarians who visited the U.S. to study its Congress and government
institutions, and funded an American delegation of legal specialists who gave
lectures and seminars in Mongolia on constitutional law and human rights. 163
After the draft constitution was circulated to the public for comment in June of
1991, The Foundation had several leading American constitutional experts
contribute their commentary for the parliamentarians to consider. 16 4
With their new Constitution firmly established but untested, Mongolia turned
its attention to creating a market economy and enacting legislation to implement
the Constitution. Mongolia, like other post-Leninist countries, searched for an
optimal law regime in an era of globalization and law convergence.165 For this
intricate task, Mongolia's leadership was ill-equipped to make the transition alone.

158. Sanders, supra note 150, at 511.
159. Id. at 510 (discussing the different drafts and the changes made to them, and noting that the
International Commission of Jurists assisted the formation of the first draft). In fact, in addition to the
International Commission of Jurists, representatives from the Asia Foundation, USAID, the diplomatic
community in Ulaanbaatar and foreign experts reviewed the constitution's drafts and made suggestions.
This was probably the first collusion in legal reform between the Mongolian government and
international organizations and foreign governments.
160. Tom Ginsburg and Ganzorig Gombosuren, When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia's
ConstitutionalCrisis, 14 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 309, 310 (2000).
161. Sanders, supra note 150, at 506.
162. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, THE ASIA FOUNDATION & MONGOLIA: A TEN YEAR HISTORY 1

(2000).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. There are numerous foundations, international organizations and governmental agencies and
groups assisting legal and judicial reform in Mongolia, all ostensibly advancing the rule of law. See
United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report Mongolia 51-52 (2003). The
ones who have been the most contributory are, in no particular order: the National Center for State
Courts of the United States; United States Agency for International Development (USAID); Asian
Development Bank; World Bank; The Asia Foundation; United Nations Development Program
(UNDP); Hans Siedel Foundation; German Technical Cooperation Association (GTZ); the Soros
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Mongolia received extensive technical assistance from international
organizations and used its newly formed bilateral relationships to enlist the legal
and technical assistance of donor countries.166 To its benefit, Mongolia had a
respectable starting point: Eastern Europe and Central Asian ex-Soviet satellites
already had stumbled through a few years of growing pains. Indeed, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and German Development
Corporation (GTZ) were experienced legal reform advisors by the time they
entered Mongolia in 1990.167 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) began
working with Mongolia's government in 1991.168 To all parties involved, the goal
was to create a market economy, a multi-party system, and a democratic
governance structure. 169
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MONGOLIAN LEGAL REFORMS AND THE WORK OF
DONOR ORGANIZATIONS

Thejustice ofMongolia should become a Mongolianproduct.17 0
It is neither apparent nor likely that Mongolia or its donors used any
procedurally-minimalist formulation of rule of law or any analogous guide for its
initial reforms. 171 Instead, they engaged in many reforms on an as-needed basis. 172
Nonetheless, over time, Mongolia and its donor agencies touched on nearly every
single stage of rule of law promotion. 173
Mongolia's experiences demonstrate four important lessons to future rule of
law promotion: (1) judicial independence is the cornerstone of the rule of law; (2)
formal government action plans offer "more bang for your buck;" (3) public
participation and sentiment is a proxy for the institutionalization of the norms and
culture of the rule of law; and (4) the leverage of donor coordination pays
dividends.
A. Lesson One: JudicialIndependence Is The Cornerstoneof the Rule ofLaw
The importance ofjudicial independence seems self-evident, but a remarkable
number of rule of law definitions omit it as a factor or put it very low on the

Foundation and Open Society Institute (OSI); and PACT.
166. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 7.

167. See USAID, Brief Chronology and Highlights of the History of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Activities, http://www.usaid.gov/about usaid/chronology.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010); GTZ, The
1990s - A Dynamic Decade, http://www.gtz.de/en/unternehmen/29091.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
168. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK & MONGOLIA: FACT SHEET 6

(2008).
169. Lake, supranote 148, at 5.
170. B. Chimid, Advisor to the Parliament, The New Constitution of Mongolia and Legal Reform,
Speech at A Conference in Celebration of Tenth Anniversary of The Asian Foundation's Mongolian
Program (Sep. 11, 2000), in THE ASIA FOUNDATION, MONGOLIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 26-30 (2000).

171. See Cheung, supranote 10, at 70-72.
172. See infra Appendix B for a detailed summary of Mongolia's rule-of-law reforms and the donor
institutions that assisted these reforms.
173. Id.
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hierarchy of essential values. 174 The Mongolian experience highlights the
importance ofjudicial independence.
Mongolia has had some difficulties with judicial independence for a few
fundamental reasons. First, during its socialist past, the executive controlled the
judiciary, which the executive utilized as another way for the state to exercise
control over the country. Accordingly, judges occupied a lower status and decided
cases and implemented decisions based on party lines and executive directives.
Second, the continuity of the Mongolian communist party and continued party
affiliation negatively affect judicial independence. The MPRP continues to be in
power (although under a reformulated democratic basis) and many of the present
judges on the bench were and continue as MPRP members. Thus, there is a close
interrelation between the past and the present, and the executive and legislative
branches continue to influence the attitudes and decisions of some judges. The
third main factor affecting judicial independence is the difficulty in changing legal
psychology from communist times.
In Mongolia and other similarly situated states, an early and targeted focus on
judicial independence would be appropriate. The ftndamental barriers to the
establishment of judicial independence in Mongolia were not adequately dealt with
during the first six years of reforms, until the government of Mongolia and the
donor community had turned to judicial reform projects. But, two failures have
resulted in Mongolia's judiciary having a precarious independence: the failure to
acknowledge the fact that judicial independence is a cornerstone to the rule of law;
and the failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the impediments to the
establishment of judicial independence in Mongolia and then dedicate money and

programs to removing those impediments.
Donors provided a great deal of focus on the General Council of Courts
(GCC), which controls the management of the judiciary, including the budget,
selects judges and undertakes disciplinary proceedings of justice sector
employees. 175 As mentioned above, the creation and implementation of a judicial
council supports an independent judiciary and embodies it with the freedom and
strength to challenge governmental actions that hinder the rule of law.
The General Council of Courts, mandated by Article 49 of the Constitution of
Mongolia to assure judicial independence, has twelve members: the Chief Justice,
the General Prosecutor, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA), a
Secretary appointed by the President, two members appointed by the Supreme
Court, two by the Parliament, two representing the Aimag and Capital City courts,
and two representing the courts of first instance. 176

174. See discussionsupra Part IIA.
175. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR THE FUTURE 10

(2009), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/

pdf docs/PDACO255.pdf.
176. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT 7 (2001) (discussing the state of the

judiciary).
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Although the majority of the membership comes from the judiciary, there is
significant representation by the executive and legislative branches, compromising
the independence of this body and the judiciary branch.17 7 There has not been any
indication that the membership composition will change in the near future. Indeed,
Ganzorig Gombosuren, a former Supreme Court Justice, argued that this executive
oversight influenced the GCC and reduced its independent decision-making
capacity, resulting in its decision not to renew his nomination.178 The International
Commission of Jurists relates this incident.
Ganzorig Gombosuren - Retired Judge of the Supreme Court of Mongolia:
Mr. Ganzorig Gombosuren served as a Judge of the Supreme Court of
Mongolia for eight years and left the Court in 1998 to take a master in
law degree in the United States. When he returned to Mongolia in
March 2001 he was nominated by the Supreme Court to be appointed as
a judge again. In spite of his prior service, he had to take a test that the
Judicial Professional Committee has established as a first step in order
to ensure the adequate qualification of candidates. He was unsuccessful
on the test and was therefore not recommended by the General Council
of Courts to the President for renewed appointment. The General
Council of Courts rejected his request to reconsider this decision.
Reportedly, the majority of the members of the General Council of
Courts at first voted in his favour, but after the Minister of Justice, who
was Chairman of this body, made comments to his disadvantage, the
second round of voting confirmed the negative decision not to renew his
nomination . . . . According to Ganzorig Gombosuren, the de facto

reason behind his rejection is that he has been active in promoting the
independence of the judiciary in Mongolia. In December 1993 he and
his colleagues established the Mongolian Group for the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers to support judicial independence and legal reform
in Mongolia. He has also written a number of articles in newspapers and
law journals, spoken on TV and on the radio, and in law schools and
conferences. 179
As this anecdote demonstrates, judicial independence is precarious in
Mongolia, in part because of executive oversight of the judiciary by the Ministry of
Justice. Donors have had to implement reforms within the reality of this
framework, and have thus focused on increasing transparency and accountability
and improving public relations.8 0
The GCC has been criticized for having a hierarchical management style, an
inadequate budget and a small and poorly trained staff, all of which constrain the

177. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, MONGOLIA: ATTACKS ON JUSTICE 263-64 (2002),

available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/mongolia.pdf
178. Id. at 268-69.
179. Id.
180. USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 5.
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creation or implementation of the rule of law.18 1 The other branches of
government have not made enough human and fiscal resources available to the
GCC, to assist in its judicial reforms of accountability and transparency. 182 As
well, within the leadership of the GCC, there has not been significant willingness
to modernize its decision-making process to give the judiciary more control over
its branch and independence vis-A-vis the other branches of government.1 8 3 This
could result from the existence of membership from the executive and the
legislative branches in the Council.
Apart from institutional issues with the judicial council, status, continuity, and
legal psychology were barriers to an independent judiciary. At the time of its
transformation, Mongolia's judges and legal professionals had no training in
adjudicating disputes in a market economy, and their mindset remained that of the
communist era - viewing the judiciary is an instrument of state power, not an
independent branch of government. 18 4 In addition to basic market-economy
training and changing the mentality of the judiciary, the donors focused on
teaching the many newly-passed laws, which included whole sectoral changes. 8
Judges have "had to adjust to a rapidly changing legislative environment,
particularly in the civil area. Although most of the judges have attempted to
familiarize themselves with the new legislation, there are still some who base
decisions on their old knowledge as they find it difficult to keep up with the
changes. Their experience in the application of commercial laws is limited, and
many find the unfamiliar situations of a market economy that they are faced with
confusing."l 8 6 Mongolia's judges and other legal professionals have had to absorb
the many changes in the law, and then decide how to prosecute, administer, or

implement these laws. This was particularly difficult since many of the new laws
were poorly drafted, overlapping or inconsistent.1 7 Mongolia and the donor
organizations have managed these challenges through the creation of judicial
training centers, as further discussed in the lesson on donor coordination.18
Overall, given Mongolia's unique cultural and institutional attributes, the
donor community should have recognized the fundamental value of judicial
independence and dedicated attention and resources to identifying and then
overcoming impediments to the independence of the judiciary in Mongolia.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 12, 17-18, 20-21.
Id. at 17
Id. at 18-20
See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM

PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS

supra note 175, at 4-8 (discussing how the
attitudes of the judiciary were slow to respond to the Constitution's adoption of an independent
judiciary as a third branch of government).
185. See infra Appendix B.
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FuTURE,

186. DEVELOPING MONGOLIA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK: A NEEDS ANALYSIS, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT

BANK 32 (1995), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Papers/Mongolia
/thejudges.asp?p=lawdevt.
187. See e.g., infra note 345 and accompanying text.
188. See infra Part JV.D.
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Instead, work on the judiciary was largely ignored during the first six years of
independence while necessary legislative reforms took precedence.
As will be further shown in the other rule of law lessons, the precariousness
of judicial independence leads to serious societal problems, namely corruption and
perceptions that there is no rule of law, thereby ensuring that people do not access
the judiciary in the case of disputes, and instead engage in corrupt exchanges or
"black market justice."
B. Lesson Two: Formal Government Action Plans Offer "More Bang for Your
Buck"
This lesson recognizes the inherent limitation of exhaustible resources of a
donor state or donor institution. The resources that a donor would be able to offer
is limited to budget constraints and the political willingness to commit money,
resources and personnel to the establishment of the rule of law in a donor-recipient
country. For instance, after September 11, 2001, the United States focused its
state-promoted programs and money predominantly on Afghanistan and Iraq, its
two main foreign policy commitments. 189 In that regard, resources and even
commitments can be pulled from recipient states and recommitted elsewhere.
Recognition of the inherent limitation of exhaustible resources would aid the
provision of rule of law assistance. The experience of Mongolia demonstrates that
formal government action plans offer one method of counteracting that inherent
limitation.
Mongolia's legislative reforms can be divided into two phases, each with a
distinct hallmark. 190 Phase one was the "uncoordinated emergency reforms," and
had as its hallmark ongoing political strife and disorganization between the
government and its donors, as well as among the donor community itself 191 Phase
two was the "government reform plans" that had as its hallmark formal
government plans to direct the various branches of government and its government
agencies and employees, as well as civil society and the donor community, which
resulted in a more dynamic, lasting and comprehensive reform process. 192 The
formal government action plans resulted in numerous benefits, including by
signaling formal government "buy-in" of some of the earlier reforms and norm
creation; offering guidance to the executive, legislation and judicial branches as to
the next phase of reform; broadening and deepening the reform process; and
pushing the donor community to work together as an effective "single
organism."193

189. See generally
OVERVIEW

OF U.S.

CONGRESSIONAL

PROGRAMS

AND

RESEARCH SERVICE,

POLICY

FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTORY

(2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/

organization/31987.pdf.
190. The phases discussed herein are the author's conclusions concerning the effectiveness of
Mongolia's legal reforms. See B. Chimid, supranote 170, at 12.
191. Id. at 12-13.
192. Id. at 12-14.
193. Id. at 13-14.
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Judicial reforms mostly occurred during phase two and as such, have been
more thoughtful and complete. Reforms of the judiciary began modestly with the
1993 Law on Courts, which mandated a reduction in the number of courts, an
increase in the number of judges and the establishment of higher eligibility
standards for appointment to the bench. 194 After the passage of this restructuring,
Parliament did little to advance the judiciary and its legal institutions. For some
reason, there seems to have been a lack of attention to judicial reform between
1994 and 1998. This could be the result of the balance of powers crisis and
deadlock in Parliament during those years. Conversely, it could be the result of
needed attention to reforming the economic system to become a market-based
system and reforming the political system to become a multi-party democracy.
Regardless, the institutional strengthening of the judiciary stalled, while free
market and economic reforms continued.
The lesson to be learned by the power of formal government action plans,
however, begins with the reform of legislation. From 1992 to 1998, the State
Great Hural enacted nearly 180 independent laws and approved over 200
amendments, and Mongolia joined nearly 60 international agreements and
treaties. 195 Following Mongolia's democratic transition, the legal reform process
was intense and immediate. On the whole, the GTZ has been the greatest stimulus
of the legislative reforms in Mongolia, and much of the new civil legal code
closely approximates German law. 196 A likely reason for the prevalence of the
GTZ in legislative reform is the fact that the GTZ undertook similar reform
projects in the former Soviet republics. 197 Essentially, the GTZ's previous
expertise in the recodification of the civil and criminal codes in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia was available immediately to Mongolia.1 98
Despite the success in the sheer number and breadth of the passage of new
laws, Mongolia had substantial difficulty with its phase one legislative reforms.
This was due in large part because, for the first six years of its democracy, the
government undertook reforms without a comprehensive program in place.
All donor outcomes could have been better if agreements on strategic
frameworks could have been reached for more sectors .... While initial
technical assistance ... helped to change the thinking toward a marketbased economy (particularly within the Ministry of Finance and the
Central Bank), many aspects of the institutional framework for a
market-based economy remain fragile (lack of compliance with new

194. THE AsIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 2.
195. See Tsend Munkhorgil, Justice Minister, Government of Mongolia, Speech at the Investor's
Forum: Legal Reform in Mongolia, available at http://www.mol.mn/modules.php?name=News&file=
print&sid=7611. (A noteworthy piece of legislation is Mongolia's liberal Mining Law, said to be
among the best in the world).
196. See WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 22.
197. See GTZ, Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/574.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010).
198. Id.
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laws and regulations, weak institutional capacity and resources, and
poor accountability of public service delivery). 199
Inadequate methods and practice of legislative drafting has been an additional
major cause of legal disorder. "Legal science is just not present there."200 In
addition to better legal drafting, there was little coordination of legislative drafting
among the donors and all members of parliament, which could have been a system
for checking the consistency and relevance of legislation.201
Indeed, much of donors' subsequent assistance in legislative reforms occurred
to amend previously enacted laws that were poorly drafted, inconsistent with other
obligations and laws, or simply improper for Mongolia given its unique history and
cultural attributes.202 These early laws were developed without any single policy
in mind, and without effective planning or integration.
Then-Deputy Justice Minister, Ts. Munkhorgil, later concluded that during
the early years of reform, the "failure to enact economic laws in mutually
consistent and comprehensive ways so as to be able to set up a legal framework of
market relations, with the enforcement mechanism defined optimally .

.

. might

have a negative impact on economic reform."203 Further, he considered that "the
differences and specific features of [foreign] legal systems were disregarded with
laws and regulations of different countries taken as a model. All this led to such
negative consequences, as incompatibility of laws and inappropriate mechanism
for their enforcement." 204
It seems that reforming the legal code with assistance from donor countries
has resulted in transplantation effects - whereby laws from Germany, for example,
were not appropriate for Mongolia's culture. In fact, one can easily surmise that
much of the impetus in specific legal reforms - as well as in the pace and direction
of reforms - came not from Mongolian leadership but from donor countries and
donor organizations willing and hoping to remake Mongolia in its own vision.
To be fair, most Mongolian government officials had little expertise in market
systems and did not understand even the patent impact that certain legislation
would have.205 Thus, it is fair to say that these leaders did not foresee the latent
199. WORLD BANK, MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF A COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY OF THE WORLD
BANK GROUP FOR MONGOLIA 12 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD BANK COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY
2004], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MONGOLIAEXTN/Resources/CAS_ Mongolia
2004.pdf.
200. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 154, at 28-29
(quoting Supreme Court Justice Hon. A. Dorjgotov. A course on legislative drafting is no longer taught
in the standard law-school curriculum, and needs to be reintroduced in the curriculum to cure drafting in
the future. Law students need to be taught critical and analytical thinking, to understand the policies
underlying the laws, for better legal drafting, coordination of laws and interrelating of laws.)
201. Id.
202. See e.g., Munkhorgil, supranote 195.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Dan Southerland, Mongolia: A DemocraticBreakthrough, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 31,
2009,http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1231/Mongolia-a-democratic
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and long-term implications of certain legislation. Whether or not the donor
organizations understood these implications and whether they communicated such
dangers to the leadership is uncertain. Nonetheless, these donors impacted the
reform of the legislation greatly, and bear at least part of the fault in the resulting
negative consequences.
As a result of these discrepancies and early failures in these phase one
reforms, the government decided to change the structure within which the previous
legislation occurred. In the view of this author, the clear demarcating line between
the phase one reforms and the phase two reforms in Mongolia was the passage in
January of 1998 of the "Legal Reform Program of Mongolia" by the State Great
Hural.206 The purpose of the Legal Reform Program is to implement the objective
of "developing a human, civil and democratic society," to define basic guidelines
of work of state organization and officers at all levels, and to create a legal
framework and favorable environment to ensure political, social and economic
development and progress in compliance with the principles and concepts
proclaimed in the Constitution.207
In an elemental sense, the Legal Reform Program articulated a framework for
the government and civil society to implement the rule of law. In order to guide
key stakeholders in the creation of this framework, the Act articulates six
objectives: (i) development of the legal basis for ensuring the sovereignty of
Mongolia; (ii) perfection of the legal basis of economic relations; (iii) ensurance of
human
rights
freedoms
and
its
legal
guarantees;
(iv) perfection of the legal basis of state structure; (v) creation of the environment
for legal reform; (vi) perfection of the training of legal professionals; and (vii)

broadening of participation of Mongolia in international legal regulations.208
The Legal Reform Program has been one of the fundamental pieces of
legislation since Mongolia's democratization. It created the framework for further
reforms and defined the policies and principles that the State Great Hural should
follow in future legislation. Importantly, as well as improving legislation, it
deepened the reform process. For example, the State Great Hural subsequently
passed the "Guidelines for Improvement of Legislation of Mongolia for Period Up
to 2004," which listed over 40 laws to be enacted in six main areas. 209 The
government complied with these guidelines and also passed measures "to set up a
system of studying enforcement and impact of legislation, carrying out monitoring
and making assessment."2 10
One of the principal benefits of the Legal Reform Program has been to guide
the substantial amount of donor activity in assisting further legislative reforms.
Donor activity became particularly helpful after Mongolia passed the well-crafted

breakthrough.
206. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 40.

207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id. at 41.
See Munkhorgil, supra note 195.
Id.
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"Law on Non-Government Organizations" in 1997.211 Donors such as the Asia
Foundation began to influence the reform process by working with new interest
groups and domestic NGOs, as well as members of government.2 12 As well, NGOs
have taken a more active and direct role in influencing the reformation process.
After some tepid initial moves, Mongolian society began to interact with the
government to influence the passage of specific laws (whereas previous agitation
occurred to stimulate general ideals - like a democratic revolution). The benefit of
the legal reform program in part has been for Mongolians to take more ownership
over the path of the reform process.
For instance, NGOs with the support of donors played a formative role in the
passage of the new Family Law in 1999.213 Additionally, The Asia Foundation
assisted in the revision of the 25-year old Family Law to reflect the changed social
and economic conditions of Mongolia.214 The Foundation provided support for a
seminar to discuss subjects of amendments, such as domestic violence, joint
property, and social benefits.215
Another example illustrates the confluence of donors with domestic actors. In
1999, The Asia Foundation supported the Political Education Academy of
Mongolia to study the Constitution, its organic laws and its impact on
government.216 This exercise has contributed to the development of Mongolian
democratic and constitutional studies, and it should lead to constitutional changes
to increase efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability of the
government.217 Partly because of these efforts, in December of 1999, the State
Great Hural passed the first amendments to the Constitution.218
Although the Legal Reform Program created the atmosphere for positive rule
of law reform, there was a risk that no subsequent enactments would guide or
implement the rule of law. In this vein, the government recognized the need for
more guidance and implementation and subsequently passed various government
action plans, further signaling a divide between phase one and phase two
reforms.2 19
Although they were probably not intended to do so, these action plans
embody a procedurally-minimalist rule of law definition, and focus on the creation
of norms and concepts, rather than ends-based goals. They closely follow the

211. Tom Ginsburg, Mongolia in 1997: Deepening Democracy, 38 ASIAN SURV. 64, 65 (Jan.
1998).
212. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 3.
213. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, BUILDING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MONGOLIA 2 (2000).
214. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 4.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Stewart Fenwick, The Rule of Law in Mongolia -- Constitutional Court and Conspiratorial
Parliament, FED'N PRESS, http://digital.federationpress.com.au/pageview/3aj4a/9nO61/17 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2010).
219. See generally WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note

154.
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suggestions of this article's rule of law formulation, with an appropriate
overarching emphasis on norm creation, especially in the judiciary.
Suffice it to say, the reforms that occurred after these government action plans
were superior to those that preceded them. The contrast between reform of
legislation (many reforms occurred before the plans) and judicial reforms (most
reforms occurred after the government plans) demonstrates the importance of these
plans. To be clear, these action plans affected the legal and judicial reforms in two
ways - (i) they implemented a more detailed framework to guide the passage of
future legislation and reforms and (ii) they mandated and embodied the rule of law
in the work of Mongolia's branches of government, and the donor organizations
consulting them.
Donor coordination accelerated after the release of the Legal Needs
Assessment, which was funded in part by the Danish International Development
Agency (DANIDA) and administered by the World Bank's Mongolian Legal and
Judicial Reform Project. 22 0 World Bank officials implemented the assessment
process with the assumption that the country itself must design the course of
action.221 There was much institutional disagreement with this theory, as it was not
usual World Bank practice to cede control of the agenda to the donor-recipient
state.222 However, World Bank staff members that were supportive of this idea
were able to exert enough pressure on obstructions within the World Bank system
to overcome these doubts.223
The assessment utilized the guidance of the Government's Legal Reform
Program, and it was designed to further achieve the government's stated goals.224
The assessment culminated in the identification for assistance of the following
areas: (i) legislative drafting: development and coordination; (ii) judicial and
criminaljustice reform; (iii) legal profession: improvement of legal education and
bar development; (iv) legal scholarship: development of materials and research
databases; (v) public awareness: dissemination of legal information; and (vi)
coordination and harmonizationof internationaltreaties.225

220. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 3.

221. This conclusion is based on the author's off the record discussions with an official of the
World Bank while in Mongolia.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. The Legal Needs Assessment assessed the major problems affecting the efficiency of the
newly shaped legal system; identified programs that were needed to further legal reform activities;
provided information to external donor community for designing of legal reform projects and for
coordination of ongoing activities; and coordinated efforts of government, parliamentarians, judiciary,
scholars and civil society to assess their needs of legal and judicial reform. See WORLD BANK,
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LEARNING AND INNOVATION CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT
OF SDR 4.0 MILLION (US$5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO MONGOLIA FOR A LEGAL AND JUDICIAL

REFORM PROJECT 4-5 (2001), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/01/07/000094946 01121708452144/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT]; WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA:
LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 154, at 15-16.

225. Id.

494

VOL. 3 8:3

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

The Legal Needs Assessment was direct, comprehensive, and signaled to the
state that the government direction imposed by the Legal Reform Program was
acceptable to the donor community and the domestic constituencies.226 A principal
benefit of the assessment was that it resulted in a sincere societal buy-in of the
assessment's conclusions by both government actors and citizens, since it was
designed and administered by domestic actors. Many of these same domestic
actors then designed and endorsed the resulting legal reform plans that arose from
the legal reform program and assessment. Although the assessment was unusual
and it likely would be difficult to repeat in many donor organizations - even its
source, the World Bank - it should be held up as a prototype, as it has resulted in
many tangible benefits.
Following in the wake of the Legal Needs Assessment, on May 4, 2000 the
government of Mongolia passed its first government action plan, the "Strategic
Plan for the Justice System of Mongolia." 22 7 This plan identified the direction of
the development of the judiciary within the framework of the overall Legal Reform
Plan and sets strategic goals to define the judicial reforms. 228 A working group
that involved representatives of all judiciary bodies and experts of USAID
prepared the Strategic Plan.229
The Strategic Plan identified six fundamental values: (i) independence: that
the judiciary protects its political, economic, organizational and decision-making
independence; (ii) accountability: ability to use public resources efficiently
including personal accountability on the part of all individuals who work in the
justice system; (iii) responsiveness: ability of the justice system to anticipate and
timely

respond

to

the

changing

needs

of

society;

(iv) fairness: ability to treat all with respect and to apply only the law; (v)
accessibility: ability of the justice system to be convenient, timely and affordable
to everyone with a legitimate claim or concern; and (vi) effectiveness: ability to
uphold and apply the law consistently throughout the country.230
This Strategic Plan is extraordinary because, rather than calling for ends (such
as an online court database), it mandated the establishment of values that are the
equivalent to norms of the rule of law. These values represent process-oriented
reforms and closely relate to the procedurally-minimalist rule of law. An analysis
of each of the values clearly corresponds to the rule of law formulation described
above; in particular, this plan establishes the framework to implement the second

226. See WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ON A LEARNING
AND INNOVATION CREDIT OF XDR 4.0 MILLION (US$5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO MONGOLIA FOR A
JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM PROJECT 6-7 (2001), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external
/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/08/21/000333037 20090821003929/Rendered/PDF/ICR8
770P074001 1C0disclosed081181091.pdf.
227. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 175, at 5; WORLD BANK,
MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 31.
228. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 30-3 1.
229. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supranote 224, at 5.
230. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 30-3 1.
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essential value, the second primary quality and all of the secondary qualities of the
rule of law. Most importantly, this Strategic Plan calls for an integrated approach
to the rule of law (at least in the judiciary) where norms of universal value create
an umbrella structure in which to generate specific ends that assist the
procedurally-minimalist rule of law. The linchpin of this strategy is the USAIDfunded Judicial Reform Program (JRP), which will be discussed below.231
Overall, the Government of Mongolia and donors have promulgated many
new concepts in the justice system, and the adoption and implementation of these
concepts in a coordinated fashion has been difficult. An emphasis on training new
and established judges in these concepts somewhat has mitigated these difficulties.
Apart from some conceptual confusion, judicial reforms mostly have been
successful. The judicial sector has been modernized, and its court management
and processes have been automated to increase efficiency, transparency,
accountability and fairness.232 The judiciary is becoming more professional, and is
engaged in training to learn the new legal codes, and how to implement them. As
well, there have been significant efforts to reduce corruption and increase judicial
independence.233 The challenge for Mongolia and its donors will be to move
beyond the "introduction" of these new approaches and ensure that they are
actually "embedded" and "institutionalized" within the legal profession.
Further, since the government reform plans, legislative reforms have been
passed in a coordinated fashion. While some technical and drafting issues persist,
donor coordination and guidance by the government of Mongolia has resulted in
the passage of laws that are cleaner, clearer and appropriate for the circumstances
of Mongolia. 3 4

The deepening of the reform process, leading in particular to

judicial reforms, has helped to ensure that the implementation of these laws by
judges and practitioners has become more accurate and appropriate.
While it is clear that in the case of a total societal implosion, there is an
immediate need to begin to pass laws to structure a new society, the case of
Mongolia demonstrates that as soon as it is possible, the government and the donor
community should pass a government reform plan that will guide future reforms.
These plans can identify specific needs, and, more fundamentally, contain
important norms and notions that should guide the passage of laws and rules, and
their subsequent implementation. For a variety of reasons, including clarity, buyin, guidance, and comprehensiveness, these government reform plans offer the
most bang for the buck.

231. See National Center for State Courts International, Mongolia - Mongolia Judicial Reform
Project, http://www.ncscinternational.org/x/DocumentViewer.aspx?DocumentlD=683 (last visited
Feb. 9, 2010); USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE,

supra note 175, at 4.

232. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE,

233. Id. at 5, 10-11.
234. See id.at 7-8.

supranote 175, at 6-11.
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C. Lesson Three: Public Participation and Sentiment is a Proxy for the
Institutionalizationof the Norms and Culture of the Rule ofLaw
This article puts forth a definition of the rule of law that focuses in large part
on the creation of the norms and culture of the rule of law. While the
institutionalization of norms through legislation is a stepping stone, as would be
the case where a law formally makes the judiciary independent, there are a variety
of other factors that impede the true institutionalization of those norms. Indeed,
some of those impediments are apparent facially, such as the particular legal
history of Mongolia and the recent control of the judiciary by the Communist
party. Others are more nuanced and thus difficult to identify. Because of the
difficulty of direct identification of the creation and implementation of these
norms, practitioners could utilize a proxy to aid in such an identification.
One proxy for whether the culture and norms of the rule of law are being
adopted is public participation and public sentiment. In short, whether the public
is participating in the passage of laws, in elevating disputes to the judiciary, and in
other aspects of the rule of law actually indicates whether those norms and culture
are being institutionalized.235 This proxy will provide gross direction (that is, not
nuanced) to the practitioner or researcher and would not permit a sophisticated
understanding (or if somehow enumerated, a statistically significant conclusion) of
whether a particular norm has been established. Nonetheless, it provides important
guidance to aid in a determination of the efficacy of the donors' assistance to a
donor-recipient and could provide an opportunity to change direction or refocus
efforts and aid as needed.
The experience of Mongolia provides a useful example. In Mongolia's
implementation of legal, judicial and societal reforms, the members of parliament
and government leaders enacted the first four years of reforms without proper
participation of the public. This was more or less expected since governmental
decision-making during the communist era was private and opaque, so most initial
reforms in the democratic era were nontransparent or minimally so. The fact that
there were very few NGOs or interest groups operating in Mongolia also
236
contributed to this lack of public participation.26 Mongolians simply were too
worried about their financial situation to invest energy in special interest reforms to
create a particular ideal within, or type of, a market economy.237 Anyways, very
few knew about the workings of a market economy. While it is difficult to state
with certainty which factor impeded public participation, the very fact that the
public was not a part of the process indicates that there was no culture of the rule
of law at the inception of the reforms.
As discussed above, only once there was a law on NGOs in place and
sufficient donor activity in this field, did the public actually and actively

236. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 211, at 65.
237. See USAID, THE JUDIcIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 175, at 20; see WORLD BANK,
MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 6.
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238

participate.
Prior to that point, public participation was limited to mass protests
over faulty or hasty previous reforms. To its credit, Mongolia's leaders quickly
have recognized errors in new legislation, and enacted subsequent legislation to
remedy those problems.239
This awareness and willingness to rectify the earlier reforms is nowhere more
apparent as in electoral reforms. The parliamentary election of 1992 resulted in the
election of an overwhelming majority of representatives for the MPRP.240 Because
the opposition garnered 40% of the vote, but won only 5 out of 76 seats, the public
revolted and engaged in a stinging protest against the new government. 241 An
ensuing hunger strike by the Mongolia Democratic Union resulted in a negotiated
agreement to revise the election law, to enact a law for the independence of the
media from government control and interference,242 and to address the new
243
Previously, the MPRP had come to power under 76
problem of corruption.
single member districts, but after pressure from the opposition, who concentrated
their support in urban areas, the election law changed to a mixed system of districts
and proportional representation. 244
The Asia Foundation sponsored exchange programs and forums to develop
information for the revised election law, which was approved in 1992.245 The
revised election law paid dividends to the MPRP-opposition - the subsequent
national election resulted in a coalition ousting the MPRP and winning 47 of 76
seats in Parliament.246 The new election law also increased fairness and
accountability, by requiring all candidates to open separate finance accounts which
were subject to audits, by giving equal access to state-run media for campaign
purposes, and by liberalizing nomination processes. 4 7
The hunger strike also clearly identified corruption as a public issue and
exposed the sense that many of the key norms of the rule of law were not being
established or absorbed by the government actors.
Corruption in the judicial system is a root of corruption throughout society, as
it reduces the ability of a judiciary to freely mete out justice. Corruption displaces
the natural process of decision-making, and makes access to justice insignificant.
In a 2005 Transparency International corruption survey, Mongolia scored a 3.0 out
238. See Ginsburg, supranote 211, at 65.
239. As well, Mongolia has been receptive to social considerations arising from their reforms, such
as poverty, rural inequities, and the increased presence of street children. Id. For the most part,
Mongolia's commitment to democracy has allowed interest groups and NGOs to agitate to bring these
problems to the attention of the MPs, free from undue interference or violence by the government. Id.
240. Sheldon S. Severinghaus, Mongolia in 1994: Strengthening Democracy, 35 AsIAN SURV. 70,
70-71 (1995).
241. Id.
242. The State Great Hural finally passed the required Media Law on January 1, 1999, after hunger
strikes in 1995 protesting the failure to do so. See id. at 71.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 4.
246. Tom Ginsburg, Mongolia in 1996: FightingFire and Ice, 37 ASIAN SURV. 60, 61 (1997).
247. THE AsIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 4.
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of 10 on the corruption scale, indicating Rampant Corruption.
As well,
Mongolian surveys and public opinion polls indicated that after Customs,
249
Judicial
participants ranked Judicial Institutions as the most corrupt institution.
corruption greatly impacts the rule of law in that it operates as a disincentive for
the public to take complaints to judicial institutions for resolution. It impacts
meaningful access to justice principles, and negatively affects the rule of law in
that it prevents laws from being an actual guide, decreases the stability of the law
and renders the law far from supreme.
*

*

The recent Law on the Courts changes the process of judicial discipline by
including public participation.250 However, as of 2005, the implementation of this
aspect has yet to be realized. 25 1 Robert La Mont, the former and long-term director
of the JRP, suggested a suite of solutions to address judicial corruption in
Mongolia, as a first step to dealing with society-wide corruption.252 These
suggestions are typical suggestions to either face judicial corruption or increase
professionalism in a judiciary.
In terms of corruption, the twin towers of transparency and disincentives are
key tools. La Mont indicates that the inquisitorial procedures of the Mongolian
judiciary create a system where judges frequently meet ex parte with witnesses and
parties.253 Thus, there is ample opportunity for the passing of bribes. The new
Judicial Code of Ethics, however, did not contain a prohibition on ex parte
conversations, because an overwhelming majority of the judges objected.254 La
Mont also specified that salary levels that allow judges to meet their needs would
limit the possibility of bribe-taking.255 However, he notes that donor activity may
not have much effect, since the Mongolian government's finances dictates judicial
salary.256 He also indicates that the cost of corruption has been nearly non-existent
in Mongolia, as there has been little prosecution of judicial corruption, save for
cases of drunkenness on the job.257 Thus, while dishonest judges and judicial

248. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, http://www.transparency.org
/policy_ research/surveys indices/cpi/2005 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
249. See ROBERT LA MONT, SOME MEANS OF ADDRESSING JUDICIAL CORRUPTION INMONGOLIA 2
(2002), available at http://www.forum.mn/en/index.php?sel=resource&f-resone&objid=1 1&menu
id=3&resmenu id=35 (summarizing Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2000 survey,
Annex 4, question 11).
250. See id. at 3 (stating that in the past, judicial discipline was initiated by chief justices and
decided by fellow justices, thus resulting in a bias against punishing colleagues).
251. This is personal knowledge relating from the author's experiences working at the Supreme
Court of Mongolia in the summer of 2005.
252. See LA MONT, supra note 249, at 6-8. These suggestions represent the views of the Mr. La
Mont and they are not official USAID policy.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. at 3-4.
255. Id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 4. The one impact donors can have, however, is where the executive does not raise
salary levels in par with other governmental agencies, either as punishment for certain decisions, or to
limit judicial independence. Id. There, donors can pressure the executive to continually raise judicial
salaries where the budget allows. Id.
257. Id. at 3.
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La Mont suggests that there are a number of additional steps that can be taken
to limit judicial corruption: require random assignment of cases;29 require regular
analysis of case reassignment; require public access terminals for all automated
courts; require special rules of financial disclosure for judges, penalties in the
Judicial Ethics Code, and random audits by the GCC Ethics Committee; prohibit
ex parte conversations in the Judicial Ethics Code; train and provide equipment to
the Judicial Disciplinary Committee; and train and provide equipment to the
Prosecutor's corruption investigation unit.26 0
Not only does the public perception of corruption offer a proxy into the
establishment of the norms of the rule of law, it can be a negative influence in and
of itself. In particular, the public perception of corruption also influences actual
corruption regardless of whether those perceptions are mistaken.26 1 The more the
public perceives corrupt legal institutions, the more likely that the public will be
induced to make corrupt overtures, rather than settle for legal mechanisms to
resolve disputes. To combat this ongoing danger, MFOS coordinates a public
competition in conjunction with the Zorig Foundation.262 Together, they seek to
increase public awareness of corruption through the publication of anti-corruption
essays and posters that are collected in a nationwide competition.263
The JRP released a report in August of 2005, which shows that public
perception of the judiciary has improved significantly, and the JRP credits some of
that increase to its work in the area.264 Indeed, the JRP has instituted many of La
Mont's suggestions, including equipping and training the new Judicial Disciplinary
Committee, and equipping and training the new Special Investigative Unit of the
Prosecutor General, empowered with investigating crimes in the judiciary.265
During the socialist era, corruption only existed at the highest echelons of
government. 266 Small gifts and promises constituted the extent of influence
peddling on every other level. But now, with a market economy, privatization and
property rights, corruption has thrived.267 It is commonly known that corruption is
258. Id. at 2.
259. Id. at 6. This reform has been undertaken, although there is indication that the automatic case
management systems are not being used by all courts.
260. Id. at 6-8.
261. Id. at 2-3.
262. See ZORIG FOUNDATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT
SUPPORTED BY PTF 1 (2002), available at http://www.partnershipfortransparency.info/uploads/
completed%20projects/Mongolia % 2 0-%20Final%20report.pdf.
263. Id.
264. HEIKE GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2004)
(stating the JRP's intention to strengthen the management and procedures of the Special Investigative
Unit).
265. Id. at 3.
266. Verena Fritz, Democratizationand Corruptionin Mongolia, 27 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 191, 195
(2007).
267. See, e.g., J. OYUNTUYA, NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS COUNTRY REPORT:
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widespread in Mongolia.268 With free speech and a free media, stories of
corruption circulate within the media widely.
Civil society was the sector that first exposed corruption and began to educate
the public about the costs of corruption. Indeed, in the early part of this decade,
civic dialogue centered around this increasing corruption and its effects on society,
and what measures must be taken to prevent it.269 The Zorig Foundation created
public education campaigns and reported on this problem widely through surveys
and summaries. 270 The Zorig Foundation's efforts were assisted by the UNDP. 2 7 1
In response to these efforts, in 2002 the State Great Hural passed the National
Programme for Combating Corruption (NPCC) and the National Anti-Corruption
Action Plan (NAAP). 272 The UNDP's Anti-Corruption Program aims to support
the implementation of the NPCC and the NAAP. 2 73 These three actors - the
Parliament, the Zorig Foundation and the UNDP - created a Mongolian AntiCorruption website as an informative portal for Mongolians. 274
The four major components of the UNDP project are: (i) participatory priority
setting within the NPCC and the NAAP and the designation of the concrete
immediate elements that can provide visible evidence of forward movement of the
plan; (ii) broad public awareness on the complex issues of corruption and their
negative impact on human security and sustainable human development; (iii)
institutional capacity building to enforce, monitor, and evaluate the police, legal
and regulatory framework to combat corruption; and (iv) strengthening the
mechanisms necessary to improve the management, coordination, and monitoring
of the implementation of the NPCC.275
Donors have stimulated a multitude of anti-corruption efforts, including
creating a special anti-corruption prosecutor's office, automating and streamlining
caseloads, and reforming election legislation to create campaign-funding

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT (2001). See also NANCY
TAYLOR, MONGOLIA CASE STUDY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION (2003); USAID, ASSESSMENT OF
CORRUPTION IN MONGOLIA (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/mn/documents/Mongolia
CorruptionAssessmentFinalReport.pdf; USAID, MONGOLIAN JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, PUBLIC
PERCEPTION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION (2005), available at http://pdf.usaid.

gov/pdf docs/PDACG136.pdf.
268. See generally OYUNTUYA, supra note 267; TAYLOR, supranote 267; USAID, ASSESSMENT OF
CORRUPTION IN MONGOLIA, supranote 267; USAID, MONGOLIAN JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra
note 267.
269. See generally id.
270. See Zorig Foundation, http://www.zorigfoundation.org.mn (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). The
Zorig Foundation is an NGO named after the slain founder of Mongolian democracy. Id.
271. Id.
272. United Nations Development Programme, Completed Projects,Democratic Governance and
Human Rights, Anti-Corruption (National Integrity System Enhancement) in Mongolia (Nov 2004 Dec 2008), UNDP, http://www.undp.mn/dghr-ac.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
273. Id.
274. See The Mongolian Anti-Corruption Website, http://www.anticorruption.mn/index.php (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010).
275. United Nations Development Programme, supranote 272.
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transparency.26 These efforts are becoming more diverse, to meet the specific
instances of corruption. However, there are still strong criticisms of Mongolia's
efforts - primarily that its anti-corruption statute is flawed, that there is no
sufficient enforcement, and that there are no sufficient anti-corruption mechanisms
or bodies tasked with undertaking these efforts.277 Needless to say, corruption
remains Mongolia's largest impediment to advancing the rule of law and
democracy.
It appears that one of the main aspects that influenced the perception of
corruption in the judiciary is that the perception carried over from Mongolia's
communist past - that the decisions of the executive branch and its actors are
unassailable regardless of wrongfulness or illegality. Apparently in response to
this challenging vestige of its history, Mongolia and its donors enacted a major
initiative to establish an oversight mechanism for wrongful decisions made by the
executive branch, through the creation of an administrative court system.278
The Administrative Cases Courts (ACC) was established by the State Great
Hural in June of 2004.279 It represents a significant success and progress in the
improvement of the judicial system - in particular it creates accountability
procedures for challenging government decisions which threaten the rule of law.
The Law on Administrative Procedure governs the jurisdiction of these courts.280
In short, "any disputes which arise from an administrative act and which may
affect a person's rights may be challenged." 28 1 The implication is that the judiciary
now settles disputes between public authorities and individuals arising from the
exercise of public authority.
This specialized court system is considered as an essential guarantee of
the rule of law with emphasis on equity and fairness. The component
would include the refurbishing of allocated space for the functioning of
three pilot courts in Ulaanbaatar (Supreme Court and Capital City
Court) and one at a selected aimag (Darkhan), training all administrative
judges, public awareness campaign, introducing new techniques of case
and court management within these administrative courts and, gathering
and publication of data on court personnel and public opinion.282
Thus, the ACC uphold access to justice principles and accountability of
government decisions by public decision-makers. There is an ongoing concern

276. See infra Appendix B.
277. USAID, ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN MONGOLIA, supra note 267, at 2. See Brent T.

White, Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure of JudicialReform in Mongolia, 4 E. Asia
L. Rev. 209, 209 (2009).
278. Interview with various officials that were involved in the formation and staffing of the
administrative court system, Mongolia Supreme Court, in Ulaanbataar, Mongolia (2005). See generally
Odgerel Tseveen & Battsetseg Ganbold, The Mongolian Legal System and Laws: A Brief Overview,
GLOBALEX, (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Mongolia.htm.
279. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT, supranote 176, at 9.
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that the aimag (provincial) ACCs will not have a sufficient workload, and as a
result, there have been delays in deciding on the exact structure of the courts and in
filling available positions.283 However, it seems likely that the advent of the
administrative court will affect public perceptions of corruption in society, by
giving it recourse to legal institutions when wronged by administrative actions.
This goes far in creating a society-wide ethos of the rule of law.
At this point it seems that by and large, the legislature and the executive in
Mongolia accept the prerogative of the administrative courts and intend to comply
with decisions by these courts. However, at any time, if these high-level officials
decide not to abide by these decisions, the rule of law will be compromised
seriously. Judges from the Administrative Supreme Court seem to be waiting to
see what reaction the other branches of government will have to the work of the
administrative courts.284
As judged by the proxy of public sentiment and public participation in
Mongolia, there have been improvements in the rule of law, including the
establishment of a rule of law culture. Nonetheless, judging both by public
participation and public perception, such improvements appear to be tenuous in
Mongolia, and accordingly are at risk of backsliding. Nonetheless, the fact that the
donor community and Mongolian governmental actors have responded to the
failure of the public to participate or to its perceptions and demonstrations for
change is significant and is a foundation to a promising rule of law culture.
D. Lesson Four: The Leverage ofDonor CoordinationPays Dividends
One of the main benefits of the World Bank's Legal Needs Assessment was
the coordination of donor activities, which resulted in a comprehensive plan among
donors.285 Indeed, the accompanying report to the assessment complained that
"there is little effort made to coordinate project activities. In a nutshell, donors and
international institutions foster legal reform activities piece by piece without a
comprehensive approach."286 Donors took up this call to arms, and engaged in a
substantial amount of donor coordination of projects and funding, to reduce
217
competitive or duplicative efforts, as well as to combine the power of the purse.
The JRP has been the primary mechanism for donor coordination, after the
passage of the Legal Reform Program of Mongolia. JRP is a mixture of work from
the National Center for State Courts, the USAID, PACT, the Mongolian Open
Society Forum, and the German Technical Corporation (GTZ).288

283. Interviews with various officials, supranote 278.
284. Indeed, it seems that the other branches of government perhaps do not understand the full
implications of these administrative courts. Thus, there is a danger that once the first big decision is
adopted, there may be significant resistance to compliance, and backtracking away from an independent
administrative court.
285. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 13.
286. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 39.
287. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 39.

288. Id.
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The JRP works closely with the General Council of Courts (GCC) 28 9 to focus
on six major tasks: (i) provide hands-on policy advice and training, including
continuing legal education; (ii) build the capacity of legal institutions, to strengthen
court management; (iii) introduce new approaches to legal education, including
establishing legal professional qualifications; (iv) curb judicial corruption; (v)
improve legal ethics; and (vi) increase public awareness and information about
Mongolia's changing judicial landscape.290 In short, the JRP works towards
achieving the Justice System Plan, with particular focus on the Mongolianidentified objectives of "good governance" and "accountability."291
One significant criticism of the Judicial Reform Project is that their office is
located at the Ministry of Justice & Home Affairs, an executive agency, thereby
threatening judicial independence and compromising the integrity of the program.
Those charges appear to be meritless, however, as the Judicial Reform Project
seems to be impartial, well-executed and was headed by an extremely competent
American lawyer, Mr. Robert La Mont.
JRP produces a "Rule of Law" newsletter to assist donor coordination and
292
inform interested sectors of reform activities.22 By 2004, JRP nearly had
integrated its activities with the GTZ, particularly in public education and judicial
training, and closely coordinated its work with the World Bank's Judicial and
Legal Reform Project.2 93
However, the center that made the most impact in training has been the
National Legal Center on Legal and Judicial Research, Training, Information and
Publicity. 294 The JRP and other foreign donors, with the support of the World
Bank, assisted in the creation of the National Legal Center (NLC) formed in late
2002 .295 The NLC moved to a new Mongolian-designed building in a central
location in Ulaanbaatar on June 16, 2004.296 The NLC is one of the linchpins of
the Mongolian Legal and Judicial Reform Project, and gets most of its support
from the JRP and the World Bank's Legal and Judicial Reform Project. 297 It is
clear that the NLC usurped most if not all of the functions of its predecessors, and
the JRP and GTZ have provided the bulk of training and CLE programs to judges,
prosecutors and advocates.298

289. The General Council of Courts is responsible for the administration of the courts.
290. THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID, USAID/MONGOLIA, JUDICIAL
REFORM PROJECT FACT SHEET, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/pdf/JRP 061306.pdf.
291. USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 6, 11.
292. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 38.

293. Id. at 3.
294. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175.

295. Id. at 8.
296. See Mongolia Legal Center, http://www.legalcenter.mn (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
297. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175.

298. See id.
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The JRP continues working with the NLC to develop new courses and
undertake trainings. USAID has funded the training of virtually every judge in
Mongolia through a JRP-provided training program, mostly administered by the
GTZ.299 The NLC holds annual "Baby Judges" training course to introduce newly
appointed judges to best practices and to assist in their receivership of their
position. 300 The JRP also sponsored training in distant aimags, and inquired into
their estimation of their training needs, for future provision of services.301
The donor coordination that Mongolia's donors engaged in after the
government action plans and the legal needs assessment was remarkable and has
been held up as a model for future donor activity. The GTZ in particular refers to
this structure as a "best practice" in donor coordination.302 After donor
coordination began in earnest in 1999, the pace and depth of Mongolia's judicial
and other reforms increased tremendously and have created a promising context
for a deep and permanent rule of law culture and civil society.303 Certainly, the
engagement of donors with each other to create complementary activities and not
overlap has been an important factor in the success of Mongolia's reforms this
decade.
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS ON MONGOLIA'S LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORMS

Mongolia has made the transition from communism to freedom, and in
just 15 years, you've established a vibrant democracy and opened up
your economy. You're an example of success for this region and for the
world. I know the transition to liberty has not always been easy and
Americans admire your patience and your determination. By your daily
efforts, you're building a better life for your children and your
grandchildren. 304
Over the past two decades, Mongolia has moved towards a procedurallyminimalist definition of the rule of law. Overall, Mongolia's legal and judicial
reforms resoundingly have been successful, although they have not been without
problems. Donors have shown a great capacity to work together under unified
leadership, and have effected serious and deep change. Mongolians have
embraced their role and nongovernmental organizations have proliferated
(especially those started by women) and have stimulated the reform process. And
finally, Mongolia's leaders have shown a willingness to embrace honest and
suitable changes to their legal system, for the benefit of all Mongolians.

299. See Skip Waskin, JudicialReform Project Update, Q4 Updates 2005, USAID, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q4-05.html.
300. Id.
301. Skip Waskin, Judicial Reform Project Update, Q3 Updates 2005, USAID, Sept. 15, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html.
302. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 40 (indicating that
the JRP is "seen by other donors as the focal point for legal and justice sector information and more and
more as the hub for rule of law coordination").
303. Heike Gramckow, The Long Winding Road: JudicialSector Reform in Mongolia, 2 INT'L JUD.
MONITOR 1, 1 (2007), http://wwwjudicialmonitor.org/archive_0207/sectorassessment.html.
304. Bush, supra note 12.
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In the beginning of its democracy, Mongolia did not have much direction over
the path of its reforms, as donor organizations and outside states influenced a large
amount of the legislation. Obviously, these donor organizations were working
with appropriate counterparts in Mongolia's government to enact the passage of
laws, implementation of new procedures, and restructuring of institutions. But
there was not a great deal of understanding by Mongolia's leaders of the exact
effects of the reforms. Likewise, in the initial stages, Mongolia's institutions did
not have any sectoral integration or cooperation amongst themselves, or even full
command over much of the reforms, resulting in poor implementation.
During the first seven years of its democracy, Mongolia and its donors
focused its reforms on legislation. Besides a slight restructuring of the courts, the
government and its donors engaged in modest work in the judiciary. New
legislation was imperfect as it was poorly drafted, difficult to implement,
overlapping and inconsistent. As it were, the initial response to many issues in
Mongolia was to draft a law or administrative procedure and as a result, the
enactment of laws has not proven to be careful or targeted solutions for Mongolia's
needs. Accompanying donor assistance in drafting laws has been transplantation
problems, where the laws or regulations of foreign jurisdictions are ill-suited to the
unique cultural context of Mongolia.
The tipping point, however, occurred when the government passed its reform
plans. The reforms occurring before the passage of the government action plans
were fundamentally flawed as they were not coherent or coordinated. Nonetheless,
the government action plans at the least showed that there was a high level of
acceptance for the pace and direction of the reform process that previously
occurred, despite shortcomings of the process. More importantly, after the process
of planning and memorializing an action plan, Mongolia's leaders gained a more
intimate understanding of and control over their reform situation.
As well, the Legal Needs Assessment by the World Bank and domestic
Mongolian actors was well-crafted and resulted in a societal buy-in, as it was
designed in part and administered by domestic actors. This type of assessment is
unusual and repeating it would be difficult in the present institutional bureaucratic
environment in many donor organizations. Nonetheless, the Mongolian experience
can be held up as a prototype, as it resulted in many tangible benefits, including the
creation of an administrative court system, which should operate to protect the
creation of a rule of law culture.
In addition to signaling high-level acceptance of the prior reforms, the
government action plans led to other tangible benefits as well. International
donors followed the government's prerogatives, and created their donor plans to fit
within the framework of the government's plans. The existence of these plans also
assisted the work of civil society to stimulate deeper reforms. Civil organizers and
leaders needed only to point to the appropriate section of the government plan,
how their work assists that goal, and then pressure for acceptance or assistance, as
the case may be.
The government action plans stimulated the donors to accept the JRP as a
donor clearinghouse and coordination center. As mentioned above, the GTZ uses
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Mongolian donor coordination as a best practice in the field of rule of law donor
assistance.305 Once the JRP began its donor coordination, donors were able to
minimize or discontinue duplicative or contradictory reforms.
The impact of these action plans cannot be understated. They created
concepts or norms as goals of rule of law reforms, rather than ends-based
institution-building. They affected the psychology of the Mongolian society, and
in particular, its leaders. Taking control over the reform process creates the belief
in the parliamentarians and civil society that they are the catalysts - and this will
make them more conducive to establishing a rule of law culture and accepting the
rule of law. Now, Mongolian justice can become a Mongolian product, since
many actors of society are taking part in the planning and decision-making in a
fixed and controlled framework.
Overall, judicial reforms largely have been successful. As with legislative
reforms, however, certain problems in the judiciary remain unresolved. Fixing the
procedural standards of the judiciary does not increase the rule of law ethos.
Increasing case-processing times, court administration and public access to
information creates needed transparency, but these technical fixes do not create
human change. Judges continue to be unwilling to embrace a more stringent ethics
standard and many of the "old guard" judges question the efficacy of most of the
reform programs. The plethora of new laws and procedures and the manifestation
of extraordinary disputes based on market circumstances have left many judges
confused, uncomfortable and ill-equipped to make good professional decisions.
During the first phase of democracy, judges in rural courts obstinately refused to
apply new laws, and used many of the outdated communist-era laws. It is unclear
to what extent this practice continues.
Training has increased the capacity of the individual judge, and procedural
and legal manuals have aided in the decision-making capability and uniformity of
the judiciary. Legal education is undergoing beneficent change, and experts agree
that it is improving and becoming standardized. Accreditation standards and bar
associations also are beginning to raise the professionalism of the judiciary.
Lastly, donors adeptly utilized public perception surveys to gauge the public's
knowledge, understanding and support for government institutions and the reform
process. After having discovered a low level of confidence in the judiciary and
other institutions, Mongolia and its donors responded effectively and engaged in
reforms that raised public confidence. Without a public buy-in, the creation of the
norms of the rule of law, as embodied in the action plans, would not be sustainable,
as the public would not feel that the rules passed by the legislature or executive are
supreme or guiding and would not have confidence in the judiciary to resolve its
disputes. Future rule of law programs would benefit from utilizing public
perception surveys and responding accordingly.

305. GRAMcKOw, MONGOLIA JUDIcIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 40 (indicating that
the Judicial Reform Program is "seen by other donors as the focal point for legal and justice sector
information and more and more as the hub for rule of law coordination").
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But in the context of all of these tangible successes, the human problem
remains in Mongolia. The norms of the rule of law have been introduced, but have
not fully taken root. Judges must embrace the independence of the judiciary, and
lose the culture of complacency of the past - that of following executive directives.
Mongolia's judges are young, competent, and embracing of the ideals of the rule of
law. As the old guard steps into retirement and the young tireless leaders continue
to adopt and accept the notion of the rule of law, Mongolia's judiciary will be what
the Constitution promises, an independent, impartial and equal branch of
government. Although the public is beginning to understand and accept the rule of
law reforms and attribute a heightened status to essential government institutions,
like the judiciary, there remains space for much improvement.
While the government plans effectively have guided the last phase of legal
reforms, there have been difficulties in their implementation. Resultantly, the next
phase of legal reforms intends to concentrate on assistance in implementation of

the recently created laws, institutions, norms and culture. The Judicial Reform
Project's 2004-2008 program focuses on implementation of specific measures of
the Program of the Government of Mongolia, which the Parliament adopted in
November of 2004.306 As well, the USAID states that "[o]ver the next five years,
the challenge for USAID will be to move beyond the "introduction" of these new
approaches and ensure that they are actually "embedded" and "institutionalized"
within the legal profession."307
Overall, the Mongolization of the legal system has not fully occurred yet, as it
is still adjusting to a new legal system and language applicable to a market
economy.

08

The seeds of the rule of law culture are planted, and Mongolia and its donors
continue to look forward to tilling the grounds, to embed these concepts and watch
their offspring grow and stimulate a deep and successful democracy and market
economy.

But this optimism belies Mongolia's serious concern - corruption. The
problem of corruption has far-reaching implications and seriously has affected
Mongolian democracy, its market economy, foreign investment, judicial
independence, public perceptions, and the rule of law. Corruption has caused
renewed and invigorated protests recently. Pro-democracy parties have threatened
to boycott, unless the corrupt leaders step down.30 9 Mongolia's society presently is
colliding over its rampant corruption. Can effective legal and judicial institutions
fully combat corruption? No, but these institutions are a prerequisite to doing so.
306. USAID,

THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS,

LESSONS

LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175.

307. USAID,
MONGOLIA
STRATEGIC
PLAN
2004-2008
40 (2003)
available at
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf docs/PDABY66 1.pdf [hereinafter MONGOLIA STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008].
308. See WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 154, at 37-38

(discussing problems with Mongolia's legal reforms, as of 2000).
309. Oyungerel Tsedevdamba, Pro-DemocracyActivists in Mongolia Worry about Potential Roll
Back of Reforms, EURASIANET, Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/
eav112202.shtml.
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Bending the leaders to accept the rule of law is fundamentally a political
exercise, and they must be constrained through domestic bottom-up pressures and
international top-down pressures.
This is true for judges as well as
parliamentarians as well as employees of the executive. It is the psychological
willingness of the judges to rule honestly and professionally, and of high-level
officials to accept living subject to the law. Otherwise, the whole premise is
undermined.
The focus is not only on the leaders. Public perception of corruption has been
very high in all sectors, although in recent years, the public seems to think more
highly of the judicial branch. But the prevalence of corruption has a basic effect
on the mentality of the citizenry, which can undermine a rule of law culture.
The administrative court is a significant catalyst to reducing corruption in
government and constraining leaders through law, but questions abound. Will the
government allow the court full discretion to hear cases and controversies - will it
allow it to be independent? Will the government accept its decisions? Will it hold
itself responsible for its actions? Will the Mongolian citizenry embrace the
concept of the rule of law? Or will they live subject to corruption and engage in
corruptive exchanges, because it is "the only way"? While the passage of time
answers these questions, the Mongolian dream of democracy hangs in the balance.
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APPENDIX A
MONGOLIA'S SOCIALIST TRADITIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

After the U.S.S.R, Mongolia became the second nation to embrace
communism, establishing a one-party system and eventually a command economy
administered by five-year plans. 10
The U.S.S.R.'s military and diplomatic
assistance in Mongolia's independence from China initiated an extremely close
bilateral relationship between the two states.311 Although formally independent,
Mongolia became the defacto sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union.3 12 Indeed, of
all former soviet bloc states, Mongolia was the most dependent of Soviet aid and
technical assistance. In the 1980s, Soviet direct aid reached as high as 30% of
Mongolia's GDP, and approximately 40,000 Soviet advisors gave technical
assistance to Mongolia's industrial development, particularly in the mining and
manufacturing sectors. 313 This aid helped Mongolia close its wide trade gap and
increase social services, thus benefiting Mongolian rural society and increasing the
legitimacy of the rule by the communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
314
(MPRP).
The beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Council on
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the 1980s was the principal agitation for
change in Mongolia.315
Mongolian students, like their Eastern European
counterparts, began peaceful demonstrations calling for democracy, and organized
sit-ins and hunger strikes in Sukhbaatar Square, the main square in Ulaanbaatar
where the Parliament is located.316 Math and Physics professors from the
Mongolian National University formed the Social Democratic Party, and
professors from the Economics Department formed the National Progress Party.317
Mongolia's versions of glasnost and perestroika unexpectedly promoted the
democratic reformists' agenda, although the government originally initiated them

310. See Fedor S. Mansvetov, Russia and China in Outer Mongolia,24 FOREIGN AFF. 143, 147-49
(1945-46).
311. Id. at 146-47 (explaining that in return for the 1912 treaty whereby Russia agreed to assist
Mongolian autonomy from the "presence of Chinese troops on her territory [and] the colonization of her
land by the Chinese," Russia gained unfettered rights to railroad construction).
312. CEVDET

DENIZER
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MONGOLIA:

PRIVATIZATION

AND

SYSTEM

TRANSFORMATION IN AN ISOLATED EcoNOMY 3 (2005). See also Bradsher,supranote 2, at 548.

313. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 208; Cheung, supra note 10, at 70-71 (detailing the
withdrawal of Soviet assistance and Mongolia's initial painful reforms).
314. See Bradsher,supra note 2, at 545-46. In fact, aid disproportionately influenced Mongolian
welfare, in that herdsmen's standard of living was greatly higher than it would have been without it. In
1970, Mongolian aid far outpaced other developing countries. Id. at 546. Bradsher cites $220 in aid per
capita for Mongolians, in comparison to $4.20 in 80 non-communist countries and $36 in US aid for the
South Vietnamese. Id.
315. See Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 461.
316. Id. at 462-63 (examining the transition period and the elasticity of the MPRP in responding to
the popular demonstrations, after briefly debating whether to respond with force, like the Chinese in
Tiananmen Square).
317. Id. at 463.
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to strengthen the socialist economy, not render it obsolete.318 Under these plans,
moderates in the MPRP were increasingly placed in leadership positions while
Mongolia sought to increase government transparency and performance, by
allowing more autonomy to state enterprises and government ministries.319 In the
end, these moderates were the key factor in the MPRP's decision to allow a
transition to democracy. During glasnost and perestroika, Mongolia began to
establish international relationships with deft speed.320
Economic Background: Initially, Soviet control was largely over Mongolia's
economic system - all of Mongolia's trade was with the Soviet Union from 1921
until 1952.321 During that time, the Soviet Union left Mongolia relatively
undeveloped, as the U.S.S.R. tended to its own nation-building. Mongolia's
economy remained dominated by livestock-raising and nomadism.
Once
appropriately strengthened, however, the U.S.S.R. eventually asserted control over
322
In 1948, the
Mongolia's political and social spheres in addition to its economy.
Soviets introduced economic planning in Mongolia with the first of the five-year
plans, which collectivized herds, built winter animal shelters and wells, and sought
to industrialize Mongolia.323 The plans aimed to stimulate a change from an
agricultural-industrial economy to an industrial-agricultural economy.
The Soviet Union invested substantial sums in developing Mongolia's mining
industry, primarily its copper trade, and in developing light industries within
Ulaanbaatar (translation: red city), such as carpet, wool and shoe factories.324
After the establishment of the CMEA, the Soviet trade bloc, Mongolia's
industrialization reflected the "international Socialist division of labor and the
steady growth of international cooperation between Socialist countries. 3 25 Within
that framework, Mongolia provided meat, hides and other livestock products,
minerals and coal to the Soviet bloc, and imported the balance of other daily
326
necessities.
The government administrated and coordinated all banking,
production, distribution, and social services functions during Mongolia's socialist
era.327
Political and Social Background: The MPRP controlled Mongolia from 1921,
when that party's young revolutionary founder, Sukhbaatar, led the state to
independence from China, with the help of the U.S.S.R.328 Soviet assistance came
318. Id. at 461.
319. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 208-11 (discussing the "renewal" program modeled after
Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts in the Soviet Union).
320. Id.
321. Bradsher, supranote 2, at 548.
322. Id. at 206.
323. Id. at 207; Bradsher, supra note 2, at 549-50.
324. K.L. Abeywickrama, The Marketization ofMongolia, 10 MONTHLYREV. 25,27 (1996).
325. Bradsher, supranote 2, at 550 (quoting former Premier Tsedenbal in 1970).
326. Omar Sattaur, Thoroughly Modern Mongolia, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 1, 1990, at 23. See also
Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 461 (detailing that in the 1980s, Mongolia traded 95% with the Soviet Union,
and the balance with CMEA).
327. See Abeywickrama, supranote 325, at 26-27.
328. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 462.
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hand in hand with Soviet influence, which soon changed into Soviet command,
mainly by directing the MPRP, the governing Mongolian communist party. 329 The
MPRP increased its stranglehold on society until it controlled all aspects of its
citizens' behavior. The MPRP regulated prices.330 It collectivized and controlled
herds. The government managed domestic production and all traffic and supply of
goods. 331 The MPRP controlled foreign trade, and consistently ran trade deficits,
which Russian direct aid closed.332 In terms of human development, the socialist
regime in Mongolia stymied human freedoms.333 The MPRP controlled the media,
and there was no freedom of speech or association.334 There was no opportunity
for private initiative. In short, the Mongolian people were governed, not
governing.
In addition to the communist party, the negdels, the state herding and
agricultural cooperatives, governed Mongolia. 335 They provided veterinary care,
abundant wells, and decreased risk of loss from natural disasters.336 The negdels'
marketing function supplied necessary services - they purchased raw materials at
fixed prices set by the Ministry and transported the products to the state run
processing facilities at set schedules.337 The negdels also established customary
land use rights, controlling concentration of the herds and their grazing within each
negdel as well as among themselves.338
Under the rule of various dictatorships, the Mongolian people suffered
through a period of brutal atrocity.3 39 The state eventually provided its people with
a strong sense of security.
Indeed, Mongolia's development advanced
considerably under communist rule. Economically, society benefited from fixed
prices at home,3 4 0 above market prices for meat, leather, cashmere and copper

abroad,3 4 1 and cheap luxury goods from Eastern Europe.

Socially, educational

329. See id.at 460.
330. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 207.
331. Abeywickrama, supranote 325, at 26.
332. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 462.
333. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 206-07.
334. See id.
335. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT MONGOLIA 2003 25
(2003), available at http://hdr.undp.org.
336. See id.at 39.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 207 (describing the destruction of the lamaseries and
the transformation of the command economy). Mongolia's two dictators are known as the Mongolian
equals of the Soviet versions. Id. Horolyn Choibalsan was "Mongolia's Stalin" for transforming
Mongolia's society with murder and violent purges to rid it of any challenges, killing over 100,000
persons, including Monks, intellectuals and the traditional elite, and causing the near-total destruction
of Buddhist lamaseries. Id. Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal was "Mongolia's Brezhnev" for suffocating
Mongolia's economy through the introduction of command and control characteristics. Id.
340. Id. Fixed prices allowed rural society to purchase goods for the same prices as in Ulaanbaatar,
although the distances to supply rural aimag (provincial) centers was vast. Id.Ultimately, the demise of
fixed prices undermined rural society's well-being and civic participation. Id.
341. See Abeywickrama, supra note 325, at 27. These goods were sold to the U.S.S.R. at prices
fixed at a percentage over world prices. Id.
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improvements were impressive, health services were free, and there was practically
no unemployment.342 Importantly, the government solidified (superficial) gender
equality, social protection, and human security.3 43
Legal Background: Mongolia has gone through various and interrupted legal
systems during its existence as a state. Mongolia's rich legal history originated
from the yassa, Chinggis Khan's legal codification.344 Subsequently, during
Manchu rule over Mongolia, administrative authority encompassed judicial
authority.345 Once Mongolia gained independence from China as a result of the
1921 People's Revolution, the government instituted a mixed Asian and European
legal system. 3 46 Mongolia's legal system during the communist era was based on
the Soviet adaptation of the Roman law system; however, there were no
professional lawyers or judges.347 In 1933, Mongolia reorganized its court system
and vested much judicial power in the executive.348 When the judicial system was
reestablished during communist rule, it was structured primarily as a criminal legal
system. 349 After heavy amounts of Russian funding, a tangible legal profession
emerged.350
Thousands of directives from the MPRP, ordinances of the People's
Representatives Hurals (parliaments) and decisions of the Ministerial Counsel
comprised the rest of Mongolia's legal system.351 Overall, the appropriate
government ministries resolved what problems arose, and there was no need for a
formal civil law system. Negdels and other cooperatives also played a significant
role in the rule of law. Along with aimag (provincial) governors, negdels were the
primary regulators of the rural population, and they settled disputes amongst
themselves, or went to the aimag governor for assistance.352

342. Id.
343. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 336, at 6.
344. M. BYAMBA & MONGOLIAN WOMEN LAYERS ASSOCIATION, HISTORICAL AND CURRENT
OVERVIEW OF THE MONGOLIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1 (2005); GEORGE LANE, GENGHIS KHAN AND
MONGOL RULE 37 (2004).

345. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278; Dorothea Heuschert, Legal Pluralism in the Qing
Empire: Manchu Legislationfor the Mongols, 20 INT'L HIST. REV. 310,321 (1998).
346. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 161 (2003).
347. Id.; BYAMBA, supra note 345, at 4.
348. WILLIAM ELLIOTT BUTLER, THE MONGOLIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION
AND DOCUMENTATION 92-93 (1982). See also The Supreme Court of Mongolia, Judicial System of

Mongolia, http://www.supremecourt.mn/english/index.php?what-system
(giving a broad overview of the history of Mongolia's judicial system).

(last visited Feb. 28, 2010)

349. GINSBURG, supra note 347, at 161.

350. Id.
351. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 4-5.
352. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 336, at 39-40.
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APPENDIX B
MONGOLIA'S REALIZATION OF THE PROCEDURALLY-MINIMALIST RULE
OF LAW:
STEPS TAKEN BY MONGOLIA AND ITS DONOR ORGANIZATIONS
I. REFORM OF LEGISLATION
The first phase of legal reform was the reformation of the Constitution. The
Asia Foundation contributed the most, but there also were independent analyses of
the draft constitution by scholars and professors from the U.S. and Germany.
The next aspect of stage-one reforms was the rewriting of the legal code to create
appropriate rules that govern newly-created market-based relationships.354 To be
consistent with the rule of law formulation described above, any decisions with the
effect of law and any lawmaking should be transparent and should allow for
meaningful public participation. As such, the reforms of the legal code should
result in the passage of fair, equal and nondiscriminatory laws and decisions with
the effect of law.
Construction of a market-oriented economy was the first priority of
Mongolia's newly elected government, which based this transformation on (i)
privatization as the centerpiece, (ii) financial, fiscal and external sector reforms
311
and (iii) removal of controls on prices, tariffs and wages.
Moderate price reforms occurred first, to soften the way for privatization. In
January of 1991, the government freed prices on most non-essential commodities
and increased prices on state subsidized essential items and public utilities.356 An
increase in salaries, a reduction in spending and the budget, and a decrease in
subsidies to most state enterprises rounded out these price reforms.357
The government then privatized state assets under the Privatization Law of
May 1991, which entitled all citizens to 10,000 tugrug (Tg) of vouchers.358 These
citizens could redeem small-value assets under the green vouchers, and shares in
public limited or joint stock companies from large state enterprises under the blue
vouchers.359 Public utilities and key transport, telecommunications and mining
enterprises however, remained under state control. 360 Livestock was privatized to
herdsmen and accommodations were privatized to its inhabitants. 361
The Banking Law of May 1991 reformed the financial sector and created a
new state central bank (its previous version was the sole banking center of

353. See Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 210 (stating that Mongolia lobbied the U.S. for help in
formulating their constitution); THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 213, at 1.
354. See Bliskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 211-12. See also infra note 101 and accompanying text.
355. See Goyal, supranote 10, at 635 (discussing the development of the transition period).
356. Cheung, supranote 10, at 70.
357. Id.
358. Goyal, supra note 10, at 635.
359. Id. at 635-36.
360. Id. at 636.
361. Id.
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Mongolia) as well as constructed the basic legal framework for commercial banks
to operate in Mongolia. 362 An unlikely early reform that complemented
Mongolia's financial reforms was the establishment of a stock exchange in 1992,
under the direction of Zoljargal, one of Mongolia's many "brash young
reformers."363 The Foreign Investment Law of May 1994 created the necessary
conditions for Mongolia's entry into the globalized system of investments and
trade, by stipulating the conditions for foreigners to own property and
investments.364
II. REFORM OF THE JUIJCIARY
A. The PresentState of the MongolianJudiciary
Legal Profession: The legal profession is composed of the same four main groups
of professional lawyers as during the socialist period: (i) judges; (ii) prosecutors
representing the state; (iii) advocates who are admitted to practice law, provide
legal advice and represent parties in court; and (iv) notaries, who witness or
authenticate documents.365
Advocates: Previously, the state operated the economy, the social network and the
administration and its officers resolved any arising disputes. Resultantly, citizens
had little need for lawyers and the legal system, unless they were involved in a
criminal case. Now, with increasing citizen rights (property rights, civil rights,
etc.) and the rise of a civil law system, the number of lawyers is growing. The
number of advocates in the Association of Mongolian Advocates (AMA) has
increased from 200 in 1994 to over 500 in 2001.366 In 1995, Mongolia passed the
Law on Advocacy, which delineates the functions of the profession - advocates
may present legal advice, prepare legal documents, participate in investigations,
and may represent clients in court and other administrative organs. 367 Advocates
must be members of the AMA, and to qualify for membership, an individual must
have a law degree, an absence of a criminal record and pass an examination
administered by the AMA and the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs

(MOJHA). 368
Judges: During the communist era, judges historically occupied one of the lowest
governmental levels, and garnered little respect.369 In those times, the MPRP
directly appointed judges and retained and exercised a substantial amount of
oversight. For instance, oftentimes the party recalled judges to explain a decision
to a local party committee where it disagreed.370 Prosecutors traditionally had
more power than judges, and effectively decided cases based on party lines,
362. Id. at 637.
363. Cheung, supranote 10, at 71.
364. Tsedendambyn Batbayar, Mongolia in 1993: A FragileDemocracy, 34 ASIAN SURVEY 41, 44
(1994).
365. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278. This article does not treat notaries in depth.
366. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supranote 224, at 8.

367.
368.
369.
370.

Id.
Id.
See Tseveen & Ganbold, supranote 278.
Id.
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resulting in about a 98% conviction rate before 1991.371 Today however, judges
are gaining more prestige in society, and the Constitution and national legislation
protect their independence. Presently there are approximately 360 judges in
Mongolia, who are appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the
General Council of Courts, and who have life tenures.372 Most Mongolian judges
are very young, between 30 and 35 years old. This result is due to the low age and
experience requirements to be a judge: for the lower courts, judges must be at least
25 years old and have three years legal experience; for the Supreme Court, judges
must be at least 35 years old and have ten years of legal experience.373 At present,
two-thirds of the judiciary's cases are civil, in contrast to the communist period
where nearly all cases were criminal.374 However, judges in Mongolia are
overloaded with cases.3 7 5 On average they settle 350 cases a year- far in excess of
the international average - which "often causes a superficial approach in settling
cases and disputes." 376
Legal Education: As of 2005, there were 31 law schools operating in Mongolia.377
In 2001, approximately 6,000 students attended law school, with half of those
students enrolled in one of the four main universities. 3 78 The Ministry of Justice
and Home Affairs has been planning to audit all law schools to determine their
curricula and the level of expertise and qualifications of the law professors. It is
unclear whether this exercise has been completed. In general, law schools in
Mongolia need a unified curricula standard applicable to all accredited law schools
and elevated standards of entry into the legal profession on the basis of merit,
equality and fundamental fairness.
Judiciary System: Soum, intersoum and district courts are courts of first instance

that handle less serious crimes and civil disputes under ten million tugrug.3 7 9
Aimag (province) and city courts are found in the capitals of the aimags and there
is one specialized court in Ulaanbaatar called the Capital City Court (this is the
equivalent of an aimag court). 38 0 These are also courts of first instance but they
have different jurisdiction than the other courts of first instance.381 Aimag courts
have jurisdiction over more serious crimes, civil disputes over ten million tugrug,
and appeals from lower courts.382 The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all

371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. ZORIGFOUNDATION, REPORT ON THENATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 10 (2001).

375. Id. at 8.
376. Id.
377. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA-LEGAL AND JUDIcIAL REFORM PROJECT, REPORT No. PID 10443 5
(2005). See also Worldwide Legal Directories, Schools of Law in Mongolia Directory,
http://www.hg.org/law-schools-mongolia.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
378. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIALEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT, supra note 378, at 5. The
report identifies that MOJHA provided this information to the World Bank. Id.
379. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278.
380. Id.
38 1. Id.
382. Id.

516

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

appeals from decisions of aimag and the Capital City courts as well as jurisdiction
over some matters of first instance.8 In 2004, the government of Mongolia with
the assistance of the World Bank initiated a specialized system of administrative
courts.384 Lastly, there is a Constitutional Court which only has jurisdiction over
questions concerning the constitution.
B. DonorActivity And Structuring The JudicialReforms
Law on Courts: Reforms of the judiciary began modestly with the 1993 Law on
Courts. 385 During the passage of the Law on Courts, The Asia Foundation
provided two legal consultants to work with the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the Parliament.38 6 These consultants were two
Americans - Clifford Wallace, Chief Senior Judge of the Ninth Circuit, and a
specialist from the U.S. Congressional Research Service.387 Between 1994 and
1998 USAID entered its second phase of assistance for Mongolia, and it reported
that this era was marred with energy crises and economic stabilization issues. As a
result, although it paid attention to and engaged in reform programs concerning
democratization and improving legal institutions, short-term emergency
considerations disproportionately diverted its aid away from rule of law
programs.388
C. The ProgressionofMongolia's JudicialReforms
Although the reform process occurred across various fields simultaneously,
this appendix describes Mongolia's judicial reforms by subject matter, for ease of
understanding. This approach paints a cogent picture of the overall path of
Mongolia's judicial reforms, but not necessarily a temporally accurate one.
Judicial Independence: Increasing the political, economic, organizational and
decision-making independence of the judiciary is the first fundamental value of the
parliament's Strategic Plan for the Justice System of Mongolia.389 Judicial
independence is of course a necessary aspect of a procedurally-minimalist rule of
law.
In advance of the legal reform program, The Asia Foundation supported the
Mongolia Group for Independence of Judges and Lawyers (MGIJL) seminar on
judicial independence and ethics. 390 As well, the JRP brought a consultant to
Mongolia - Marie Milks, a retired Hawaii State Court Judge who has had prior

383. Id.
384. See interview with various officials, supra note 278, and accompanying text; THE WORLD
BANK, MAJOR WORLD BANK JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECTS APPROVED AUGUST 2004 1 (2004).
385. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 2.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. USAID, MONGOLIA STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008, supranote 308, at 10-11 (summarizing its
prior programs and strategies).
389. Id. at 11 2; WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154,
at 30.
390. See THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supranote 213, at 1.
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experience in Mongolia -in September of 2005 to work on improving judicial
independence.391
Capacity Building of Legal Institutions: Mongolia and its donors have spent a great
amount of money and resources on increasing the capacity of the judiciary and
other legal institutions. One necessary and specific focus has been on reforming
the Judicial Council.
The Judicial Reform Project has focused its assistance on Mongolian legal
capacity building, with particular attention to the General Council of Courts
(GCC), Mongolia's judicial council. The initial priority of the JRP was assistance
in court management and administration, with the goal of increasing transparency,
accountability and judicial efficiency. Throughout its assistance, the JRP did not
impose any of its own ideals on the GCC.392 Rather, it presented the GCC with
comparative background material from other countries with different
administrative and management systems, and aided in the GCC's informed
decisions.393 The JRP supports the GCC in creating a national case information
database and improving its budget expertise. Further, it has assisted the GCC in
making adjustments in its decision-making processes and introducing the use of
sub-committees for better information and broader participation in the GCC's
decisions. 394 In addition, Robert La Mont, then-Chief of Party for the JRP,
personally participated in the GCC's meetings, as a monitoring activity and to
directly impact the GCC's policy making and administrative decisions.3 95
Outside of the GCC, over the last fifteen years, Mongolia has built a
substantial amount of capacity in its judiciary. Mongolia has automated all 61 of
its courts under the JRP's assistance, which includes automated case management
procedures and records, and automated random assignment of cases. 396 More than
three-quarters of the caseloads in Mongolian courts are automated, and almost all
courts have computers, and many with Internet access.397 Mongolia soon hopes to
create a central database for case information on the Internet. After a slight
learning curve, USAID issued and installed generators to back up the computers
when the power goes out, as frequently occurs in the aimags.398
As well, the JRP has assisted each court in creating public information areas
and improving the efficiency of records management processes. The goal has been

391. See Skip Waskin, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, Oct. 21, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q4-05.html.
392. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 4.
393. Id; See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 6.

394. Id.
395. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 8.

396. USAID, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, Aug 5, 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/
mn/programs/jrp/index.html (explaining improvements in judicial independence).
397. See USAID, Case Study, Helping Mongolia to Reform JudicialSector, USAID, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://www.usaid.gov/stories/mongolia/cs mongolia law.html.
398. See Skip Waskin, Mongolia, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, July18, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html (explaining court automation).
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to improve transparency, efficiency and reduce opportunities for system
manipulation. The JRP organized court management training to increase the
performance of case flow management of individual courts, to raise the efficiency
and productivity of the bench.399
Further, the World Bank has funded a Unified Information System
link all national level justice sector institutions in Ulaanbaatar to share
make court information available to the public, and make available all
regulations, with the intention of giving courts complete knowledge
judges to rule consistently.400

(UIS), to
data and
laws and
to allow

These reforms have increased judicial efficiency, which in turn assures
fairness, a fundamental principle of the rule of law. As well, these reforms
increase accountability and transparency, to reduce possibilities of corruption and
assure access to the courts for meaningful, fair, impartial and equal redress and
justice.
Training and Continuing Legal Education: Training professionalizes the judicial
system, and has been an extremely important part of Mongolia's rule of law
reforms. In January 2000, the Association of Mongolian Judges, the Association
of Mongolian Lawyers, and the Association of Mongolian Advocates founded the
Judicial Training Center. 401 The Mongolian Foundation for Open Society
(MFOS), which jointly runs the JRP with USAID and PACT, supported the
establishment of the Judicial Training Center through financial and technical
support.402 The Judicial Training Center resides at the Supreme Court. As well,
The Asian Development Bank opened a Legal Retraining Center for Lawyers in
February of 2000.403
III. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE REFORM THROUGH GOOD GOVERNANCE
PROGRAMS

With judicial reforms in place, the Government of Mongolia and its donors
have begun fine-tuning the application of these reforms. While this process
occurs, their joint attention has shifted to good governance reforms, through
increasing transparency and accountability. Mongolia has undertaken many good
governance reforms that donors primarily advance and fund.
Capacity Development of the Office of the President: The UNDP supports the
Office of the President of Mongolia in developing its institutional capacity for
public consensus building and to provide long-term solutions to political and
socio-economic challenges.404 The four core objectives of the project are: (1) to

399. See id. at T 4 (Court Management Training).
400. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 16 (stating that
the Judicial Reform Project is assisting the World Bank in networking the courts into the UIS).
401. See Retraining Centre of Judges, Introduction to Judges Retraining Centre of Mongolia, T 1,
http://www.owc.org.mnjrc/English/introduction eng.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
402. Id. at 12.
403. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 6 n. 6.
404. See United Nations Development Programme, Completed Projects, Institutional Capacity
Development of the Office of the President of Mongolia (Jan.2005-Dec. 2007), UNDP, http://www.
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enhance constitutional and legal status of the President of Mongolia, including the
President's inclusive public policy-making powers, (2) improve organizational
development of the Office of the President, including its policy analysis capacity
and human resources management, (3) improve staff performance management
system of the Office of the President, including results based assessment for public
service delivery, and (4) increase responsiveness and transparency / accountability
of the Office of the President, including better connecting the President with the
people and application of tools. 405
Capacity Development of the State Great Hural: The Asia Foundation has a
program on Strengthening the Legislative Research and Analysis Capacity of the
State Great Hural.
Mongolia's State Great Hural (SGH), or parliament, is at the center of the
country's democracy, but possesses little independent capacity to conduct policy
research and analysis. This hinders its ability to play an active role in policymaking
and oversight of the government. 406
The Asia Foundation has focused on creating an independent analytic
capacity for the parliament. It endeavors to go past donor-driven demands to
create local demand. In order to achieve this, The Asia Foundation has worked to
increase transparency in governmental and legislative processes, so that
nongovernmental organizations and civil society have a role in influencing the
legislature.407 The Asia Foundation supports improving the quality of policy
research capacity, and advances the notion that civil society may be able to
increase that capacity.408 This "may be a linchpin reform that will lead to more
demand for information, more transparency, and better quality information. But the
current situation of low transparency provides a core structural constraint to the
development of more analytic capacity." 409
Finally, the Asian Development Bank has been assisting Mongolian
governance reforms on a more macro level. ADB has undertaken a country
governance assessment which highlights the importance of public sector reform
and strengthening the government's institutional capacity.410
Legal Professional Qualifications: In addition to training of existing judges,
prosecutors and advocates, Mongolia has been revamping its legal professional
qualifications. The reformation of legal education meets two fundamental goals:
creating predetermined standards that all graduates must meet; and coordinating

undp.mn/dghr-icd.html.
405. Id.
406. THOMAS B. GINSBURG, STRENGTHENING LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CAPACITY
OF MONGOLIA'S STATE GREAT HURAL 3 (2005).

407. Id. at 5, 17.
408. Id. at 8.
409. Id. at 3.
410. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, MONGOLIA COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAM UPDATE 20042006 4 (2003) (showing the relatively large size of Mongolia's public sector and the high public sector
wages in proportion to GDP).
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legal education to ensure that all law schools teach substantially the same subject
matter.
The Mongolia Legal Needs Assessment Report indicated that legal education
needs drastic improvement. The quality of the courses and testing is inadequate, as
the "faculty is basically confined to teaching the relevant chapters of the Civil
Code and limited to recitation of the provisions of the passed laws." 4 11 The report
calls for a new methodology, which concentrates on developing critical and
analytical thinking, to understand and debate the rationale behind the law, and not
just to memorize and know the provisions of the law.412 The Soros Foundation has
supported curriculum development and the development of textbooks, and donated
funds to the Ulaanbaatar Metropolitan Central Library to establish a specialized
public law library.413 While Mongolia and its donors have begun curriculum and
systemic reforms in the Mongolian legal education, they leave much to be desired.
As a third prong of legal educational reform, the creation of a required bar
examination will ensure that established minimum standards are met by all legal
graduates. The JRP assisted in the creation and administration of the first
qualification exam for legal professionals (bar exam) given by the Ministry of
Justice and Home Affairs. 4 14 As of 2005, there have been two exams. 415 There
were some major problems in the first qualification exam; however, the report on
the second Lawyer Qualification Exam, offered in 1995, showed that the exam was
conducted fairly and openly and that grading mistakes were corrected and being
investigated.4 16
Bar Associations: Mongolia does not have a functioning bar association. The
Mongolian Advocate's Association regulates advocates, but not government legal
advisors, prosecutors or judges.417 It functions to represent the interests of only its
advocate members. Accordingly, to cure this deficiency, the JRP is assisting the
Mongolian Advocates Association's efforts to become a full Bar Association, with
two main functions: monitoring of member ethics; and training of member skills.
Ethics in the Legal Profession: Because of Mongolia's socialist legal traditions,
judges have not understood the concept of conflict of interests, and a majority of
judges has met with significant resistance the work that donors have done in this
field. Judges maintain significant personal relationships with the participants of
cases, parties and witnesses, and (in part because of this) judges are prone to

411. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 32.

412. Id. at 7.
413. See id. at 33 (lamenting also the lack of adequate study and research textbooks and teaching
materials).
414. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 2
(demonstrating JRP's seminal role in contributing to the drafting of the legislation that created this
exam, and its assistance in drafting the exam questions and ensuring secrecy).
415. Skip Waskin, Mongolia, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html.
416. See Waskin, supranote 302, at 2.
417. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM: DEVELOPING MONGOLIA'S
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS: A NEEDS ANALYSIS 39, 1 3 (1995).
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financial and personal influence.41 8 The JRP also has recognized that the
communication culture of judges is very low. 419 The JRP provided advice on the
Judicial Ethics Code and the draft Law on Courts.420 Jack Marshall has taught
ethics courses in an interactive and enthusiastic environment, and the participants
have indicated that they actually changed their behavior as a result of these
workshops.421 Professor Marshall continues to work with the Judicial Disciplinary
Committee to fine tune the recommended changes to the Judicial Ethics Code and
helps improve procedures for investigating and prosecuting violations.422
Public Education and Awareness: Public opinion surveys have shown that
confidence in Mongolia's legal institutions has been low. 42 3 The JRP developed a
variety of public outreach and information programs, including a television
program that presents changes in the criminal code.424
PACT administers the public education campaign for the JRP. PACT
conducted focus groups to gauge their awareness levels and then developed themes
and content for the public education campaign. 4 25 The result was its production in
collaboration with the German Technical Corporation of a TV drama series,
Huuliin Tsag, which informed people of the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure
codes.426 More importantly, it provided practical knowledge on how to exercise
rights by showing how the courts work and demonstrating the independent rule of
law.427 At the time, this series was the most watched program on Mongolian
television. 4 28 After success with the television program, the JRP created a radio
drama with the same subject matter and purpose, to reach Mongolia's rural
population.429
To manage public information about the judiciary, JRP has created a Public
Access website which will put all case information on the web. This is occurring
despite the reservations of some judges.430

418. GRAMCKOw, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 24 (stating also that
judges are careless in court sessions and are too bureaucratic).
419. Id. at 24.
420. See id. at 17, 22.
421. Id. (emphasizing that future lawyer qualifications examinations must include the subject of
legal ethics).
422. Id.
423. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 9-10.
424. Id.
425. See PACT, Judicial Reform Program, http://www.pactworld.org/cs/judicial reform (last
visited Feb. 11, 2010).
426. USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 38.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See Judicial Reform Project Update, National Center for State Courts, http://www.usaid.gov/
mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). (Although not stated, publicizing
the case docket prevents the shifting of cases between judges, and this may be one reason for their
reservations, since they are known to reassign cases frequently. Reassignment of cases to "interested"
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Public Media Education: Mongolia has not had a long tradition of independent
media, and journalists during the socialist-period mostly reiterated and reported the
government line. 431 They have not had a tradition of impartiality and critical
thinking. 432 In addition to its public outreach, PACT maintains the JRP website,
and conducts training for public affairs and public information officers and
journalists, to improve the depth and quality of the media, which plays a vital role
in monitoring and public awareness.433
IV. INCREASING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND ACCESSIBILITY THROUGH LEGAL
AID PROGRAMS AND NGOs
Legal Representation and Accessibility: With the advent of a market economy,
Mongolia has had to increase its citizens' accessibility to the courts. Many of the
access to justice problems focus on access to information. However, in many
cases, there is not sufficient personal access to legal representation.
For instance, due to inefficiencies in the system, free legal assistance has not
been fully used by citizens charged with crimes. A key underlying cause of this is
likely to be a shortage of well-trained lawyers. Until October 2002, for instance,
there were only 390 certified advocates in the country, of whom only 21.0 percent
were located outside Ulaanbaatar. There were fewer than five advocates in most
aimags. Bayan-Olgii and Govi-Altai aimags had just one advocate each. While the
number of lawyers has increased with the holding of qualification examinations for
lawyers in 2002, the concentration of lawyers in Ulaanbaatar has also continued to
increase.434
Under their Rule of Law Program, MFOS undertook a legal education
program that supported the Law School of Mongolian State University's efforts to
start a legal clinic to provide free legal aid to indigent clients, under the
supervision of law professors and attorneys. 435 MFOS had previously assisted the
Shikhikhutug private law school's establishment of a legal clinic. 43 6 MFOS
supports a project that provides free legal aid and psychological consultancy to
prisoners of juvenile and women's prisons.437

judges has resulted in charges of corruption and bribe-taking and the JRP and civil society has clamored
for rules controlling and monitoring reassignment of cases).
431. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 5 (assessing the
past traditions of the media in Mongolia, and stating that impartial public awareness and public
monitoring of the justice system is "not always mastered even in advanced democracies").
432. Id.
433. See Amartya Sen, Speech at the World Bank Legal Conference: What is the Role of Legal and
Judicial Reform in the Development Process? (June 5, 2000), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legalandjudicial.pdf (discussing how an active and free
media can do much to advance the rule of law).
434. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 336, at 17.
435. M. ICHINNOROV, ET AL. & SOROS FOUNDATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ACCESS TO A FREE
LEGAL AID (NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, MONGOLIA) (2002), available at http://www.soros.org.mn

/en/index.php?sel=resource&f-resone&objid=263&menu
436. Id.
437. Id.

id=3&resmenu id=2.
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MFOS also has a new initiative, an Access to Justice Project, which promotes
right-based justice reform.438 MFOS intends to create a new justice system with
the cooperation of state and non-state actors. 439 This entails linking legal clinics,
human rights NGOs and private law firms to provide effective legal assistance to
all of society, with a focus on vulnerable groups. This MFOS program focuses on
the creation of an adequate fee structure and a budget for a mandatory legal
defense system and legal assistance to the indigent.4 0
Lastly, MFOS' Freedom of Information Project aims to increase access to
government information and raise public awareness and active participation. In
1998, MFOS assisted the creation of the Legal Resource Center with the
Ulaanbaatar Metropolitan Library to increase access to legal information and
research materials by creating a centralized law library for law students, lawyers
and other professionals and the general public.441
Alternative Dispute Mechanisms: Improving access to justice through the creation
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or formalization of traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms increases the ability to achieve meaningful redress.
The Asia Foundation has supported legal mediation and research on
traditional dispute resolution to deal with social developments - such as the
herding communities' disputes over traditional pastureland use. The Asia
Foundation is documenting traditional conflict resolution practices on a
comparative basis to identify the changes in the pastureland use and the effects of
economic and political transitions, to increase and improve the resolution of these
disputes.
Likewise, the JRP has worked with the Foreign Trade Arbitration Court of the
Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Mongolian Advocates
Association to organize training on arbitration principles, case resolution at the
arbitration court, and mediation and involvement of state courts in the court
procedures.442
Strengthening the Role of NGOs as Civil Society: Nongovernmental organizations
assist in the advancement of the rule of law by advocating on behalf of individuals,
interest groups or causes, to influence governments to take action, usually through
the promulgation of legislation or legal reforms. International nongovernmental
organizations play a complementary function by drawing attention to
governmental violations of the rule of law. These organizations, like the UNDP or
the World Bank, widely disseminate detailed reports, which actually influence
governmental action.

438.
4 39.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

442. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 23 (discussing a
lack of donor coordination in the arbitration field, and stating that the JRP will focus on creating a
combined donor strategy as it has in the legal education field).
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As well, domestic nongovernmental organizations can advance the rule of law
by exerting bottom-up pressures. Foreign donors in Mongolia have done a
formidable job at stimulating the role of domestic NGOs and increasing their
influence in communications with the Mongolian government.
The Asia Foundation's program on nongovernmental organizations aims to
expand and strengthen citizen decision-making and relationships between rural
NGOs, government and business to improve governance.443 In that regard The
Asia Foundation assisted in the passage of the NGO law, which has given
nongovernmental organizations a robust freedom to operate in Mongolian
society.444 As well, The Asia Foundation has supported the work of numerous
NGOs (primarily women's rights and family rights organizations) and citizen civic
outreach programs. 441
Specifically, The Foundation built the Center for Citizen Education, which
has a rural outreach program.446 It also has supported the Mongolian Women's
Lawyer's Association with technical assistance, in their efforts to develop a
judicial advocacy program to advance women's rights, by filing test cases in key
areas of discriminatory practices.447 Resultantly the Mongolian Women Lawyers
Association has raised public awareness of laws and regulations, published
handbooks on legal topics and undertaken legal training programs.448
V. POLICE, PROSECUTOR,

AND PRISON REFORMS

The police system, the state prosecution system, and the prison system all can
impact the rule of law. They principally affect meaningful access to justice and
procedural standards. These three systems should be reformed to prevent
interference with the establishment of a procedurally-minimalist rule of law.
Mongolia has not ignored these structures. Rather, Mongolia actively has been
reforming the police, the prosecutor's office and the prison system.
Prosecutor Reforms: The JRP assists the Office of the Prosecutor General. The
JRP formed a special prosecutor's office focusing on judicial corruption - the
General's Special Investigation Unit - which investigates crimes by justice sector
officials. 4 49 The JRP provided specialized training from a U.S. prosecutor with
experience in corruption, and provided equipment to the Prosecutor General.450
The JRP has been developing a joint procedural manual for prosecutors and
investigators, which will ensure compliance with international standards for human
rights and provide uniform implementation procedures and enhanced coordination
443. See THE ASIA FOUNDATION, STRENGTHENING MONGOLIA'S NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS (2000). See also THE ASIA FOUNDATION, WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
MONGOLIA (2000).
444. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supranote 162, at 1.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 38.

449. Judicial Reform Program, Ethics in the Legal Profession, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs
/jrp/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
450. Id.
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among justice sector institutions. As well, the JRP has begun to automate the
prosecutor's office to link the work of the prosecutors with the administration of
the judiciary.
Penitentiary Reforms: MFOS has worked in the criminal justice system, in support
of penitentiary training. MFOS is assisting the Penitentiary Department to
establish a long-term, sustainable training structure for corrections officers. In
addition, MFOS lends support to a pre-trial detention centers monitoring project
implemented by the Center for Human Rights and Development. 451 This project
investigates human rights abuses in detention centers and publicizes them to the
general public. MFOS has supported the establishment of community service
sentencing, which is a provision of the new Penal Code.452
Arrest and Detention Reforms: Many organizations, domestic and international,
work in the reformation of arrest and detention. The JRP assisted in developing
arrest and detention joint regulations, and then used these regulations to make
recommendations on the Criminal Procedure Code.453 UNDP also engaged in
arrest and detention reforms. As well, the National Human Rights Commission
made significant headway in securing the constitutional rights of those who are in
arrest and detention situations.454

4 5 1. Id.
452. Id.
453. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 2.

454. The National Human Rights Commission is beyond the scope of this work, but does affect the
rule of law in that it has helped to create fair procedural standards and meaningful access to justice. For
more information on this, see the National Human Rights Commission website, available at
http://www.nhrc-mn.org; the National Human Rights Status Report 2003, available at http://www.nhrcnu.org/docs/Annual2003StatusReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); and United Nations
Development Programme, UNDP Current Projects, Democratic Governance, Capacity Development of
the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia, http://www.undp.mn/dghr.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2010). The UNDP Capacity Development of the NHRC is also supported by NZAID. NZAID, New
Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency, http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-timorleste.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). This project provides technical assistance to the National Human
Rights Commission of Mongolia to enhance Mongolia's capacity to promote and protect human rights.
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Mongolia, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/AsiaNorth/Mongolia.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).

THIN ICE, SHIFTING GEOPOLITICS: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ARCTIC ICE MELT
Tessa Mendez*
INTRODUCTION

Navigators searched for a commercial sea route via the Arctic Sea for
centuries. In North America, this route was historically known as the Northwest
Passage, and generations of merchants and seamen sought the route because the
existence of such a passage would dramatically cut travel time and costs.1 Heavy
ice in the Arctic Ocean once prevented utilization of both the Northwest Passage
over the American continent and the Northern Sea Route over the Eurasian
continent. Today, this may be changing. Arctic ice naturally recedes every
summer when the region is exposed to long hours of sunlight, and the melting in
recent years has been considerably greater than historical averages. Due to rising
global temperatures, scientists project that the Arctic sea routes will open up to
seasonal shipping within the century.2
The melting ice will also facilitate access to the Arctic's lucrative natural
resources. Not only does the Arctic seabed have rich mineral deposits, but
geologists also believe large quantities of oil and natural gas lie beneath the Arctic
seabed. 3 As one expert has aptly noted, "[i]ronically, the great melt is likely to
yield more of the very commodities that precipitated it: fossil fuels." 4 The growing
pressure to discover diminishing supplies of oil and natural gas will likely entice
oil and gas companies to extract the resources that are predicted lie under the
Arctic sea.
Due to the hostility of the region, the Arctic expanse has been largely ignored
or forgotten throughout modem history. Because Arctic sovereignty has never
been completely determined or agreed upon, rights to the opening Arctic
passageways as well as the natural resources located under the water are sure to be
* University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected 2011; Editor in Chief of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 2010-2011. This paper was the winning submission in the 2009
Leonard V. B. Sutton international law writing competition. As part of the award, the author was
presented with a scholarship to attend the Hague Academy of International Law in the Netherlands
during the summer of 2010. I would like to thank Professor Nanda for leading our international law
program with unpretentious good humor. Additionally, I would like to thank my parents, friends, and
the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy who made this note possible.
1. Clifford Krauss, Steven L. Myers, Andrew C. Revkin & Simon Romero, As PolarIce Turns to
Water, Dreams of TreasureAbound, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Al.
2. Mark Jarashow, Michael B. Runnels, & Tait Svenson, Note, UNCLOS and the Arctic: the
Path ofLeast Resistance, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1587, 1587 (2007).
3. Scramblefor the Seabed, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009.
4. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global
Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63 (2008).
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contested in years to come.5 As a consequence, questions regarding the delineation
of territorial sovereignty that are largely settled in other areas of the world remain
contested in the Arctic. As states realize the value of the Arctic, they start to assert
and enforce their privileged claims of dominion. Within the last few years, the
international struggle for control of the Arctic's natural resources, navigational
capacity, and military opportunities have dramatically increased.6
International law has a vital role to play in resolving the unfolding dispute.
The provisions and definitions within the United Nations Convention on the Law
of Sea 7 ("UNCLOS" or "the Convention") provide critical guidance for Arctic
nations as they attempt to assert sovereignty claims. UNCLOS also establishes
dispute resolution mechanisms that could be used to determine ownership of Arctic
territory if countries cannot negotiate acceptable decisions. Moreover, although
not yet ratified by the United States, this Convention is largely seen as a
codification of customary international law. Therefore, UNCLOS should be
regarded as a primary resource for resolution of Arctic disagreements.
Sovereignty disputes reflect the geopolitical realities of the region.
Geopolitics is defined as the study of the influence of geography, history, and
social science with reference to spatial politics and patterns at various scales.8 The
geopolitical balance of power in the Arctic is radically changing as the geography
of the region undergoes massive transformation. Arctic geography has increasing
economic and strategic significance because the resources in the area are becoming
commercially available. Geopolitics, because it is preoccupied with borders,
resources, flows, territories, and identities, can provide a pathway for critical
analysis of future disputes.? Moreover, the interrelationship between power and
geography can be used as a tool to understand and anticipated trends in the
international law of the region. The changes in the Arctic have created a unique
situation, and the analysis that follows will provide an in-depth review of the
various legal claims.
This paper is divided into six parts. Part I gives background information
about how fast the ice is melting. The pace of the melt is important because visible
signs of warming pressures countries to assert claims on resources and navigable
regions. Part II highlights the importance of northern sea routes and is followed by
Part III outlining the mineral wealth in the region. Because mining and travel in
the Arctic will be both expensive and hazardous even after significant portions of
sea ice have melted, states seek to understand the dangers of the region to better
appreciate the costs and benefits of development. Part IV analyzes the law of
continental shelves and how countries are already utilizing this law to claim the sea
floor. Part V examines the laws that could affect the Northwest Passage and the
5. See Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic
Sovereignty, 9 CI. J. INT'L L. 323, 324 (2008).
6. Scramblefor the Seabed, supranote 3.
7. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
8. GEAROID

9. Id.

6 TAUTHAIL, CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 10

(1996).
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international use of the Arctic ocean over North America. Part VI concludes by
outlining potential resolutions to the Arctic dispute and projections about the
future.

I. How QUICKLY Is ARCTIC ICE MELTING?
Global warming is most dramatic in the Arctic. 10 In Alaska and western
Canada, average winter temperatures have increased by as much as seven degrees
Fahrenheit in the past 60 years." Scientists agree that atmospheric warming will
continue for years to come, and that this warming will significantly affect ice
coverage in the Arctic. Many experts believe the particularly sharp increase in
warming and melting throughout the last few decades can be attributed to both

human and natural causes.12 Because ice and snow are white, they have what is
known as a "high albedo" and reflect most solar energy.13 Albedo is a measure of
how strongly an object reflects light from sources such as the sun. Water is darker
and thus has a "low albedo" that absorbs most solar radiation. This creates a
condition known as a "positive feedback loop" and, as a consequence, the Arctic
region essentially amplifies any sort of warming trend. 14 The ocean exposed by
melting ice soaks up more heat, which melts more ice and exposes more sea.15 In
the most extreme scenario, the positive feedback loop could cause extreme
deterioration of Arctic sea ice, leaving the Arctic Ocean more like the Baltic Sea,
covered by only a thin layer of seasonal ice in the winter. 16 At the current pace of
retreat, trans-Arctic voyages could be possible within the next five to ten years, but
it remains extremely difficult to make an accurate prediction. 17
Arctic ice is melting at a much faster rate than scientists originally projected.
According to satellite images from the European Space Agency, the year 2007
showed the lowest Arctic sea ice levels on record.18 The ice was so sparse that, for
the first time in recorded history, the Northwest Passage was fully clear of ice. 19
While the Northern Sea Route, a similar sea passage over the Siberian coast,
remained blocked by a large mass of ice, the Northern Sea Route is predicted to
open at approximately the same time as the Northwest Passage. 20 Experts at the
National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) in Boulder, Colorado, noted that this
significant transformation in Arctic geography occurred 30 years ahead of what

10. Borgerson, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. Andrew Revkin, No Escape: Thaw Gains Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at Fl.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Borgerson, supra note 4.
18. John Roach, Arctic Melt Opens up Northwest Passage,NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept.
17, 2007,
available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/09/070917-northwestpassage.html.
19. Id.
20. Press Release, National Snow and Ice Data Center, Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous
Record Lows (Oct. 1 2007) available at http://www.nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum
/20071001_pressrelease.html.
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had been predicted.2 1 Scientists are exploring several theories that may explain the
mismatch between observations and climate models. The models may have
assumed sea ice levels to be thicker than they actually are, they may lack a key
dynamic in ocean circulation patterns, or they may underestimate the effects of the
feedback loop. 22
Anthropogenic climate change will continue to affect the geography of the
Arctic. Because geography shapes political power, the human struggle over
borders, space, and authority in the Arctic will only increase in years to come.23
As the physical landscape of the Arctic shifts, the landscape of human control
shifts too. Not surprisingly, Arctic countries are scrambling to exert control over
this potentially critical region.
II. WHY Do NORTHERN SEA ROUTES MATTER?

Northern sea routes provide economic, strategic, and political advantages.
This section will analyze how an ice free Arctic tempts international shippers and
traders with the promise of large cost reductions. It will also examine some of the
concerns associated with shipping in this delicate and dangerous region. The
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage could assist international trade by
cutting existing transit times by days, and would save shipping companies
thousands of miles in travel.24 The current route from Rotterdam and Yokohama
through the Suez Canal stretches 11,200 nautical miles. 25 The Northern Sea Route
could reduce the sailing distance to only 6,500 nautical miles, saving more than 40
percent.26 Likewise, the Northwest Passage could cut a voyage from Seattle to
Rotterdam by 2,000 nautical miles, making it nearly 25 percent shorter than the
current route, through the Panama Canal.27
International business would also be profoundly affected by Arctic ice melt.
Taking into account canal fees, fuel costs, and other variables that determine
freight rates, the shortcuts over the top of the world could cut the cost of a single
voyage of a large container ship by as much as 20 percent, from approximately
$17.5 million to $14 million. 28 The savings would be even greater for the
megaships that cannot fit through the Panama and Suez Canals and must currently
29
sail around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn.
Moreover, these Arctic
routes would also allow commercial and military vessels to avoid sailing through
politically unstable Middle Eastern waters and the pirate plagued waters off the
coast of Somalia and in the South China Sea.30

21. Roach, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. 0 TAUTHAIL, supranote 8, at 10.
24. Borgerson, supra note 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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These advantages have led many leaders and intellectuals to reconsider the
value of the Arctic; an inherently geopolitical process. Geopoliticians argue that
the world is actively 'spacialized,' divided up, labeled, and sorted out into a
hierarchy of places of greater and lesser importance.31 States then express their
sovereignty by enforcing property rights over the areas of importance. As Arctic
countries increasingly understand the significance of the northern reaches, they
become anxious to possess them.
Arctic interest is somewhat tempered, however, by the significant drawbacks
of Northern Sea routes. Not only will the Arctic remain covered in ice throughout
the winter, but thick, multi-year ice will remain prevalent for some time to come.32
As opposed to first-year ice that is usually 3 feet thick and formed over a single
winter, multi-year ice can be over 16 feet thick and sharp enough to cut through the
hull of a ship. 33 Models have shown that the melting of first-year ice will annually
open the Northwest Passage, but the melt may also clear the way for large pieces
of multi-year ice to drift down from the North Canadian Archipelago.34 This
multi-year ice can be exceptionally dangerous. One study showed that multi-year
ice accounted for 74 percent of the damage suffered by ships traveling in the
Canadian Arctic between 1976 and 2007.35 Therefore, if shippers ever attempt to
take advantage of the passages, they will have to employ significant precautions.
In order to navigate these dangerous, opening sea-lanes, many of the world's
shipyards are building ships with fortified hulls.36 The lure of the Northern Sea
Route and Northwest Passage are driving the development and construction of new
types of ships, such as a double-ended tanker that can cruise bow first through
open water and then tum around and proceed stem first to break through ice. 7
Russia has already acquired fourteen ice-breakers for its fleet, and many American
naval specialists now say the two ice-breakers currently owned by the United
States are grossly inadequate. 38 The very act of purchasing ice-breakers reveals
interest in the region, and demonstrates future intentions.
III. WHAT ARE THE PROJECTED NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE ARCTIC?

Open and accessible sea lanes are not the only valuable commodity that an
ice-free Arctic Ocean offers. This part of the paper will analyze the natural
resources of the Arctic. Importantly, the technology and infrastructure needed to
utilize these resources has not yet been developed. Nevertheless, these resources

31. JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD POLITICS 2-3 (2d ed. 2003) (1998).

32. See Peter Tyson, Future of the Passage, NOVA, Feb. 2006, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/nova/arctic/passage.html.
33. Anne Casselman, Will the Opening of the Northwest Passage Transform Global Shipping
Anytime Soon?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm
?id=opening-of-northwest-passage.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
37. Id.

38. Andrew Revkin, Experts Urge U.S. to IncreaseIcebreakerFleet in Arctic Waters, N.Y. TIMES
Aug. 17, 2008 at AO.
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have generated the most excitement about the Arctic, and may generate future
conflict. The Arctic may be the next, and probably the last, great energy frontier.39
Scientists estimate the resources in the Arctic account for about 22 percent of the
undiscovered, technically recoverable hydrocarbon resources in the world.40
Typically, "undiscovered" resources are those which have not been measured or
even fully identified, but are marked by some degree of geological assurance.41
"Technically recoverable resources" are those resources producible using currently
42
available technology and industry practices.
Scientists in the American
government believe that 90 billion barrels of oil and vast amounts of natural gas
may lie beneath the Arctic Ocean.43 This quantity of oil would sufficiently the
meet current world demand for approximately three years.44 With such huge
potential profits at stake, the race has begun among Arctic nations for control of
the resources in areas once considered too harsh to explore. As fuel prices become
extremely volatile, the possibility of oil and natural gas reserves in the Arctic takes
on added geopolitical significance. Because politically unstable Middle Easter
countries currently possessed the majority of fuel resources, Arctic nations may
fight to possess oil and natural gas in the region and achieve energy independence.
While scientists begin to gain a better understanding of the resources in the
Arctic, the exact locations of those resources remain relatively unknown. About
84 percent of the estimated resources are expected to be offshore. 45 A third of the
undiscovered oil, or about 30 billion barrels, is believed to be off the coast of
Alaska while nearly two-thirds of the undiscovered natural gas resources are in two
Russian provinces, the West Siberian Basin and the East Barents Basin.46 Many
countries - including the United States - have scrambled to launch geological
survey missions to better understand and assert their claims.47 The imprecise
boundaries in the Arctic have made the ownership of off-shore Arctic resources
ambiguous. If the majority of the Arctic oil and natural gas can be found in
territorial waters, long-term conflict is less likely to occur. At this point, however,
the lack of certainty and the huge economic potential of the oil and gas reserves
add to tensions between Arctic nations.
Oil and natural gas are not the only resources likely to be found in the Arctic
- valuable minerals may also exist on the seabed. Scientists have long known
about unconventional mineral ore deposits known as manganese nodules. These
nodules are spherical accretions of manganese, cobalt, copper and nickel which

39. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
40. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet
of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic (Jul. 23, 2008), available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/
article.asp?ID= 1980&from-rsshome.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Scramblefor the Seabed, supra note 3.
44. Jad Mouawad, Oil Survey Says Arctic has Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2008, at CO.
45. U.S. Geological Survey, supranote 40.
46. Mouawad, supranote 44.
47. U.S. Geological Survey, supranote 40.
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precipitate out of sea water at depth.48 They form when warm solutions of
dissolved metals from the earth's crust leach into cold ocean waters, and they are
found on roughly a quarter of the ocean floor. 49 Recovering the nodules can be
technically difficult. The nodules are usually found under at least 2 miles of water
and dredging them stirs large quantities of sediment which seriously disrupts
marine habitat.5 0
Thus, excitement surrounding the minerals has calmed
significantly since the 1970's.51 Not only must the technology become cheaper
and more widely available, but industrial commodity prices must also remain high
to make manganese nodules profitable.52
Because the Arctic can be relatively unstable and much remains unknown
about specific conditions, environmental issues surround all forms of resource
extraction in the region. Concerns about onshore resources, such as the oil in
Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, have dominated debates about Arctic
development in the United States up to this point.53 However, in the future most
resources will likely be discovered offshore. Arctic development will surely create
environmental consequences. The United States Coast Guard has already begun to
prepare for the time when tanker and other ship traffic increases in the area, taking
precautionary steps to deal with an inevitable oil spill. 54 Russia, on the other hand,
has taken very few steps to prevent and manage oil spills. For the entire Barents
region, Russia has only two bases with the equipment necessary to fight an oil spill
while Norway has at least 50 bases of this kind. 5 Any oil spill occurring in the
Arctic will take longer to dissipate because the waves are not as strong in the
region and natural decomposition occurs slowly in colder temperatures. 56
Therefore, even as countries look to the Arctic to supplement declining oil
reserves, environmental security may become an issue that divides countries as
well.
Geopolitics is inherently tied to resource use and control. The Arctic, as
relatively virgin territory, lacks the geopolitical stability that has been established
in most other areas of the world. The fact that the geography itself is in flux adds
to the instability of the region. Countries will jockey for position until an effective
legal regime is established in the area.
IV. WHAT

Is THE

LAW OF CONTINENTAL SHELVES?

As global pressures on resources inevitably increase, contested Arctic
sovereignty claims beg resolution. International law of the sea will be an essential
tool in resolving debates. This section begins with a brief history of maritime law,
48. Scramblefor the Seabed, supra note 3.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Borgerson, supra note 4.
54. Andrew Revkin A Little Oil Goes a Long Way, Dot Earth Blog, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2008,
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/a-little-oil-goes-a-long-way/?apage=9.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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followed by an examination of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and how the Commission of Continental Shelves may be the body used to
determine resource rights.
These analyses reveal the importance of the
Commission of Continental Shelves and UNCLOS, and suggest that it is
imperative for the United States to ratify this treaty to protect its national interests.
A. HistoricMaritime Law
In 1608, Hugo Grotius published a short treatise arguing that the world's
oceans constitute a common resource belonging to all states.
This proposition
became known as the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine and still forms the basis of
modem maritime law." Grotius supported his argument with the premise that the
ocean was so large and inexhaustible that rival countries could simultaneously
carry out the major activities of fishing and navigation without incident.5 9
Unfortunately, Grotius' premise did not hold true post-industrialization, and the
world's oceans have become vulnerable to overuse. 60 The high seas have become
subject to the tragedy of the commons.61 In this context, the tragedy of the
commons is represented by multiple states acting independently and ultimately
spoiling large portions of the ocean through over-fishing, resource exploitation,
and pollution. 62 The Arctic region, with its fragile environment, seems particularly
susceptible to the tragedy of the commons, especially if sovereignty rights remain
unresolved.
International law of the sea evolved dramatically throughout the twentieth
century as technology developed and the problems associated with overuse
expanded. Historically, nations could only exert rights over the ocean for three
nautical miles (nm) beyond their geographic territory, but this standard began to
shift in the beginning of the twentieth century as countries sought to extend their
territories to include mineral deposits and fishing rights. In 1945, President
Truman extended the United States' control to all resources on the continental
shelf using the customary international law principle of resource protection.63 Also
in the latter part of the 1940's, several countries extended their control to 200 nm
beyond their land territory to cover productive fishing grounds.64 Both the 200
nautical mile boundary and continental shelf sovereignty have become part of
modem law.65

57. Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberian (Ralph Van Deman, trans., Oxford 2001) (1916).
58. Rebecca Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits of
InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 213, 219 (2001).
59. Id.
60. Id. at216-17.
61. See Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968).
62. Id.
63. Policy of the United States With Respect to the NaturalResources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed
of the ContinentalShelf Proclamation No. 2667 (Sept 28, 1945), reprinted in 1945 Pub. Papers 150,
150 (nullified by the Outer Continental ShelfLand Acts, 43 USC § 1331 et. seq. (2000)).
64. Bratspies, supranote 58, at 222.
65. See UNCLOS, supra note 7, art. 57, 76.
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Toward the latter half of the twentieth century, resources heavily contested,
and thus nautical disagreements, became more frequent. There was a general call
for the codification of international maritime law, so negotiations began on the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1973. The Convention was
designed to resolve international nautical disputes 66 and to set aside the resources
of the high seas as the common heritage of mankind.67 UNCLOS is sometimes
considered the "constitution of the oceans," due to its expansive nature. 68
UNCLOS governs nearly every aspect of maritime law, including sovereignty
limits, navigation, seabed mining, and environmental protection.69 Moreover it
provides a legal framework for resolving ocean-related disputes, which may make
it an appropriate organization to deal with the Arctic conflict. While the United
States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, it has become generally accepted worldwide
and recognized as a codification of customary international law. To understand
how UNCLOS may apply to the Arctic, the following provides a brief description
of the terminology and access rights associated with coastal zones described in
UNCLOS.
B. UNCLOS and ContinentalShelves
Despite the United States' non-ratification, the expansive nature of UNCLOS
and its general acceptance make this treaty a prime candidate for adjudicating
sovereign claims and natural resource disputes in the Arctic. UNCLOS creates a
general structure of maritime control for coastal states all over the world.
UNCLOS codified customary international law by granting states the most control
over the waters closest to its shore or "baseline."7 0 A state can exercise less
control over areas found further from its land territory. In general, a state can
exercise its sovereignty 200 nm from its baseline.
This area is known as the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights
over all natural resources within that boundary - including oil and natural gas
reserves.72 UNCLOS allows states to extend their exclusive economic zone
beyond 200 nm only if they can demonstrate that the continental shelf beyond their
coastline extends further.73
UNCLOS defines the continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land
territory to the continental margin's outer edge.74 So long as the shelf extends at
least 100nm from the point at which the sea reaches a depth of 2.5km - known as
the 2500 meter isobath - a country may be granted rights over the natural resources

66. Id. at Preamble.
67. Id. art. 150.
68. UNCLOS is often commonly referred to as the "constitution of the oceans." See e.g., John T.
Swing, What Futurefor the Oceans?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS Sept. 2003 at 139.
69. See UNCLOS, supra note 7.
70. See discussion of internal waters and the Northwest Passage, infra.
71. UNCLOS, supranote 7, arts. 56, 57.
72. Id.
73. Id. arts. 76, 77.
74. Id.art. 76.
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on and under the seabed up to 350 nautical miles from land. 5 This provision
allows coastal states to extract oil and natural gas on the continental shelves, to the
exclusion of others.
Because it can be difficult to decipher the geologic structures of the
continental shelf, UNCLOS created a specific body to examine claims. This body,
known as the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,
meets every two years.76 While this Commission may provide specific proposals
to the countries that submit claims, UNCLOS describes the role of the Commission
of the Continental Shelf as 'recommendatory' only.
Coastal states have the
liberty to establish their boundaries on the basis of the Commission's
suggestions. 8 Countries have ten years to submit claims to the body after
ratification of UNCLOS. 7 9 Five countries have territory within the Arctic Circle:
the United States (via Alaska), Russia, Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), and
Norway. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, and so has not yet established a ten
year deadline. Russia ratified the Convention in 1997, making 2009 the last
session during which it could bring claims.o Canada ratified UNCLOS in 2003
and Denmark in 2004, so both of these countries have some years before they must
submit their final claims. Norway ratified the Convention in 1996, and submitted
a claim to the Commission on Continental Shelves in 2006.82
The Commission on Continental Shelves has already reviewed Norway's
submission and in 2009, the Commission approved Norway's 146,000 square mile
claim.83 One small section, known as the Loophole, overlaps with a previous
Russian claim.84 When the Commission approved Norway's claim, it stated that it
was up to Norway to resolve any disputed areas through negotiation.
Because
the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS, it cannot bring claims before the
commission and no representatives sit on the advisory board.
Russia has aggressively asserted its sovereignty in the region since its
ratification of UNCLOS in 1997. In 2001, Russia was the first Arctic nation to
bring a submission before the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf.86 In this claim, Russia sought ownership of approximately 460,000 square
miles of the continental shelf; an area roughly the size of the states of California,
75. Id.
76. Id. Annex II.
77. Id.
78. See David A. Colson, The Delimitationof the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring
States, 97 A.J.I.L. 91, 93 (2003).
79. UNCLOS, supranote 7, at Annex art. 4.
80. Holmes, supranote 5, at 331.
8 1. Id.
82. UN Backs Norway claim to Arctic Seabed Extension, CALGARY HERALD, Apr. 15, 2009,
available at http://www.calgaryherald.com/technology/backs+Norway+claim+Arctic+seabed+exten
sion/1499675/story.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Borgerson, supra note 4.

2010

THIN ICE, SHIFTING GEOPOLITICS

537

Indiana, and Texas combined.8 7 This 2001 claim included the North Pole.8 8 The
UN Commission neither rejected nor accepted the Russian proposal, but
recommended the country undertake additional research.89
In the summer of 2007, Russia sent a team of scientists in one of its nuclear
powered ice-breakers to survey the Arctic region and plant the Russian flag on the
seabed beneath the North Pole. 90 While the submersible was planting the flag, it
also took samples from the sea floor. 91 From these geologic samples, Russia
argued the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain ridge that runs underneath
the North Pole, and the Mendeleev Ridge, were natural extensions of the Eurasian
continent.92
Russia submitted these findings to the UN Commission on
Continental Shelves in May of 2009.93
What did Russia argue in its submission to the Commission? Under the
Convention, a state must demonstrate that an underwater structure is a geologic
extension of the land territory. Thus, Russia would have to establish that the
Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges were not "oceanic ridges," defined in the
Convention as free-standing geologic structures separated from the continental
shelf.94 Therefore, Russia would have to demonstrate that the Lomonosov and
Mendeleev Ridges were "submarine elevations that are natural components of the
continental margin." 95 If Russia is successful in its claims, then the 200 nm EEZ
outer limit would be removed, allowing Russia to extend its EEZ to 350 nm or the
end of the continental shelf.96
While Canada and Denmark have not yet submitted a claim to the
Commission on Continental Shelves, Canadian and Danish scientists claim to have
proof that the Lomonosov Ridge is actually a natural extension of the North
American continent. 97 The culminating research - the product of millions of
dollars of contributions from both governments - was presented at the 2008
International Geological Congress.98 These two countries hope that the geologic
87. Id.
88. Press Release, UN Commission on Continental Shelves, Commission on Continental Shelves
Receives its First Submission: Russian Federation First to Move to Establish Outer Limits on its
Extended Continental Shelf (12/21/2001) available at http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2001
/seal729.doc.htm. Mark Benitah, Russia's Claim in the Arctic, and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in
UNCLOS, 11 A.S.I.L. 27 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Yuri Zarakhovich, Russia Claims the North Pole, TIMES, Jul. 12, 2007.
91. Id.
92. Benitah, supranote 88.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also UNCLOS supra note 7, art. 76. ("The continental margin comprises the
submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of
the shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the
subsoil thereof.").
95. Benitah, supranote 88.
96. Id.
97. Randy Boswell, Canada to Make GroundbreakingArctic Claim, NATIONAL POST, Aug. 6,
2008, available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=705136.
98. Id.
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research will give them grounds to support territorial claims to the Commission on
Continental Shelves. These two nations must submit their final submissions by
2013 and 2014 respectively.
Canada has been strengthening its claims of sovereignty over the continental
shelf in other ways as well. In 2002, Canada began patrolling the most remote
reaches of the Arctic with army rangers. 99 In response to Russia's symbolic
flagging of the Arctic sea floor, Canada added eight new ice-breakers to its fleet,
built a new deep-water port, reopened a closed air force base, and started a "cold
weather" army training facility. 100 The Canadian military recently launched a
satellite system that will allow surveillance of the Arctic as far as 1,000 miles
offshore.o
Bill Graham, the Canadian defense minister, exemplified the
aggressive Canadian posture when he said: "I don't see the Northwest Passage as
something for another 20 years, but at the rate of present global warming, we know
that it will be within 20 years and we have to get ahead now." 102 Canada aims to
not only tighten control of its territory, but also establish a strong posture for future
disputes over the ownership of the continental shelf and the Northwest Passage.
These widely varied country positions make it clear that more geologic
evidence must be acquired before this issue can be settled decisively. While the
Commission on Continental Shelf is in the best position to delimit boundaries, the
Commission has received dozens of pending claims from countries claiming
continental shelves all over the world. Some argue the Commission on
Continental Shelves has become overburdened with work in the past couple of
years. 103 The Commission may not be able to resolve the nature and ownership of
the Lomonososov Ridge and the area around the North Pole for some time to
come. Therefore, even though it is my belief that the Commission on Continental
Shelves would provide the best resolution to the problems of the region, Arctic
countries have incentives to scrutinize alternative methods of settling disputes.
V. WHAT Is THE LAW REGARDING STRAITS AND PASSAGES?

As mentioned previously, under the UNCLOS regime, states can exert the
most control over the waters closest to shore. This section will analyze the various
legal standards and levels of control associated with the maritime zones
immediately surrounding coastal states. This section focuses on the classification
of the maritime zone containing the Northwest Passage, because its categorization
may affect the ability of international shippers and merchants to traverse the waters
above Canada. It is important to note that the analysis to follow would not apply
to the waters above Russia. The Northern Sea Route is completely within Russian

99. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
100. Arctic Patrol Ship Purchase Met with Skepticism, CBC NEWS, Jul. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/07/10/north-shipreax.html.
101. Borgerson, supra note 4.
102. Krauss et al., supranote 1.
103. Nathanial Gronewold, A Peek Inside the U.N 's ContinentalShelf Commission, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2009.
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control, which is significant because many models demonstrate the Northern Sea
Route opening before the Northwest Passage does.
Each coastal zone is measured from a carefully defined baseline most often
located at the shore or low-water line. UNCLOS recognizes "internal waters" as
all waterways on the landward side of baseline. 104 These waterways basically
function as a continuation of a country's land territory. The coastal state may set
laws, regulate use, exploit resources, and maintain absolute control over internal
waters.105 UNCLOS defines "territorial waters" as the coastal area up to 12 miles
from baseline. 106 The state retains the right to set laws, regulate use, and draw on
any resource. Foreign vessels, however, have a the right of "innocent passage"
through these waters, which this means a foreign vessel can safely traverse
territorial waters but cannot fish, pollute, fire weapons, or spy. 107 "Archipelagic
waters" under the UNCLOS, are considered a hybrid of internal and territorial
waters. An archipelagic baseline can be drawn between the outermost points of the
outermost islands, so long as the points are sufficiently close to one another.108
Archipelagic waters are like internal waters in that the state can exercise full
sovereignty, but foreign vessels have right of innocent passage - similar to
territorial waters. 109
Canada has claimed sovereignty over many of the islands in the Arctic sea,
and argues that these islands create archipelagic waters under UNCLOS. 110 If
these claims are upheld, then experts believe that Canada may be able to assert
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and thus regulate its use - which could
include the imposition of usage fees. 1 The United States disputes Canada's claim
to exclusive sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.112 The United States holds
the position that the northern islands of Canada may constitute archipelagic waters,
but contends that the Northwest Passage is actually an international strait under
UNCLOS, and thus cannot be subjected to Canada's restrictive control.
If the Northwest Passage is classified as an international strait, then ships
could freely to travel the route without Canadian control. International straits are
defined as internationally trafficked waterways that connect oceans and economic
zones through several viable routes. 1 13 While the Northwest Passage connects
oceans through numerous viable routes, Canada argues the route should fall under
its exclusive sovereignty because it has never been "internationally trafficked."1 1 4
104. UNCLOS, supranote 7, arts. 5, 8.
105. Id. art. 2.
106. Id. art. 3.
107. Id. arts. 17-19.
108. Id. art. 47.
109. Id. arts. 47-53.
110. Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reassessment, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 332 (1993).
111. See Jarashow, Runnels, & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1600-01.
112. Rothwell, supra note 110, at 332.
113. Jarashow, Runnels, & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1605. See also UNCLOS, supra note 7, art.
37.
114. Jarashow, Runnels, & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1605-1607.
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Since 1903, when the first transit of the Northwest Passage was made, less than
fifty transits have been completed.1 15 Non-Canadian vessels made only sixteen of
these transits and few were for commercial use. 116 Even though the number of
completed transits may rise exponentially in the future, at this point Canada claims
primary usage.
The United States has not accepted Canada's efforts to
conclusively establish exclusive sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Instead,
the United States argues the Northwest Passage should not be subject to the
exclusive sovereignty of one state. 117 However, the United States has not ratified
the Convention, thus hampering the utility of any of the potential dispute
resolution mechanisms discussed below.
VI. How

WILL ARCTIC NATIONS RESOLVE DISPUTES
SHELVES AND THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE?

OVER CONTINENTAL

International dispute resolution is controversial and tenuous. There are few
enforcement mechanisms and states are often unwilling to bind themselves to
unsavory decisions.
Nevertheless, this section will analyze various legal
frameworks within the international sphere that could be used to resolve the Arctic
disputes. UNCLOS will be addressed first, followed by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") and the continental shelf cases that have already been decided by
this body. The Arctic Council and the rights of indigenous peoples will be
examined next and the benefits of an Arctic Treaty will be treated last. While this
aspect of the paper will focus on the more binding forms of dispute resolution, it is
worth remembering that non-binding decisions are the norm in the international
sphere. Thus, "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means" 1 8

may be a more realistic, efficient, and effective means of resolving Arctic disputes.
A. InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea
Article 83 of the UNCLOS instructs countries with opposite or adjacent
coasts that have submitted overlapping claims to the UN Commission on
Continental Shelves to agree upon a boundary. 119 If the countries cannot reach an
agreement within a "reasonable period of time," then Article 83 directs them to
resort to the remedial provisions of UNCLOS. 120 UNCLOS recognizes that
dispute resolution within the international sphere can be complex, and so the
Convention offers a variety of resolution options. UNCLOS indicates a strong
preference for peaceful resolution of disputes, and provides that countries should
first try to settle disputes informally. 12 1 If the two parties are unable to settle a
dispute on their own, UNCLOS suggests a range of forums. UNCLOS directly

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1610.
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Rothwell, supra note 110, at 332.
U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1.
UNCLOS, supranote 7, art. 83.
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sponsors the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but also allows parties
to access the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal. 122
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has 21 member judges. 123
Thus far, it has decided 16 cases.124 The Tribunal has jurisdiction over all disputes
submitted to it in accordance with the Convention. 125 It also extends to all matters
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the
Tribunal. Notably, Article 298 allows nations to opt out of the binding dispute
resolution provisions for disputes that arise under Article 83.126 All Arctic nations
except Norway have exercised this option.127 This is not surprising given the
general distaste for binding dispute resolution in international law, and this fact
should not be read to undermine the effectiveness of the Tribunal. The Tribunal
could still act as an arbitral body or issue an advisory opinion, presenting a
121
valuable opportunity for compromise among Arctic nations.
B. InternationalCourt ofJustice
The International Court of Justice has decided three major overlapping
continental shelf disputes since its inception in 1946, and could act as to resolve
the current Arctic disputes over sovereignty of the Arctic sea floor and the
resources that may lie below. 129
The ICJ applied UNCLOS customary
international law provisions on continental shelves in Tunisia v. Libya1 30 and Libya
v Malta.131 The well known North Sea Continental Shelf Case1 32 was decided in
1969, before UNCLOS was drafted, but this case also dealt with similar issueS.133
However, as the ICJ noted in Libya v. Malta, even as the UNCLOS esteems a goal
of equitable solutions, it offers little guidance in achieving those solutions. 134
Because the language of the Convention is unclear, the ICJ may draw on other
international law principles-such as the equidistant principle, natural
prolongation principle, historical practice, and sector theory-to give UNCLOS
provisions context in an Arctic dispute decisions.
The equidistant principle has a strong history in customary law. Before
UNCLOS, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf provided that
continental shelf disputes for countries with opposite or adjacent coasts should be
decided by drawing a median line between the two coasts, unless the countries
122. Id. art. 287.
123. Id. Annex VI art. 2.
124. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, http://www.itlos.org/start2 en.html (last visited
Jan. 17, 2010).
125. Id.
126. UNCLOS, supranote 7, art. 298.
127. Holmes, supranote 5, at 325.
128. UNCLOS, supranote 7, art. 191
129. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 5, at 340-41.
130. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 63 at 25-26 [hereinafter Tunis. v. Libya].
131. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 3 (June 3) [hereinafter Libya v. Malta].
132. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. Den. v. F.R.G. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 2 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter
North Sea].
133. See id.
134. Libya v. Malta at 37-39.
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came to another agreement or special circumstances required a different
arrangement. 135 This method of demarcation was used in the North Sea
ContinentalShelf Cases but rejected in Tunisia v. Libya.13 6 Originally, the method
often came under strong attack for being arbitrary because "special circumstances"
could preempt its use.137 However, the principle has grown more widely accepted
over time. An analysis based on the equidistant principle would likely favor
Canada's interests in the Arctic - at the expense of the United States. Canada
argues the Alaskan border should be demarcated as a straight continuation from the
land border on the coast. This method would allow Canada to claim a portion of
the Beaufort Sea that is predicted to be rich in natural resources.13 8
The United States argues that the Alaskan maritime border should follow the
landform in a continuous northeasterly line.13 9 This argument seems to be a
variation on the natural prolongation principle - or the principle that a nation's
maritime boundaries should reflect the 'natural prolongation' of the land territory
where reaches the coast. The meaning and application of the natural prolongation
principle has evolved over time as well. When the doctrine was first used, its
relationship to the 1958 Geneva Convention was far from clear. 140 The Court
began to expand and clarify both the equidistant principle and the natural
prolongation doctrine in Libya v. Malta.14 1 Libya argued that the natural
prolongation of the land territory into and under the sea was fundamental to the
juridical concept of the continental shelf.142 The Court, however, disagreed. This
was the first case decided after the adoption of UNCLOS, and the Court
completely set aside the relevance of natural prolongations.143 Instead, the Court
noted the significance of the 200nm exclusive economic zone described in the
access rights of the UNCLOS, and disregarded the geological or geomorphological
characteristics of the sea floor.144 Since the time of Libya v. Malta, however, the
law and practice of maritime delimitation has matured and natural prolongations
are often considered today when determining continental shelf access rights.
Countries coming before the ICJ may also try to bolster their claims with
evidence of historical use. 145 While Tunisia successfully made this argument in
Tunisia v Libya, Tunisia had an eighty year historical practice of fishing in the
contested area. 14 6 In that case, the Court noted that historical rights and the

135. Holmes, supranote 5, at 344.
136. North Sea at 5. See also Tunis. v. Libya at 25-26.
137. Colson, supranote 78, at 99-100.
138. WALTER B. PARKER & JOHN H. BYRNE, SEA CHANGES: PERSPECTIVES ON ALASKA'S FUTURE
UNDER PENDING UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE FINDINGS OF THE
UNITED STATES OCEANS COMMISSION REPORT 3 (2004).
139. Id.
140. Colson, supranote 78, at 100.
141. Libya v. Malta at 23-24, 45-46.
142. Id. at 40.
143. Colson, supranote 78, at 91.
144. Id. at 100.
145. Holmes, supranote 5, at 342.
146. Tunis. v. Libya at 134-35.
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continental shelf are governed by distinct legal regimes. 147 As noted previously,
the Arctic has generated very little interest historically; the region has largely been
left to indigenous people who call the region home.
Various Arctic countries may also try to assert coastline proportionality, a
method of delimitation used in Libya v. Malta.148 In the Arctic, coastline
proportionality could be advanced by calling on "sector theory," a historic method
of claiming territory around the poles. Under sector theory, a country may assert
sovereignty over a pie-shaped wedge formed by extending lines of longitude from
its coast to the pole. 149 Russia and Canada have both been strong proponents of
sector theory, arguing that the ocean within each nation's sector becomes internal
waters subject to their exclusive control. 5 o The United States has historically
opposed sector theory, as Alaska represents a narrow shoreline and sector theory
tends to favor those countries with the longest coastlines. 51 This method of
demarcation does not require geologic evidence gathering from deep-sea ridges,
and will provide each Arctic country an expansion in territory.
While the ICJ has some experience dealing with continental shelf issues, nonbinding dispute resolution is the norm in the international sphere. However, even
if the parties choose to act outside the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
or the International Court of Justice, UNCLOS would still probably apply.
UNCLOS has gained almost universal ratification, and those countries that remain
as hold-outs recognize the Convention as a codification of customary international
law. Thus, an international arbitral tribunal or mediator would almost certainly use
UNCLOS if the Arctic nations chose a non-binding resolution process.
C. Arctic Council
The Arctic Council is another forum that could offer resolution to Arctic
territorial disputes. The Ottawa Declaration formally established the Arctic
Council in 1996 as an international body designed to deal with problems in the
region, but currently it only addresses issues of sustainable development and
environmental protection. 152 Part of the reason for its silence on the most pressing
concerns is a 1996 prohibition made by the United States that prevents the group
from addressing security concerns, a prohibition that has thus far prevented the
Arctic Council from addressing territorial demarcation of the region.153 If the
charter were reconstructed, however, the Arctic Council might prove a powerful
tool in the creation of a new standard for the Arctic region. One of the major
advantages of utilizing this international group is the consideration the Arctic
Council already gives to the indigenous people of the region - including the
Aleuts, Inuits, and Saami. 15 4 The Arctic has a population of over four million
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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people, including more than thirty different indigenous groups.15 5 The people who
currently live in the Arctic and have roots going back centuries deserve to have
their opinions incorporated into future decisions. If indigenous people have a
voice in the decision-making process, then they will be more likely to support
policies and aid scientists with their ability to detect early or unnoticed impacts of
climate change. 156 Thus, the concerns of indigenous people should be considered
in any attempted resolution, whether through the Arctic Council or otherwise.
D. Arctic Treaty
The conflicts surrounding arctic resources and sea routes could also be
resolved through treaty. A treaty could adjudicate sovereignty, postpone territorial
disputes, and foster cooperation amongst signatories. One option is a limited treaty
involving the North American countries. The other option is an expansive treaty
involving all Arctic nations. In the wake of the aggressive Russian maneuvering
that took place in 2007, some called for the United States, Canada, and
Denmark/Greenland to enter into a limited trilateral treaty that would exercise joint
jurisdiction over any potential North American Arctic shipping. 157 This treaty
could be designed to counteract Russian control over the region, and would allow
the free passage of vessels from the United States through the Northwest Passage.
A treaty such as this could enact a policy that would allow countries to share
responsibility for policing the Arctic waters as well as protecting the fragile Arctic
environment. 1'
Specific provisions within the treaty could be used to
administrate the division of resources such as oil and natural gas. Moreover, a
treaty of this kind would offset or even stop Russian expansionism and afford
Canada and Greenland protection under the United States' military. However, a

limited treaty such as this would contain drawbacks. Excluding Russia would
leave measure of oversight for Russian use of the Arctic. Therefore, most experts
advocate a multilateral treaty among all Arctic nations rather than the more limited
trilateral treaty.
Multilateral treaties have already proved to be an effective way of resolving
territorial disputes similar to the Arctic controversy. For 50 years, the 1959
Antarctic Treaty has regulated the sovereignty disagreements that previously
plagued the southern polar region and has preserved the region as a global
commons area. 159 The success of the Antarctic Treaty is often attributed to its
expansive membership. The Antarctic Treaty quickly became a legitimate
document because twelve major powers ratified it immediately after its creation. 160
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Since its inception, more than 40 states have ratified the Antarctic treaty, thus
cementing its goal of promoting peace and science.
The Arctic and the Antarctic nations share four common goals: continued
scientific investigation, preservation of territorial sovereignty, national security,
and environmental protection. 16 1 In Antarctica, these goals have been achieved
through the unique provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.162 Article IV
suspended all territorial rights to the Antarctic, but also stated that signing the
Treaty did not represent "a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of
any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica." 163 Part 2 of Article IV
also states no country may make new claims of territorial sovereignty while the
treaty is in force. 164 The treaty has been successful because no party has been
allowed to advance their claims, but at the same time no party has been forced to
renounce their claims.
Article IV has undoubtedly been essential to the Antarctic Treaty, and if an
Arctic Treaty were created, the decision to include a similar clause would be a
major and controversial choice. While the suspension of territorial rights in the
Arctic may protect the environment, the countries in the region may hesitate to
give up their claims on hydrocarbon fuels. Some critics argue the differences
between the Arctic and Antarctic outnumber the similarities, and thus the Antarctic
Treaty is an imperfect guide. Not only does the Antarctic lack the promise of
readily accessible hydrocarbon resources, but the southern polar reaches are also
removed from valuable trade routes and are far from any other continent. 165
Furthermore, the Arctic is an ocean while the Antarctic is a continent. The
solutions that allowed the peaceful division of land may not be as successful in
oceanic disputes over valuable waters.
While there are undeniable differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic,
they are similar in that they are both fragile ecosystems needing protection.
Moreover, the fact that the Arctic is closer to trade routes and continents means
that it is even more subject to dispute and clearly designated ownership is all the
more essential.
Undoubtedly, Arctic nations will have a difficult time
compromising, and it is possible that 'soft law' provisions may be the best way to
reach a compromise. Any decision made must not only balance the competing
sovereignty claims, but also assess long term environmental concerns as well.
CONCLUSION

The United States' persistent refusal to ratify UNCLOS is somewhat
surprising because the Convention's negotiations concluded in 1982 and every
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162. See, Rothwell, supra note 110, at 364-65. Antarctic Treaty supra note 159, art. IV.
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other major industrialized country has ratified it. 166 Presumably, the United States'
position is rooted in the negotiation of the Convention that took place in the
1970's. At that time, the UN proposed arrangements for the sharing of technical
mining information with a new International Seabed Authority.167 The United
States - a leader in the development of the technologies necessary for deep sea
mining - was unwilling to divulge its practices, and thus refused to sign the
Convention. 168 Even though the provision was dropped in 1994, the United States
has yet to endorse UNCLOS despite numerous calls for the ratification from within
the country and abroad. 169 It appears that a few U.S. Senators remain the last
holdouts of resistance to the Convention - blocking its ratification.
Can UNCLOS be considered a powerful international agreement if the United
States has not ratified it? Legitimacy relies on the internalization of external
standards to substantiate the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be
obeyed. In the international sphere, very few laws or organizations have obtained
recognition and approval of all countries. Because so few bodies govern the
relations between states, any breach to the legitimacy of those bodies is clearly
significant. Despite the destabilizing effect of the United States' non-ratification
of the UNCLOS, 157 countries and the European Community have joined in the
Convention.1 7 0
Moreover, in many areas, UNCLOS codifies preexisting
customary international law of the sea that the United States already recognizes.171
Therefore, while non-ratification may weaken the UNCLOS, at the moment, it
appears the rest of the world accepts the Convention as legitimate. UNCLOS will
play an essential role in resolving disagreements in the Arctic, and it is critical for
the United States ratify UNCLOS in the very near future.
This paper began with an explanation of climate change and Arctic ice melt
because predictions about future developments in the region rely on a basic
understanding of these forces. As the ice melts, the Northwest Passage and the
Northern Sea Route will become viable routes for summer shipping - opening the
region to a new reality. Merchants as well as politicians are calculating the
dangers as well as the potential cost reductions associated with northern shipping
routes. As the technology and infrastructure develop in the Arctic, it may become

166. "Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, etc.," Division for Ocean
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possible to utilize the region's rich natural resources. It is this prospect that has
generated the most excitement among Arctic nations and precipitates the need for
an effective legal regime in the area. It is my belief that UNCLOS and the
Commission on Continental Shelves can provide the legal mechanisms necessary
to delineate sovereignty over the continental shelves and ownership of the
resources that may be discovered there. UNCLOS will inform the debates about
the Northwest Passage; implicating the future of international trade. Finally, any
dispute resolution in the Arctic would likely either involve a UNCLOS body, such
as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or an application of UNCLOS
principles. The United States' non-ratification of the Convention acts as a major
roadblock to advancing its national interests and settling the controversies in the
region.
While it is probably already too late to prevent the Arctic ice melt, it is not too
late to effectively resolve the sovereignty issues the melt will create. Thus far, the
United States has not taken a significant role in the conflict or its resolution, but
this type of ambivalence cannot continue as disputes escalate. Many suggest the
United States join and support multilateral efforts that have already been
established. Dispute resolution will be certainly be complicated and controversial;
therefore, the full participation and engagement of all Arctic nations will be
necessary. A geographical transformation of this magnitude has never occurred in
the course of modem human history, and never has a physical change in landscape
freed so many natural resources or created such new potential for trade. Therefore,
it is essential that an adequate framework be developed to deal with these radical
changes, and it is obvious that the framework needs not only the cooperation, but
also the leadership of the United States.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Reviewed by LaraL. Griffith*
MICHAEL LEWIS, ERIC JENSEN, GEOFFREY CORN, VICTOR HANSEN, RICHARD
JACKSON AND JAMES SCHOETTLER,THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2009).

I. INTRODUCTION

The War on Terror and the Laws of War was written by a group of legal
scholars and professors who are equally as comfortable with the laws of war as
they are with the military field. Geoffrey Com, author of the introduction as well
as chapters on the application of the law to the war on terror, is currently an
Associate Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law. Corn graduated from
Hartwick College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, earned
his J.D. with highest honors at George Washington University, and served in the
U.S. Army for twenty-one years, finishing his career as a Lieutenant Colonel in the
Judge Advocate General's Corps.! Michael Lewis, author of perhaps the most
analytic chapter in the book, Battlefield Perspectives on the Laws of War,
graduated cum laude from Harvard Law School and continued on to have a 7-year
career flying F-14 fighter airplanes with the United States Navy.2 Lewis and his
other co-authors Victor M. Hansen, Dick Jackson, Eric Jensen and James
Schoettler, have extensive experience authoring literature on the laws of war.
Such sweeping military and academic experience is likely the reason for the
authors' comprehensive and meticulous analysis of the laws of war.
This is a book geared towards practicing lawyers; namely, as it became
evident through the progression of the book, to international lawyers and
practitioners dealing with the laws of war. An incredibly specific niche to which
the authors are directing their literature, the book's audience is expected to have a
baseline understanding of both the American legal system as well the interaction
between the military and the law during times of international conflict.

*Lara L. Griffith is a third-year law student at the University of Denver. She received a B.A. in Art
History from Washington University in St. Louis.
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II. THE LAWS OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICATION
The authors start blending the military and legal genres military and legal
immediately from the beginning of the book. The Introduction cites NATO
General James L. Jones's remark from 2003, stating that going to war was once a
task focused on leading combat forces, but now, "you have to have a lawyer or a
dozen. It's become very legalistic and very complex." 4 Thus, while the role of the
lawyer is established right from the beginning, the Introduction warns lawyers to
be weary of what they are dealing with. Professor Corn cautions his readership
that they, as lawyers, know the law rather than the technological intricacies of
modem warplanes. While he assumes his readers are knowledgeable, he notes that
the laws of war and the arena wherein they evolve are extraordinarily convoluted
and variable. The Forward of the book, then, sends a caution to lawyers: do not
step into unfamiliar waters and assume to understand how to navigate through
them. The authors of the book provide such a warning presumably to illustrate the
necessity of their book as a guide through this arena.
Professor Com follows the Introduction by authoring the first chapter entitled
What Law Applies to the War on Terror? He quickly sets the legal framework of
the entire book by distinguishing between a pre- and a post-9/11 legal and
militaristic structure. He explains how the September 11t attacks both created and
obliterated the categories of the laws of war. Up until that point, the only
framework that existed was either inter-state or intra-state war.5 Professor Com
explains that the paradigm shift began with the determination and categorization of
the "unlawful enemy combatant" and its effect on the pre-9/11 legal
configuration.

This term and its significance will be discussed later in this note.

Professor Com derives much of his framework from Common Articles 2 and 3 of
the Geneva Convention. It is clear, then, where his steep dichotomy comes from;
Article 2 conflicts are international armed conflicts which arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, and Article 3 conflicts are conflicts not of an
international character.8 Chapter 1 is devoted to establishing the difference
between these two types of conflicts, and emphasizing the enormous importance of
what rhetoric can do within the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
Much of the chapter is derived from Professor Com and co-author Eric Talbot
Jensen's previous article: Untying the Gordian Knott: A Proposalfor Determining
Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror.9 That article focuses on the
concept of "rules of engagement" and how those rules are broken into either statusbased rules or conduct-based rules. While that article brings its readers to a narrow
and esoteric view of the rules of engagement, the present book broadens and even
4. GEOFFREY S. CORN, ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR vii (2009).
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K33), Jan 14, 2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1083849.
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simplifies the scope of the argument. This is particularly evident when Professor
Corn concludes Chapter 1 by deriving his perspective from that of "the warrior."
The warrior's understanding, Corn writes, is "based on the pragmatic and simple
reality that authorization to engage an opponent based solely on a status
determination means the line has been crossed."10 Essentially, Professor Corn
anchors the idea of the very wartime framework he is promoting to the most
militaristic of all men in history, the warrior. With the weightiness and simplicity
of the warrior supporting the book's basic legal paradigm, the book is able to move
forward into more specified areas of the field.
Chapter Two focuses on the targeting of persons and property in war. It is
written by Eric Jensen, a Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army JAG Corps. The
chapter begins by laying out the history of the codification of the laws of war. The
chapter provides a concise background of where the rules came from for targeting
persons and property, explaining that regulations on specific weapons systems and
tactics grew in the post-World War II era.11 The authority for this chapter is found
in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (GPI). 12 Jensen uses the GPI to
methodically lay out three categories of individuals on the battlefield: combatants,
non-combatants, and civilians.13 He explains, however, how the category of
civilians can lose their immunity as civilians if they engage in conflict and turn
themselves into pseudo combatants. The analytical break down of the players on
the battlefield is a helpful academic tool for those unfamiliar with the layout of
war.
One of the most revealing portions of the book in terms of military operations
was the section in Chapter Two about the Air Force. The author explains how the
Air Force must calculate collateral damage before they can go ahead with a
targeted mission against combatants or civilian objects.14 The chapter delves into
soldiers' discretion, and segues into how targeting of transnational terrorists is an
entirely different playing field. Much of the rest of the book turns on the
revelation found in this chapter concerning how transnational armed terrorists do
not fit the definitions of any of the three categories of battlefield players listed
above. Thus, the now infamous label synonymous with the War on Terror and with
the then-reigning Bush Administration was born: "unlawful enemy combatants."
The authors made a noteworthy mention of an International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) study currently being conducted regarding whether civilians'
memberships in the armed wing of terrorist organizations will not only increase the
State's ability to respond to the threat, but will also reinforce fundamental
principles of the LOAC that are designed to protect those very civilians from the
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effects of the hostility.15 Why the study is not included in the references is unclear
and unfortunate, as the brief mention serves to pique the reader's interest.
Further, for all the discussion surrounding former President Bush's policy on
the detention of combatants in the war on terror, Chapter Three, entitled Detention
of Combatants and the Global War on Terror, is noticeably silent as to the
controversy. It is a refreshing change to read this chapter as it is entirely void of
judgment on the subject, and instead is wholly focused on the definitional status of
these individuals. While concurrent articles such as Stephanie Cooper Blum's The
Why and the How of Preventive Detention in the War on Terror1 6 aptly focus on
whether the Bush Administration's approach was unsound and unlawful, Jensen's
chapter solely focuses on dissecting the definition of combatants for purposes of
detention.
A useful and interesting section of Chapter Three, particularly to the lawyer
or law student is the Executive Branch Response and the following section of
Schoettler's Observations. It is a necessary part of the book where the author is
able to scrutinize the lessons learned from the litigation which ensued following
the president's detention of combatants in the war on terror. Schoettler emphasizes
the recurring concern from the Supreme Court that the Executive branch did not
exercise unchecked power when it came to indefinite detention of enemy
combatants. 17 A testament to Schoettler's partisan authorship, however, is that his
conclusion aligns itself only with keeping to the laws of armed conflict instead of
playing to a particular political angle.
III. TREATMENT AND TRIAL OF DETAINEES IN MILITARY COURTS

Chapters Four and Five focus on treatment and trial of detainees. This part of
the book appeals to the sensationalists because it describes interrogation techniques
and goes into detail about how such techniques violate virtually every human
rights treaty of which the United States is a party, the 8th Amendment, and the
uniform code of military justice." After a frustratingly circular, albeit entirely
accurate, analysis of how the amorphous standards became alarmingly susceptible
to abuse, resulting in investigations of misconduct and ultimately re-regulation
with the 2006 Department of Defense detainee program, the author leaves us with
the standards the military began with: minimum humane treatment of Article 3 of
the Geneva Convention. 19
Chapter Five brings the reader back to the warrior ideal, but instead of using it
for the legal and militaristic framework, this chapter describes how military courts
trying war crimes makes sense because it is akin to warriors judging warriors.
Again, the author goes through a somewhat circular history of how military courts
have ebbed and flowed throughout different conflicts. The author points out and
15. Id. at 59.
16. Stephanie Cooper Blum, The Why and How of Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 26
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 51, 56 (2009).
17. CORN, supranote 4, at 122.
18. See id.at 148.
19. Id.
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argues the most notable events in the progression of military courts: First,
President Bush's decision in November of 2006 to order a military commission for
terrorist operatives was justified by stating that the fight against al Qaeda was
sufficient to trigger LOAC application. 20 After its establishment, the Supreme
Court eventually ruled that the structure violated domestic and international law.21
More recently, changes have been made since President Obama's original plan to
fully shut down the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.22 Since the book's
publication, a task force, led by Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., has
recommended that thirty-five detainees face prosecution or military commission.23
While 110 detainees have been approved for transfer, the goal that President
Obama set when he took office in 2009 is far from being realized on the date
originally set for the facility's closure.24 The administration has decided that
approximately forty other detainees should be prosecuted for terrorism and related
war crimes even though it is still unclear whether these detainees should face a
civil trial or a military commission.25
Both of these chapters explain that while procedural limitations for detention
and prosecution of transnational terrorists is somewhat clear, substantive
jurisdiction for trials and interrogation is lacking in clarity. Such a lack of
substantive clarity is evidenced by one of the most recent decisions by Mr. Holder,
announcing that five detainees would face military commission and five others
would be prosecuted in federal court.26 The authors' conclusion at the end of
Chapter Five is both fitting and timely, in that it looks to the future and demands
"continuing observation and analysis," of these military courts and the decisions
that allow for prisoners to be held under their jurisdiction.27
IV. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BATTLEFIELD PERSPECTIVE

The final two chapters of the book, the first of which is devoted entirely to the
doctrine of command responsibility, and the second, a thorough analysis of the
battlefield perspective of the laws of war, provide for strong final chapters. One
commentator disparaged the book for not having a conclusion and proffered the
suggestion that a lack of conclusion means the war on terror "is something that will
keep the military busy for a while."28 While a conclusion to the entire book may
have been a helpful additive, each chapter's author provided insightful
observations in their own mini-conclusions. Such disparate topics do not provide
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. CBC News, Prosecute 35 Guantanamo Detainees: Task Force, CBC News, Jan 22, 2010,
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24. Id.
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2010, at A14, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22gitmo.html?partner-rss&emc-rss.
26. Id.
27. CORN, supranote 4, at 186.
28. Gentian Zyberi, Book Review - The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military
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perfect fodder for an ultimate conclusion, and reviewer Gentian Zyberi may be
correct in that a conclusion is preemptive because the war on terrorism is quite
evidently not near a conclusion.
The doctrine of command responsibility is analyzed in Chapter Six as having
a foundation in substantive criminal law principles. The author explains that
command responsibility does not refer to instances of direct liability; rather, it
based on "the principle of derivative imputed liability." 2 9 Explaining further, he
states that the commander's liability derives from his relationship with his soldiers
and the link between his act and the crimes committed by his subordinates.30
While this doctrine first seems esoteric and too particularized for this survey book,
the author ties in its codification with principles used against members of the
Taliban and other non-state actors. This chapter results being one of the most
edifying of the entire book, as the author describes how preoccupied commanders
are to be held within the doctrine. Rightfully so, as they are more likely to prevent
and suppress LOAC violations if they could be held liable in a criminal court for
their subordinates' violations. The true analysis, however, comes when the author
compares commanders in the United States Army to leaders of terrorist
organizations and how the latter find the doctrine entirely useless.31
V. CONCLUSION

As noted, while Chapter Seven, the final chapter, does not fully substitute for
a conclusion, it gives a thoughtful final nod to the complexities between military
operations and the laws of war. In summarizing what the reader should take from
this narrative, the author returns to the warrior ideal to produce two overall
principles. The first principle boils down to a simple epithet: warriors need rules. 32
Such a catch phrase is perhaps what the authors, collectively, would use if asked to
summarize their book in three words. The second take-away is that the laws of war
need to be clear and simple, and both given and received with confidence.33
Although Chapter Seven delves into more specifics of aviation and technology, the
chapter's worth is found in its brief explanation of the authors' intention in writing
the book. The ability to see the laws of war through a militaristic eye is an
invaluable perspective for lawyers and lawmakers alike. The authors of the book
present an incredibly thorough study of exceedingly pertinent information. Such a
task, in light of the ever-changing laws is daunting, but these authors have created
this book as an important tool as the war on terror presses forward.
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